ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17636 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareDarkComet

DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like the Windows Firewall.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareRemsec

Remsec can add or remove applications or ports on the Windows firewall or disable it entirely.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareTYPEFRAME

TYPEFRAME can open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareBADCALL

BADCALL disables the Windows firewall before binding to a port.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareHiddenFace

HiddenFace can reconfigure Windows firewalls to enable communication by adding a rule named “Cortana” to allow inbound connection to TCP/47000.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareHARDRAIN

HARDRAIN opens the Windows Firewall to modify incoming connections.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwarenjRAT

njRAT has modified the Windows firewall to allow itself to communicate through the firewall.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareH1N1

H1N1 kills and disables services for Windows Firewall.

T1686.003
Windows Host Firewall
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware

The Gentlemen Ransomware has modified windows firewall rules to allow for discovery actions using `netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=”Network Discovery” new enable=Yes` and using the PowerShell command `-Command Get-NetFirewall Rule -DisplayGroup “Network Discovery” | Enable-NetFirewallRule`. The Gentlemen Ransomware has also modified firewall rules to allow remote desktop access using the command `netsh firewall set service type remotedesktop mode enable` or `netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group="remote desktop" new enable=Yes`. The Gentlemen Ransomware has also deactivated Windows firewall rules using the command ` netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off`. The Gentlemen Ransomware has disabled the Windows Firewall settings using the PowerShell cmdlet `powershell -Command Set-NetFirewallProfile -Profile Domain,Public,Private -Enabled False`.

T1688
Safe Mode Boot
MalwareAvosLocker

AvosLocker can restart a compromised machine in safe mode.

T1688
Safe Mode Boot
MalwareRansomHub

RansomHub can reboot targeted systems into Safe Mode prior to encryption.

T1688
Safe Mode Boot
MalwareLockBit 3.0

LockBit 3.0 can reboot the infected host into Safe Mode.

T1688
Safe Mode Boot
MalwareEmbargo

Embargo has used a DLL variant of MDeployer to disable security solutions through Safe Mode.

T1688
Safe Mode Boot
MalwareBlack Basta

Black Basta can reboot victim machines in safe mode with networking via `bcdedit /set safeboot network`.

T1688
Safe Mode Boot
MalwareREvil

REvil can force a reboot in safe mode with networking.

T1688
Safe Mode Boot
MalwareQilin

Qilin can reboot targeted systems in safe mode to avoid detection.

T1689
Downgrade Attack
CampaignFrostyGoop Incident

During FrostyGoop Incident, the adversary downgraded firmware on victim devices in order to impair visibility into the process environment.

T1689
Downgrade Attack
MalwareBlackByte Ransomware

BlackByte Ransomware enables SMBv1 during execution.

T1689
Downgrade Attack
ToolSILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can downgrade NTLM to capture NTLM hashes.

T1689
Downgrade Attack
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware

The Gentlemen Ransomware has used the following command to re-enable SMB1: `Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol -NoRestart`.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware to clear the `HISTFILE` environmental variable and to inject into Junos OS processes to inhibit logging.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included disabling logging on targeted Cisco ASA appliances.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
GroupAPT38

APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.
APT38 has prevented logging and muted error logs through the use of `/dev/null 2>&1 &`.
APT38 has also executed scripts to delete the PowerShell command history file and to prevent future history recording using `-Force Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing`.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
GroupUNC3886

UNC3886 has tampered with and disabled logging services on targeted systems.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
GroupSea Turtle

Sea Turtle unset the Bash and MySQL history files on victim systems.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has removed PowerShell command history through the use of the PSReadLine module by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
MalwareBRICKSTORM

BRICKSTORM has impaired command logging through the use of `dev/null` which prevents generating output from the command and does not wait for input.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
MalwareLine Dancer

Line Dancer can disable syslog on compromised devices.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
MalwareBPFDoor

BPFDoor sets the `MYSQL_HISTFILE` and `HISTFILE` to `/dev/null` preventing the shell and MySQL from logging history in `/proc/<PID>/environ`.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
MalwareSPAWNCHIMERA

SPAWNCHIMERA has disabled logging and log forwarding on Ivanti devices targeting the `dslogserver` process.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
MalwareVIRTUALPITA

VIRTUALPITA can impair logging by setting the `HISTFILE` environmental variable to `0` and stopping the `vmsyslogd` service.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
ToolSILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can bypass ScriptBlock logging to execute unmanaged PowerShell code from memory.

T1690
Prevent Command History Logging
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware

The Gentlemen Ransomware has prevented command logging through the use of `/dev/null 2 &1` that silences output and discards any written data.

T1697
Steal Application Specific Passwords
GroupAPT42

APT42 has stolen application specific passwords in order to bypass MFA requirements to include victim environments who leverage the Microsoft App Password feature.

T1699
Direct Prompt Injection
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign

During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary entered a prompt that claimed the user was an employee of a cybersecurity firm and that Claude was being used for defensive cybersecurity testing to authorize restricted operations.

T1699
Direct Prompt Injection
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary abused Claude Code by utilizing a file-write operation within the prompt that created a `claude.md` file that contained a pre-written 1,084-line document containing penetration testing scripts that were used in the campaign.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.