Technique with 2 sub-techniques.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.
Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1074 or one of its sub-techniques.
| Rule | Level | Log source | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|
| Folder Compress To Potentially Suspicious Output Via Compress-Archive Cmdlet | medium | windows / process_creation | T1074.001 |
| Google Full Network Traffic Packet Capture | medium | gcp / NULL | T1074 |
| Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Module | medium | windows / ps_module | T1074.001 |
| Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell | medium | windows / NULL | T1074.001 |
| Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Script | medium | windows / ps_script | T1074.001 |
| Cisco Stage Data | low | cisco / NULL | T1074 |
| Rule | Type | Risk | Data source | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shai-Hulud 2 Exfiltration Artifact Files | TTP | NULL | Sysmon for Linux EventID 11, Sysmon EventID 11 | T1074.001 |
| Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior | TTP | NULL | Sysmon EventID 1, Windows Event Log Security 4688, CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | T1074 |
None recorded.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupINC Ransom | INC Ransom has staged data on compromised hosts prior to exfiltration. |
| GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider stages data in a centralized database prior to exfiltration. |
| GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has staged compressed files in specified locations prior to exfiltration over C2. |
| GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has staged collected data in password-protected archives. |
| GroupWizard Spider | Wizard Spider has collected and staged credentials and network enumeration information, using the networkdll and psfin TrickBot modules. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareKevin | Kevin can create directories to store logs and other collected data. |
| MalwareKobalos | Kobalos can write captured SSH connection credentials to a file under the |
| MalwareQUIETCANARY | QUIETCANARY has the ability to stage data prior to exfiltration. |
| MalwareShark | Shark has stored information in folders named `U1` and `U2` prior to exfiltration. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
