Sub-technique of T1078 Valid Accounts.View on attack.mitre.org
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.
An adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
Cloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods. For example, in Azure environments, adversaries may target Azure Managed Identities, which allow associated Azure resources to request access tokens. By compromising a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, adversaries may be able to Steal Application Access Tokens to move laterally across the cloud environment.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1078.004.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupAPT28 | APT28 has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes. |
| GroupAPT29 | APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD and has used `Service Principal` credentials in Exchange. |
| GroupAPT33 | APT33 has used compromised Office 365 accounts in tandem with Ruler in an attempt to gain control of endpoints. |
| GroupAPT5 | APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials. |
| GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has abused service principals in compromised environments to enable data exfiltration. |
| GroupKe3chang | Ke3chang has used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts. |
| GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials to access cloud assets within a target organization. |
| GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has used compromised Microsoft Entra ID accounts to pivot in victim environments. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareMini Shai-Hulud | Mini Shai-Hulud has used compromised accounts for Docker Hub and GitHub to publish malicious software packages. |
| ToolPacu | Pacu leverages valid cloud accounts to perform most of its operations. |
| ToolPeirates | Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations. |
| ToolROADTools | ROADTools leverages valid cloud credentials to perform enumeration operations using the internal Azure AD Graph API. |
| MalwareShai-Hulud | Shai-Hulud has leveraged compromised accounts to log into cloud services to access cloud hosted repositories. |
| ToolTruffleHog | TruffleHog has used stolen credentials to log into cloud services to access cloud hosted repositories and other cloud storage solutions to discover sensitive data to include API Keys, tokens and credentials. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged stolen credentials from on-premises environments to access cloud services. |
| CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider leveraged compromised credentials from victim users to authenticate to Azure tenants. |
| CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
