Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1583.001 Domains |
MalwareDarkGate | DarkGate command and control includes hard-coded domains in the malware chosen to masquerade as legitimate services such as Akamai CDN or Amazon Web Services. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
MalwareXLoader | XLoader can utilize hardcoded command and control domain configurations created by the XLoader authors. These are designed to mimic domain registrars and hosting service providers such as Hostinger and Namecheap. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has registered domains resembling legitimate victim sites such as scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org, checkmarx[.]zone, and git-tanstack[.]com to mask C2 and exfiltration endpoints. TeamPCP has also set up a dark web leak site to post stolen data. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has established clearnet and Tor data leak sites (DLS) including one named “SHINYHUNTERS” for the exfiltration and posting of stolen data. Additionally, ShinyHunters has registered domains that mimic legitimate Microsoft Azure NetApp Files endpoints, such as azurenetfiles[.]net, and legitimate Okta SSO login pages, such as trial-6857053.okta[.]com. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
GroupThe Gentlemen | The Gentlemen has maintained a TOR Data Leak Site (DLS) to post stolen victim data. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has created fake domains that imitate legitimate brands and services. |
| T1583.002 DNS Server |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle built adversary-in-the-middle DNS servers to impersonate legitimate services that were later used to capture credentials. |
| T1583.002 DNS Server |
GroupAxiom | Axiom has acquired dynamic DNS services for use in the targeting of intended victims. |
| T1583.002 DNS Server |
GroupHEXANE | HEXANE has set up custom DNS servers to send commands to compromised hosts via TXT records. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices infected with KV Botnet malware. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignJ-magic Campaign | During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors acquired VPS for use in C2. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignSPACEHOP Activity | SPACEHOP Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices within the ORB network. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included the use of dedicated, adversary-controlled virtual private servers for command and control. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignFLORAHOX Activity | FLORAHOX Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for the ORB network. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupBlackByte | BlackByte staged encryption keys on virtual private servers operated by the adversary. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has acquired VPS infrastructure for use in malicious campaigns. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has operated from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure outside of Russia. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM created virtual private server instances to facilitate use of malicious domains and other items. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has acquired virtual private servers from services such as Stark Industries Solutions and RouterHosting. Contagious Interview has also utilized hosting providers to include Tier[.]Net, Majestic Hosting, Leaseweb Singapore, and Kaopu Cloud. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle created adversary-in-the-middle servers to impersonate legitimate services and enable credential capture. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupWinter Vivern | Winter Vivern used adversary-owned and -controlled servers to host web vulnerability scanning applications. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupAxiom | Axiom has used VPS hosting providers in targeting of intended victims. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupEmber Bear | Ember Bear has used virtual private servers (VPSs) to host tools, perform reconnaissance, exploit victim infrastructure, and as a destination for data exfiltration. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 hosted phishing domains on free services for brief periods of time during campaigns. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupAPT42 | APT42 has used anonymized infrastructure and Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to interact with the victim’s environment. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has incorporated virtual private servers (VPS) into its operational infrastructure. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupMoonstone Sleet | Moonstone Sleet registered virtual private servers to host payloads for download. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized VPS solutions for C2. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary leveraged an attacker controlled Virtual Private Server (VPS) to facilitate C2 and exfiltration actions. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used virtual private server (VPS) providers to host C2 infrastructure including Hostwinds. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupSalt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon has utilized virtual private servers (VPS) for C2 infrastructure. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized Azure C2 subdomains that resemble `*[.]*[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com`. NIMBUS MANTICORE also utilized services that would reflect the geolocation of their targeted victims. |
| T1583.004 Server |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group acquired servers to host their malicious tools. |
| T1583.004 Server |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | For Operation Honeybee, at least one identified persona was used to register for a free account for a control server. |
| T1583.004 Server |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors purchased hosted services to use for C2. |
| T1583.004 Server |
CampaignOperation Wocao | For Operation Wocao, the threat actors purchased servers with Bitcoin to use during the operation. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupGALLIUM | GALLIUM has used Taiwan-based servers that appear to be exclusive to GALLIUM. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupMustard Tempest | Mustard Tempest has acquired servers to host second-stage payloads that remain active for a period of either days, weeks, or months. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has created dedicated servers for command and control and exfiltration purposes. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca has acquired multiple servers for some of their operations, using each server for a different role. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has leveraged backend servers within Iran. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has leased infrastructure specifically for offensive operations including Google assets in AS396982. |
| T1583.004 Server |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has used five IP addresses to host Python SimpleHTTP servers on port 8888, which exposed staging materials, customized agents, and .bash_history files. |
| T1583.005 Botnet |
GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has incorporated leased devices into covert networks to obfuscate communications. |
| T1583.005 Botnet |
GroupKe3chang | Ke3chang has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network for reconnaissance and vulnerability exploitation. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.