APT38

G0082

Threat group.View on attack.mitre.org

About this group

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, Bancomext and Banco de Chile , along with software supply chain compromises and destructive malware attacks.

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

Techniques used115

Procedure examples115

TechniqueProcedure example
T1005
Data from Local System

APT38 has collected data from a compromised host.

T1012
Query Registry

APT38 has run node.js malware to query the Registry to discover installed software.

T1027.002
Software Packing

APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium, to pack their implants.

T1027.010
Command Obfuscation

APT38 has utilized Base64 encoded PowerShell scripts.

T1027.015
Compression

APT38 has compressed its malicious payloads in ZIP files for delivery to victims.

T1027.016
Junk Code Insertion

APT38 has added thousands of blank lines to scripts to push malicious logic past the scrollable view of the script editor.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery

APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users. APT38 has run malware to enumerate the current user on compromised hosts.

T1036.003
Rename Legitimate Utilities

APT38 has renamed system utilities, such as `rundll32.exe` and `mshta.exe`, to avoid detection.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

APT38 has named malicious payloads as benign-looking executables to blend in the environment including Run keys, npm packages, and JavaScript utilities often using names mirroring Apple, Windows, or other native system files.

T1036.006
Space after Filename

APT38 has put several spaces before a file extension to avoid detection and suspicion.

T1036.008
Masquerade File Type

APT38 has configured malware to rename malicious payloads with naming conventions that reduce a chance of detection to include renaming “package.md” to “package.json”.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

APT38 has exfiltrated victim device and user details contained in a POST request to register the compromised system with C2 infrastructure.

T1048.002
Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol

APT38 has used malware to exfiltrate stolen data with a custom ICAP-style protocol over HTTPS.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery

APT38 installed a port monitoring tool, MAPMAKER, to print the active TCP connections on the local system.

T1053.003
Cron

APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.

View all 115 procedure examples

Software6

Campaigns0

None recorded.

References7

  1. CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020 Open source
    DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
  2. DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021 Open source
    Department of Justice. (2021, February 17). Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2021.
  3. FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 Open source
    FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  4. Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 Open source
    GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
  5. MIcrosoft Mastra npm Compromise JUN 2026 Open source
    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, June 17). From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet. Retrieved September 30, 2026.
  6. Microsoft Axios Compromise APR 2026 Open source
    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 1). Mitigating the Axios npm supply chain compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.
  7. Microsoft Sapphire Sleet APR 2026 Open source
    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, April 16). Dissecting Sapphire Sleet’s macOS intrusion from lure to compromise. Retrieved September 30, 2026.

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