Khadgi, N. (n.d.). A Comprehensive Overview on Stealer Malware Families. Retrieved August 25, 2026.
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has masqueraded as a Microsoft Edge DLL. Vidar has masqueraded as MicrosoftUpdate.exe in the %TEMP% folder. Vidar has masqueraded as a Notepad++ installer named npp.Installer.x64.zip. Vidar has masqueraded as an executable named Setup.exe that mimics the legitimate Yahtzee application. |
| T1055.012 Process Hollowing |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used process hollowing to inject itself into an AppLaunch.exe process. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used PowerShell commands to modify Windows Defender’s list of excluded file extensions. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has self-deleted its initial executable to operate in memory. Vidar has deleted collected data after exfiltration. Vidar has also deleted the file Malware.exe and all .dll files in the ProgramData folder using the command `del /f /q “C:\Users\MalWorkstation\Desktop\Malware.exe” & |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used HTTP/HTTPS to retrieve and send data and beacons. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has compiled collected data into a randomly generated directory in the ProgramData folder. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has gathered hardware IDs (HWIDs) regarding the victim machine. Vidar has used `GetEnvironmentStringsW` and `GetModuleHandleExW` to gather information about the victim machine. Vidar has collected OS data from the victim machine. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has gathered information about files on the victim machine. Specifically, Vidar has used `FindFirstFileExW` and `FindNextFileW`. Vidar has attempted to read hidden system directories, such as `$Recycle.Bin`, `$Windows.~BT`, and `$SysReset`, and the `C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE` directory using the `ReadFile` function. Vidar has also accessed internal streams, such as `$SDH`, and has read Jump Lists, which include recently opened files, programs and tasks. |
| T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used Telegram and Steam dead drop resolvers to recover its C2 domain. |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has downloaded additional binaries from the C2 server such as sqlx[1].dll, a sqlite3 binary for data harvesting and exfiltration. Vidar has also ownloaded get.zip, an archive containing several DLL libraries that extracted data from applications and browsers. |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has set the Registry value associated with User Access Control (UAC) (i.e. `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA`) to `0`, which disabled UAC. |
| T1189 Drive-by Compromise |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has been distributed via malicious advertisements when users searched for “Notepad++.” |
| T1217 Browser Information Discovery |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has collected browser history from the victim machine. |
| T1489 Service Stop |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used the function `TerminateProcess` to terminate processes. Vidar has forcefully terminated a process named Devil.exe using the command `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe” /c taskkill /im Devil.exe /f`. |
| T1560.001 Archive via Utility |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has packaged collected data into a zip file before exfiltration. |
| T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used a hidden directory in the ProgramData directory to store collected data. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has waited for six seconds using the command `timeout /t 6`. |
| T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has modified Windows Defender’s list of excluded file extensions, ensuring that .exe, .dll and .bat files are ignored during scans. Vidar has loaded amsi.dll, which resolves the `AmsiScanBuffer` variable to return `E_INVALIDARG`, which may disable Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.