FBI. (2026, March 20). FBI Flash: FLASH-20260320-001:Government of Iran Cyber Actors Deploy Telegram C2 to Push Malware to Identified Targets. Retrieved April 20, 2026.
Not cited by any technique.
None recorded.
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1005 Data from Local System |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has collected cached data and files from within the victim environment. |
| T1027.015 Compression |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has compressed their payloads by leveraging zip files. |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded as commonly used programs and services on Windows hosts. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded malicious payloads to resemble legitimate applications. VOID MANTICORE has leveraged malicious payloads that use nomenclature associated with common applications that include Pictory, KeePass, WhatsApp, and Telegram. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized PowerShell to execute malware in victim environments. |
| T1059.006 Python |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized Python scripts to execute its malicious payloads. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized HTTPS for communication to C2 domains. |
| T1074 Data Staged |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has staged compressed files in specified locations prior to exfiltration over C2. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has gathered system information and disseminated it back to C2. |
| T1102 Web Service |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized Telegram API for C2. |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has deployed additional payloads from dedicated C2 servers. VOID MANTICORE has also downloaded legitimate tools and software from publicly available services. VOID MANTICORE had utilized VeraCrypt a legitimate disk encrypting utility that was downloaded directly from the website. |
| T1113 Screen Capture |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has captured screen content during an active Zoom session. |
| T1123 Audio Capture |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has gathered audio during a Zoom session. |
| T1125 Video Capture |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has collected video from compromised victim devices. |
| T1204.002 Malicious File |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has delivered malicious payloads that initiate through user execution to include interaction with a masqueraded file. VOID MANTICORE has used trojanized application lures to induce targets into executing malware enabling persistent surveillance. |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has created Windows Registry entries to autorun stage two malware payloads to maintain persistence. |
| T1560.001 Archive via Utility |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has stored collected data in a password protected compressed file prior to exfiltration. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized PowerShell scripts that run without notifying the user of its execution to include `-nop -w hidden- ep bypass -enc`. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has registered domains for messaging purposes. VOID MANTICORE has created typosquatted domains and sub-domains in attempts to avoid detection or draw suspicion. VOID MANTICORE has also purchased domains leveraging cryptocurrency platforms to include LiteCoin and Ramzinex. VOID MANTICORE has registered and rotated domains to support public-facing dissemination infrastructure, replacing disrupted domains with new registrations. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has created Telegram Accounts. VOID MANTICORE has also leveraged online personas such as Handala Hack, Karma, and Homeland Justice on social media to include Telegram. VOID MANTICORE has established and maintained social media accounts on Twitter/X and Telegram to amplify operational claims and stolen data disclosures. |
| T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has gathered details on their intended victims to aid in social engineering efforts for leveraging tailored themes of attacks. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection. |
| T1684.001 Impersonation |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has impersonated individuals familiar to the victim and technical support associated with social messaging services. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.