Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2026, June 17). From package to postinstall payload: Inside the Mastra npm supply chain compromise by Sapphire Sleet. Retrieved September 30, 2026.
Published
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1012 Query Registry |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has run node.js malware to query the Registry to discover installed software. |
| T1027.010 Command Obfuscation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has utilized Base64 encoded PowerShell scripts. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users. APT38 has run malware to enumerate the current user on compromised hosts. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has named malicious payloads as benign-looking executables to blend in the environment including Run keys, npm packages, and JavaScript utilities often using names mirroring Apple, Windows, or other native system files. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has exfiltrated victim device and user details contained in a POST request to register the compromised system with C2 infrastructure. |
| T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used malware to exfiltrate stolen data with a custom ICAP-style protocol over HTTPS. |
| T1053.006 Systemd Timers |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used a multiplatform implant that can write to `~/.config/systemd/nvmconf/` to gain persistence on Linux hosts. |
| T1056.002 GUI Input Capture |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has leveraged a fictitious native macOS password dialog prompt to entice victims to enter credentials. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 leveraged Sysmon to understand the processes, services in the organization. APT38 has used Python versions of its remote access tools on Linux targets. APT38 has also configured malicious payloads to gather running processes using `ps aux`. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used PowerShell to execute commands and other operational tasks. |
| T1059.003 Windows Command Shell |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used a command-line tunneler, NACHOCHEESE, to give them shell access to a victim’s machine. Additionally, APT38 has used batch scripts. APT38 has also executed scripts to launch `cmd.exe` to POST stolen data to actor-controlled domains. |
| T1059.007 JavaScript |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has utilized malicious JavaScript payloads to compromise victims. |
| T1070.003 Clear Command History |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has executed scripts to delete the PowerShell command history file. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has staged files in a central location prior to exfiltration. |
| T1078.004 Cloud Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used victim maintainer accounts for the npm Registry to publish malicious packages. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has attempted to get detailed information about a compromised host, including the operating system, version, patches, hotfixes, and service packs. APT38 has executed malware to collect current user, host name, system time, and operating system install date from targeted systems. |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 used a backdoor, NESTEGG, that has the capability to download and upload files to and from a victim’s machine. Additionally, APT38 has downloaded other payloads onto a victim’s machine. APT38 has also injected npm packages with malicious dependencies that download second-stage payloads to victim machines. |
| T1132.001 Standard Encoding |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has utilized Base64 encoded HTTP POST communications to C2. |
| T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used the RC4 algorithm to decrypt configuration data. APT38 has decocoded Base64 encoded PowerShell scripts prior to execution. |
| T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has injected malicious dependencies into software packages such as Axios and Mastra npm packages. |
| T1204.001 Malicious Link |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used links to execute a malicious Visual Basic script. APT38 has directed users to navigate to a website under adversary control through the sharing of links in messages. |
| T1217 Browser Information Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources. APT38 has also used malware capable of enumerating 166 unique cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, and browser history. |
| T1518 Software Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has enumerated installed applications to build an inventory of the system’s software environment. |
| T1518.001 Security Software Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has identified security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors installed on a compromised system. APT38 has also executed malware implants to enumerate all installed applications on Windows hosts including installed security products. |
| T1543.001 Launch Agent |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has executed a multiplatform implant that placed launch agents in ~/Library/NodePackages/ to establish persistence on macOS. |
| T1543.003 Windows Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has installed a new Windows service to establish persistence. APT38 has gained persistence on compromised systems independent of user logon by creating a background service using `sc create scdev binPath= "c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k scdev". |
| T1546.016 Installer Packages |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has poisoned Axios and Mastra npm packages with malicious post-install hooks. |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has also added registry run keys within `HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MicrosoftUpdate` to enable persistence on Windows devices after reboot. APT38 has executed a multiplatform implant that dropped a Registry Run key to `:\ProgramData\NodePackages\` for persistence on Windows machines. APT38 has obtained boot- persistence on compromised systems independent of user logon by adding the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\scdev\Parameters`. |
| T1548.006 TCC Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to rename the folder `com.apple.TCC`, then used another process to move the `TCC.db` file to a new location, where SQLite3 was used to edit `TCC.db`. The edited `TCC.db` file allowed code signing authorization, permission access, etc. without requiring a user prompt. |
| T1552.003 Shell History |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has gathered data and credentials stored in Shell History. |
| T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has gathered Web browser data to include saved credentials, cookies, bookmarks, autofill data, and extension-specific storage. APT38 has also sought cryptocurrency wallet extensions. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has configured malicious scripts to execute in hidden windows. |
| T1564.012 File/Path Exclusions |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has added Microsoft Defender exclusions to include `C:\Windows\System32` to suppress detection of dropped tooling. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used social media sites such as LinkedIn to send malicious links to potential vicitims. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has exfiltrated stolen credentials to actor-controlled infrastructure leveraging Telegram Bot API. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts. APT38 has also installed a persistent service on targeted hosts to load malicious DLLs at boot. |
| T1571 Non-Standard Port |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has leveraged unique non-standard ports for communications with actor-controlled C2 infrastructure to include Port 8000. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has created fake domains to imitate legitimate venture capital or bank domains. APT38 has acquired domains to host fake skill assessments leading to malware download. APT38 has registered domains that masquerade as financial institutions and resemble legitimate services. APT38 has also obtained C2 domains to host second-stage malicious payloads. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used virtual private server (VPS) providers to host C2 infrastructure including Hostwinds. |
| T1583.006 Web Services |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used OneDrive and GoogleDrive to host malicious files. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used professional platforms such as LinkedIn to contact potential victims. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has set up anonymous emails to use in publishing poisoned software packages such as sergey2016@tutamail[.]com. |
| T1586.003 Cloud Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used virtual private server (VPS) providers to host C2 infrastructure including Hostwinds. |
| T1608.001 Upload Malware |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has uploaded malware to cloud storage services for download by targeted victims. |
| T1620 Reflective Code Loading |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has configured malicious payloads to reflectively load using the macOS `NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory` API. |
| T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has poisoned npm packages with fake runtime dependencies to trigger execution of malicious payloads on developer endpoints or continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) systems during npm installation or update. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has delayed C2 beaconing to longer intervals on network failures. |
| T1690 Prevent Command History Logging |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.