ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

4815 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1654
Log Enumeration
GroupVolt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has used `wevtutil.exe` and the PowerShell command `Get-EventLog security` to enumerate Windows logs to search for successful logons.

T1654
Log Enumeration
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has used Wevtutil to gather Windows Security Event Logs.

T1654
Log Enumeration
GroupAquatic Panda

Aquatic Panda enumerated logs related to authentication in Linux environments prior to deleting selective entries for defense evasion purposes.

T1654
Log Enumeration
GroupEmber Bear

Ember Bear has enumerated SECURITY and SYSTEM log files during intrusions.

T1654
Log Enumeration
GroupAPT5

APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to parse and extract information from Pulse Secure Connect logs.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to self-fund operations including the acquisition of infrastructure.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupAppleJeus

AppleJeus has targeted the cryptocurrency industry with the goal of stealing digital assets.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupScattered Spider

Scattered Spider has deployed ransomware on compromised hosts and threatened to leak stolen data for financial gain.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has stolen cryptocurrency wallet credentials and credit card information utilizing BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupAkira

Akira engages in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, in order to prompt victims to pay a ransom.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupSilverTerrier

SilverTerrier targets organizations in high technology, higher education, and manufacturing for business email compromise (BEC) campaigns with the goal of financial theft.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupStorm-0501

Storm-0501 has engaged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating data and directly contacting victims when the primary organization refuses to pay along with posting data on their data leak sites.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupCinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has maintained leak sites for exfiltrated data in attempt to extort victims into paying a ransom.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupWater Galura

Water Galura has extorted victims for ransomware decryption keys and to prevent publication of data exfiltrated to their Tor data leak site.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupMalteiro

Malteiro targets organizations in a wide variety of sectors via the use of Mispadu banking trojan with the goal of financial theft.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupINC Ransom

INC Ransom has stolen and encrypted victim's data in order to extort payment for keeping it private or decrypting it.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has conducted data exfiltration and posted stolen information on data leak sites for the purposes of financial and political extortion. VOID MANTICORE has also sold stolen data to prospective buyers for cryptocurrency.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupPlay

Play demands ransom payments from victims to unencrypt filesystems and to not publish sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupFIN13

FIN13 has observed the victim's software and infrastructure over several months to understand the technical process of legitimate financial transactions, prior to attempting to conduct fraudulent transactions.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has engaged in cryptocurrency mining and theft. TeamPCP has also partnered with ransomware and data theft extortion groups, sold leaked code, and crowdsourced supply chain compromises by open-sourcing their Mini Shai-Hulud malware.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupShinyHunters

ShinyHunters has called or sent text messages or emails to employees of victim organizations to demand payment in Bitcoin within 72 hours. Email addresses used in extortion activities include shinycorp@tuta[.]com, shinygroup@tuta[.]com, shinycorp@tutanota[.]com, and shinygroup@onionmail[.]com.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupAPT38

APT38 has conducted cryptocurrency theft.

T1657
Financial Theft
GroupThe Gentlemen

The Gentlemen has used double-extortion tactics to sway victims to pay a ransom to include exfiltrating sensitive data, encrypting files, and threatening public release if a payment is not received.

T1659
Content Injection
GroupMoustachedBouncer

MoustachedBouncer has injected content into DNS, HTTP, and SMB replies to redirect specifically-targeted victims to a fake Windows Update page to download malware.

T1665
Hide Infrastructure
GroupZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network – consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) – to obfuscate the origin of C2 traffic.

T1665
Hide Infrastructure
GroupAPT29

APT29 uses compromised residential endpoints, typically within the same ISP IP address range, as proxies to hide the true source of C2 traffic.

T1667
Email Bombing
GroupStorm-1811

Storm-1811 has deployed large volumes of non-malicious email spam to victims in order to prompt follow-on interactions with the threat actor posing as IT support or helpdesk to resolve the problem.

T1669
Wi-Fi Networks
GroupAPT28

APT28 has exploited open Wi-Fi access points for initial access to target devices using the network.

T1673
Virtual Machine Discovery
GroupUNC3886

UNC3886 has used scripts to enumerate ESXi hypervisors and their guest VMs.

T1674
Input Injection
GroupFIN7

FIN7 has used malicious USBs to emulate keystrokes to launch PowerShell to download and execute malware from the adversary's server.

T1675
ESXi Administration Command
GroupUNC3886

UNC3886 used `vmtoolsd.exe` to run commands on guest virtual machines from a compromised ESXi host.

T1677
Poisoned Pipeline Execution
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has compromised trusted CI/CD pipelines by injecting credential-stealing payloads into legitimate workflows and software packages including open-source security tools Trivy and KICS, and AI gateway LiteLLM.

T1677
Poisoned Pipeline Execution
GroupAPT38

APT38 has poisoned npm packages with fake runtime dependencies to trigger execution of malicious payloads on developer endpoints or continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) systems during npm installation or update.

T1678
Delay Execution
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has utilized the Sleep function to ensure execution of scripts.

T1678
Delay Execution
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has delayed the execution of payloads leveraging ping echo requests `cmd /c ping 8.8.8.8 -n 70&&"%temp%\<legitimate executable>"`.

T1678
Delay Execution
GroupAPT38

APT38 has delayed C2 beaconing to longer intervals on network failures.

T1678
Delay Execution
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has planted backdoors that beacon silently for long-term persistence, activating them again after the victim has attempted eradication.

T1679
Selective Exclusion
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has enumerated drives.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupVolt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has discovered file system types, drive names, size, and free space on compromised systems.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupPatchwork

Patchwork enumerated all available drives on the victim's machine.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupTeamTNT

TeamTNT has searched for disk partition and logical volume information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupHigaisa

Higaisa collected the system volume serial number.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupTropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s system volume information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupConfucius

Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives, including those other than the C drive.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupChimera

Chimera has used `fsutil fsinfo drives`, `systeminfo`, and `vssadmin list shadows` for system information including shadow volumes and drive information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupToddyCat

ToddyCat has collected information on bootable drives including model, vendor, and serial numbers.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
GroupLazarus Group

A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.

T1681
Search Threat Vendor Data
GroupUNC3886

UNC3886 has replaced indicators mentioned in open-source threat intelligence publications at times under a week after their release.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.