Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1678 Delay Execution |
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware | The Gentlemen Ransomware has the functionality to delay for a specified number of minutes before file encryption. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
MalwareDEEPROOT | DEEPROOT has a delay function that is capable of sleeping before making subsequent requests. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has delayed C2 beaconing to longer intervals on network failures. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has waited for six seconds using the command `timeout /t 6`. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has planted backdoors that beacon silently for long-term persistence, activating them again after the victim has attempted eradication. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
MalwareInvisibleFerret | InvisibleFerret has the capability to scan for file names, file extensions, and avoids pre-designated path names and file types. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
MalwareMedusa Ransomware | Medusa Ransomware has avoided specified files, file extensions and folders to ensure successful execution of the payload and continued operations of the impacted device. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
MalwareDynoWiper | DynoWiper has recursively enumerated directories with the exception of the following: System32, Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), Temp, Recycle.Bin, $Recycle.Bin, Boot, PerfLogs, AppData, Documents and Settings. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
MalwareSameCoin | SameCoin can avoid overwriting file names that contain “desktop.ini” and “conf.conf." |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
MalwareEmbargo | Embargo has avoided encrypting specific files and directories by leveraging a regular expression within the ransomware binary. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
MalwareLazyWiper | LazyWiper can enumerate the hostname of the system to determine if it is a domain controller and exclude it from being wiped if so. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware | The Gentlemen Ransomware has excluded the `C:\` volume from scanning to reduce its likelihood of being detected during the encryption process using the PowerShell cmdlet `Add-MpPreference – ExclusionPath C:\ -Force`. The Gentlemen Ransomware has also excluded encryption of specified file names, and file extensions, to include those associated with critical system functionality. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `fsutil` to check available free space before executing actions that might create large files on disk. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered the local disks attached to the system and their hardware information including manufacturer and model. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 issued `ping -n 1 ((cmd /c dir c:\|findstr Number).split()[-1]+` commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has enumerated drives. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has discovered file system types, drive names, size, and free space on compromised systems. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupPatchwork | Patchwork enumerated all available drives on the victim's machine. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupTeamTNT | TeamTNT has searched for disk partition and logical volume information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupHigaisa | Higaisa collected the system volume serial number. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s system volume information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupConfucius | Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives, including those other than the C drive. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupChimera | Chimera has used `fsutil fsinfo drives`, `systeminfo`, and `vssadmin list shadows` for system information including shadow volumes and drive information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupToddyCat | ToddyCat has collected information on bootable drives including model, vendor, and serial numbers. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareBLINDINGCAN | BLINDINGCAN has collected disk information, including type and free space available. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareNinja | Ninja can obtain information on physical drives from targeted hosts. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareProxysvc | Proxysvc collects volume information for all drives on the system. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareTorisma | Torisma can use `GetlogicalDrives` to get a bitmask of all drives available on a compromised system. It can also use `GetDriveType` to determine if a new drive is a CD-ROM drive. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareNOKKI | NOKKI can gather information on drives on the victim’s machine. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
Malwareyty | yty gathers the the serial number of the main disk volume. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareKOPILUWAK | KOPILUWAK can discover logical drive information on compromised hosts. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareSardonic | Sardonic has the ability to collect the C:\ drive serial number from a compromised machine. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareKEYMARBLE | KEYMARBLE has the capability to collect information on disk devices. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareBankshot | Bankshot gathers disk type and disk free space. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareSharpDisco | SharpDisco can use a plugin to enumerate system drives. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareStrongPity | StrongPity can identify the hard disk volume serial number on a compromised host. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareNebulae | Nebulae can discover logical drive information including the drive type, free space, and volume information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareTONESHELL | TONESHELL has retrieved the disk serial number of the device using WMI query `SELECT volumeserialnumber FROM win32_logicaldisk where Name =’C:` to identify the victim machine. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareMedusa Ransomware | Medusa Ransomware has enumerated logical drives on infected hosts. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwaremacOS.OSAMiner | macOS.OSAMiner has checked to ensure there is enough disk space using the Unix utility `df`. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareAria-body | Aria-body has the ability to identify disk information on a compromised host. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareCrimson | Crimson contains a command to collect disk drive information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareDynoWiper | DynoWiper has used the Microsoft Windows native `GetLogicalDrives()` and `GetDriveType()` functions to enumerate all the drives visible to the system. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareAvenger | Avenger has the ability to identify the host volume ID. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwarePUBLOAD | PUBLOAD has leveraged `wmic logicaldisk get` to map local network drives. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareWoody RAT | Woody RAT can retrieve information about storage drives from an infected machine. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareMafalda | Mafalda can enumerate all drives on a compromised host. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
MalwareSUGARUSH | MoonWind can obtain the number of drives on the victim machine. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.