ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17636 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1583.001
Domains
MalwareDarkGate

DarkGate command and control includes hard-coded domains in the malware chosen to masquerade as legitimate services such as Akamai CDN or Amazon Web Services.

T1583.001
Domains
MalwareXLoader

XLoader can utilize hardcoded command and control domain configurations created by the XLoader authors. These are designed to mimic domain registrars and hosting service providers such as Hostinger and Namecheap.

T1583.001
Domains
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has registered domains resembling legitimate victim sites such as scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org, checkmarx[.]zone, and git-tanstack[.]com to mask C2 and exfiltration endpoints. TeamPCP has also set up a dark web leak site to post stolen data.

T1583.001
Domains
GroupShinyHunters

ShinyHunters has established clearnet and Tor data leak sites (DLS) including one named “SHINYHUNTERS” for the exfiltration and posting of stolen data. Additionally, ShinyHunters has registered domains that mimic legitimate Microsoft Azure NetApp Files endpoints, such as azurenetfiles[.]net, and legitimate Okta SSO login pages, such as trial-6857053.okta[.]com.

T1583.001
Domains
GroupThe Gentlemen

The Gentlemen has maintained a TOR Data Leak Site (DLS) to post stolen victim data.

T1583.001
Domains
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has created fake domains that imitate legitimate brands and services.

T1583.002
DNS Server
GroupSea Turtle

Sea Turtle built adversary-in-the-middle DNS servers to impersonate legitimate services that were later used to capture credentials.

T1583.002
DNS Server
GroupAxiom

Axiom has acquired dynamic DNS services for use in the targeting of intended victims.

T1583.002
DNS Server
GroupHEXANE

HEXANE has set up custom DNS servers to send commands to compromised hosts via TXT records.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices infected with KV Botnet malware.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
CampaignJ-magic Campaign

During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors acquired VPS for use in C2.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
CampaignSPACEHOP Activity

SPACEHOP Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices within the ORB network.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included the use of dedicated, adversary-controlled virtual private servers for command and control.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
CampaignFLORAHOX Activity

FLORAHOX Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for the ORB network.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupBlackByte

BlackByte staged encryption keys on virtual private servers operated by the adversary.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupDragonfly

Dragonfly has acquired VPS infrastructure for use in malicious campaigns.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupHAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has operated from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupGamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure outside of Russia.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupCURIUM

CURIUM created virtual private server instances to facilitate use of malicious domains and other items.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has acquired virtual private servers from services such as Stark Industries Solutions and RouterHosting. Contagious Interview has also utilized hosting providers to include Tier[.]Net, Majestic Hosting, Leaseweb Singapore, and Kaopu Cloud.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupSea Turtle

Sea Turtle created adversary-in-the-middle servers to impersonate legitimate services and enable credential capture.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupWinter Vivern

Winter Vivern used adversary-owned and -controlled servers to host web vulnerability scanning applications.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupAxiom

Axiom has used VPS hosting providers in targeting of intended victims.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupEmber Bear

Ember Bear has used virtual private servers (VPSs) to host tools, perform reconnaissance, exploit victim infrastructure, and as a destination for data exfiltration.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupAPT28

APT28 hosted phishing domains on free services for brief periods of time during campaigns.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupAPT42

APT42 has used anonymized infrastructure and Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to interact with the victim’s environment.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupAPT-C-36

APT-C-36 has incorporated virtual private servers (VPS) into its operational infrastructure.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupLAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupMoonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet registered virtual private servers to host payloads for download.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has utilized VPS solutions for C2.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary leveraged an attacker controlled Virtual Private Server (VPS) to facilitate C2 and exfiltration actions.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupAPT38

APT38 has used virtual private server (VPS) providers to host C2 infrastructure including Hostwinds.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupSalt Typhoon

Salt Typhoon has utilized virtual private servers (VPS) for C2 infrastructure.

T1583.003
Virtual Private Server
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized Azure C2 subdomains that resemble `*[.]*[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com`.

NIMBUS MANTICORE also utilized services that would reflect the geolocation of their targeted victims.

T1583.004
Server
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group acquired servers to host their malicious tools.

T1583.004
Server
CampaignOperation Honeybee

For Operation Honeybee, at least one identified persona was used to register for a free account for a control server.

T1583.004
Server
CampaignNight Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors purchased hosted services to use for C2.

T1583.004
Server
CampaignOperation Wocao

For Operation Wocao, the threat actors purchased servers with Bitcoin to use during the operation.

T1583.004
Server
GroupGALLIUM

GALLIUM has used Taiwan-based servers that appear to be exclusive to GALLIUM.

T1583.004
Server
GroupMustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest has acquired servers to host second-stage payloads that remain active for a period of either days, weeks, or months.

T1583.004
Server
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards.

T1583.004
Server
GroupSandworm Team

Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.

T1583.004
Server
GroupCURIUM

CURIUM has created dedicated servers for command and control and exfiltration purposes.

T1583.004
Server
GroupEarth Lusca

Earth Lusca has acquired multiple servers for some of their operations, using each server for a different role.

T1583.004
Server
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has leveraged backend servers within Iran.

T1583.004
Server
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has leased infrastructure specifically for offensive operations including Google assets in AS396982.

T1583.004
Server
GroupShinyHunters

ShinyHunters has used five IP addresses to host Python SimpleHTTP servers on port 8888, which exposed staging materials, customized agents, and .bash_history files.

T1583.005
Botnet
GroupHAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has incorporated leased devices into covert networks to obfuscate communications.

T1583.005
Botnet
GroupKe3chang

Ke3chang has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network for reconnaissance and vulnerability exploitation.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.