Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used `wevtutil.exe` and the PowerShell command `Get-EventLog security` to enumerate Windows logs to search for successful logons. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used Wevtutil to gather Windows Security Event Logs. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
GroupAquatic Panda | Aquatic Panda enumerated logs related to authentication in Linux environments prior to deleting selective entries for defense evasion purposes. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
GroupEmber Bear | Ember Bear has enumerated SECURITY and SYSTEM log files during intrusions. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
GroupAPT5 | APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to parse and extract information from Pulse Secure Connect logs. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to self-fund operations including the acquisition of infrastructure. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupAppleJeus | AppleJeus has targeted the cryptocurrency industry with the goal of stealing digital assets. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has deployed ransomware on compromised hosts and threatened to leak stolen data for financial gain. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has stolen cryptocurrency wallet credentials and credit card information utilizing BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware. ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025Esentire ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024 |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupAkira | Akira engages in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, in order to prompt victims to pay a ransom. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupSilverTerrier | SilverTerrier targets organizations in high technology, higher education, and manufacturing for business email compromise (BEC) campaigns with the goal of financial theft. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has engaged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating data and directly contacting victims when the primary organization refuses to pay along with posting data on their data leak sites. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupCinnamon Tempest | Cinnamon Tempest has maintained leak sites for exfiltrated data in attempt to extort victims into paying a ransom. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupWater Galura | Water Galura has extorted victims for ransomware decryption keys and to prevent publication of data exfiltrated to their Tor data leak site. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupMalteiro | Malteiro targets organizations in a wide variety of sectors via the use of Mispadu banking trojan with the goal of financial theft. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupINC Ransom | INC Ransom has stolen and encrypted victim's data in order to extort payment for keeping it private or decrypting it. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has conducted data exfiltration and posted stolen information on data leak sites for the purposes of financial and political extortion. VOID MANTICORE has also sold stolen data to prospective buyers for cryptocurrency. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupPlay | Play demands ransom payments from victims to unencrypt filesystems and to not publish sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has observed the victim's software and infrastructure over several months to understand the technical process of legitimate financial transactions, prior to attempting to conduct fraudulent transactions. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has engaged in cryptocurrency mining and theft. TeamPCP has also partnered with ransomware and data theft extortion groups, sold leaked code, and crowdsourced supply chain compromises by open-sourcing their Mini Shai-Hulud malware. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has called or sent text messages or emails to employees of victim organizations to demand payment in Bitcoin within 72 hours. Email addresses used in extortion activities include shinycorp@tuta[.]com, shinygroup@tuta[.]com, shinycorp@tutanota[.]com, and shinygroup@onionmail[.]com. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has conducted cryptocurrency theft. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
GroupThe Gentlemen | The Gentlemen has used double-extortion tactics to sway victims to pay a ransom to include exfiltrating sensitive data, encrypting files, and threatening public release if a payment is not received. |
| T1659 Content Injection |
GroupMoustachedBouncer | MoustachedBouncer has injected content into DNS, HTTP, and SMB replies to redirect specifically-targeted victims to a fake Windows Update page to download malware. |
| T1665 Hide Infrastructure |
GroupZIRCONIUM | ZIRCONIUM has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network – consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) – to obfuscate the origin of C2 traffic. |
| T1665 Hide Infrastructure |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 uses compromised residential endpoints, typically within the same ISP IP address range, as proxies to hide the true source of C2 traffic. |
| T1667 Email Bombing |
GroupStorm-1811 | Storm-1811 has deployed large volumes of non-malicious email spam to victims in order to prompt follow-on interactions with the threat actor posing as IT support or helpdesk to resolve the problem. |
| T1669 Wi-Fi Networks |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 has exploited open Wi-Fi access points for initial access to target devices using the network. |
| T1673 Virtual Machine Discovery |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has used scripts to enumerate ESXi hypervisors and their guest VMs. |
| T1674 Input Injection |
GroupFIN7 | FIN7 has used malicious USBs to emulate keystrokes to launch PowerShell to download and execute malware from the adversary's server. |
| T1675 ESXi Administration Command |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 used `vmtoolsd.exe` to run commands on guest virtual machines from a compromised ESXi host. |
| T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has compromised trusted CI/CD pipelines by injecting credential-stealing payloads into legitimate workflows and software packages including open-source security tools Trivy and KICS, and AI gateway LiteLLM. Aikido TeamPCP Telnyx MAR 2026Aqua Security Blog Trivy Compromise APR 2026Aqua Security Trivy Compromise MAR 2026FBI TeamPCP JUL 2026Flashpoint Mini Shai-Hulud MAY 2026Google AI Threat Tracker MAY 2026Hunt.io TeamPCP Toolkit MAY 2026Palo Alto TeamPCP MAR 2026Phoenix TeamPCP 20 MAY 2026Sysdig TeamPCP MAR 2026Trend Micro TeamPCP MAY 2026Wiz Mini Shai-Hulud MAY 2026Wiz TeamPCP KICS MAR 2026Wiz Trivy Compromise MAR 2026 |
| T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has poisoned npm packages with fake runtime dependencies to trigger execution of malicious payloads on developer endpoints or continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) systems during npm installation or update. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has utilized the Sleep function to ensure execution of scripts. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has delayed the execution of payloads leveraging ping echo requests `cmd /c ping 8.8.8.8 -n 70&&"%temp%\<legitimate executable>"`. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has delayed C2 beaconing to longer intervals on network failures. |
| T1678 Delay Execution |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has planted backdoors that beacon silently for long-term persistence, activating them again after the victim has attempted eradication. |
| T1679 Selective Exclusion |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has enumerated drives. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has discovered file system types, drive names, size, and free space on compromised systems. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupPatchwork | Patchwork enumerated all available drives on the victim's machine. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupTeamTNT | TeamTNT has searched for disk partition and logical volume information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupHigaisa | Higaisa collected the system volume serial number. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s system volume information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupConfucius | Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives, including those other than the C drive. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupChimera | Chimera has used `fsutil fsinfo drives`, `systeminfo`, and `vssadmin list shadows` for system information including shadow volumes and drive information. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupToddyCat | ToddyCat has collected information on bootable drives including model, vendor, and serial numbers. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server. |
| T1681 Search Threat Vendor Data |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has replaced indicators mentioned in open-source threat intelligence publications at times under a week after their release. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.