ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17636 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1678
Delay Execution
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware

The Gentlemen Ransomware has the functionality to delay for a specified number of minutes before file encryption.

T1678
Delay Execution
MalwareDEEPROOT

DEEPROOT has a delay function that is capable of sleeping before making subsequent requests.

T1678
Delay Execution
GroupAPT38

APT38 has delayed C2 beaconing to longer intervals on network failures.

T1678
Delay Execution
MalwareVidar

Vidar has waited for six seconds using the command `timeout /t 6`.

T1678
Delay Execution
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has planted backdoors that beacon silently for long-term persistence, activating them again after the victim has attempted eradication.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
MalwareInvisibleFerret

InvisibleFerret has the capability to scan for file names, file extensions, and avoids pre-designated path names and file types.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
MalwareMedusa Ransomware

Medusa Ransomware has avoided specified files, file extensions and folders to ensure successful execution of the payload and continued operations of the impacted device.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
MalwareDynoWiper

DynoWiper has recursively enumerated directories with the exception of the following: System32, Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), Temp, Recycle.Bin, $Recycle.Bin, Boot, PerfLogs, AppData, Documents and Settings.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
MalwareSameCoin

SameCoin can avoid overwriting file names that contain “desktop.ini” and “conf.conf."

T1679
Selective Exclusion
MalwareEmbargo

Embargo has avoided encrypting specific files and directories by leveraging a regular expression within the ransomware binary.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
MalwareLazyWiper

LazyWiper can enumerate the hostname of the system to determine if it is a domain controller and exclude it from being wiped if so.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware

The Gentlemen Ransomware has excluded the `C:\` volume from scanning to reduce its likelihood of being detected during the encryption process using the PowerShell cmdlet `Add-MpPreference – ExclusionPath C:\ -Force`. The Gentlemen Ransomware has also excluded encryption of specified file names, and file extensions, to include those associated with critical system functionality.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `fsutil` to check available free space before executing actions that might create large files on disk.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered the local disks attached to the system and their hardware information including manufacturer and model.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 issued `ping -n 1 ((cmd /c dir c:\|findstr Number).split()[-1]+` commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has enumerated drives.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupVolt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has discovered file system types, drive names, size, and free space on compromised systems.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupPatchwork

Patchwork enumerated all available drives on the victim's machine.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupTeamTNT

TeamTNT has searched for disk partition and logical volume information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupHigaisa

Higaisa collected the system volume serial number.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupTropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s system volume information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupConfucius

Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives, including those other than the C drive.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupChimera

Chimera has used `fsutil fsinfo drives`, `systeminfo`, and `vssadmin list shadows` for system information including shadow volumes and drive information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupToddyCat

ToddyCat has collected information on bootable drives including model, vendor, and serial numbers.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupLazarus Group

A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareBLINDINGCAN

BLINDINGCAN has collected disk information, including type and free space available.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareNinja

Ninja can obtain information on physical drives from targeted hosts.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareProxysvc

Proxysvc collects volume information for all drives on the system.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareTorisma

Torisma can use `GetlogicalDrives` to get a bitmask of all drives available on a compromised system. It can also use `GetDriveType` to determine if a new drive is a CD-ROM drive.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareNOKKI

NOKKI can gather information on drives on the victim’s machine.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
Malwareyty

yty gathers the the serial number of the main disk volume.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareKOPILUWAK

KOPILUWAK can discover logical drive information on compromised hosts.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareSardonic

Sardonic has the ability to collect the C:\ drive serial number from a compromised machine.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareKEYMARBLE

KEYMARBLE has the capability to collect information on disk devices.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareBankshot

Bankshot gathers disk type and disk free space.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareSharpDisco

SharpDisco can use a plugin to enumerate system drives.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareStrongPity

StrongPity can identify the hard disk volume serial number on a compromised host.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareNebulae

Nebulae can discover logical drive information including the drive type, free space, and volume information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareTONESHELL

TONESHELL has retrieved the disk serial number of the device using WMI query `SELECT volumeserialnumber FROM win32_logicaldisk where Name =’C:` to identify the victim machine.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareMedusa Ransomware

Medusa Ransomware has enumerated logical drives on infected hosts.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwaremacOS.OSAMiner

macOS.OSAMiner has checked to ensure there is enough disk space using the Unix utility `df`.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareAria-body

Aria-body has the ability to identify disk information on a compromised host.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareCrimson

Crimson contains a command to collect disk drive information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareDynoWiper

DynoWiper has used the Microsoft Windows native `GetLogicalDrives()` and `GetDriveType()` functions to enumerate all the drives visible to the system.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareAvenger

Avenger has the ability to identify the host volume ID.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwarePUBLOAD

PUBLOAD has leveraged `wmic logicaldisk get` to map local network drives.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareWoody RAT

Woody RAT can retrieve information about storage drives from an infected machine.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareMafalda

Mafalda can enumerate all drives on a compromised host.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareSUGARUSH

MoonWind can obtain the number of drives on the victim machine.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.