ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17636 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1583.005
Botnet
GroupAPT5

APT5 has acquired a network of compromised systems – specifically an ORB (operational relay box) network – for follow on activities.

T1583.006
Web Services
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive.

T1583.006
Web Services
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter

For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used Dropbox to host lure documents and their first-stage downloader.

T1583.006
Web Services
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included the use of OpenConnect VPN Server instances for conducting actions on victim devices.

T1583.006
Web Services
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries configured the FortiGate devices to send notifications to an attacker-controlled Slack channel. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries had also staged tools and files on services such as Dropbox and Pastebin.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupAPT17

APT17 has created profile pages in Microsoft TechNet that were used as C2 infrastructure.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot. Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for hosting payloads and uploading victim system information.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupAPT32

APT32 has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupHAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has acquired web services for use in C2 and exfiltration.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupMuddyWater

MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub, Sync, and TeraBox to distribute tools.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupGamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has used Cloudflare’s TryClouldflare service to obtain C2 nodes.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupFIN7

FIN7 has set up Amazon S3 buckets to host trojanized digital products.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has set up Dropbox and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used GitHub to host malware linked in spearphishing e-mails.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has used web services such as Dropbox to receive stolen data and Google Drive, Firebase, GitHub, and Telegram to disseminate files. Contagious Interview has also used a cloud platform such as Vercel for C2 operations leveraging malicious web applications and static pages. Contagious Interview has also used Slack to coordinate their activities.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupTA2541

TA2541 has hosted malicious files on various platforms including Google Drive, OneDrive, Discord, PasteText, ShareText, and GitHub.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupPOLONIUM

POLONIUM has created and used legitimate Microsoft OneDrive accounts for their operations.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupSaint Bear

Saint Bear has leveraged the Discord content delivery network to host malicious content for retrieval during initial access operations.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupConfucius

Confucius has obtained cloud storage service accounts to host stolen data.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupTurla

Turla has created web accounts including Dropbox and GitHub for C2 and document exfiltration.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupAPT29

APT29 has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as HAMMERTOSS. APT29 has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has utilized a file hosting service named filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained malicious payloads that facilitated follow-on actions.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupTA578

TA578 has used Google Firebase to host malicious scripts.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupLazyScripter

LazyScripter has established GitHub accounts to host its toolsets.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupAPT28

APT28 has used newly-created Blogspot pages for credential harvesting operations.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupAPT-C-36

APT-C-36 campaign architecture has included image hosting sites, Pastebin, Discord, GitHub, Google Drive, BitBucket, and Dropbox.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupLazarus Group

Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupEarth Lusca

Earth Lusca has established GitHub accounts to host their malware.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupIndigoZebra

IndigoZebra created Dropbox accounts for their operations.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has obtained access to commercial VPN services to launch malicious activity. VOID MANTICORE has also leveraged Starlink internet services. VOID MANTICORE has used operator-controlled Telegram bots and channels as C2 infrastructure.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupMagic Hound

Magic Hound has acquired Amazon S3 buckets to use in C2.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has set up Clouflare Tunnels for malware C2. TeamPCP has also used the session messenger network for decentralized, encrypted exfiltration via  *.getsession[.]org to recipient  ID `05f9e609d79eed391015e11380dee4b5c9ead0b6e2e7f0134e6e51767a87323026`.

T1583.006
Web Services
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary utilized the legitimate residential proxy provider proxy[.]geonode[.]io for C2 communications.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupAPT38

APT38 has used OneDrive and GoogleDrive to host malicious files.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized the OnlyOffice platform to deliver malicious payloads to victims.

NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized webservices in attempts to provide a sense of legitimacy to its infrastructure to include *[.]azurewebsites[.]net.

NIMBUS MANTICORE has also utilized Cloudflare.

T1583.007
Serverless
CampaignAPT41 DUST

APT41 DUST used infrastructure hosted behind Cloudflare or utilized Cloudflare Workers for command and control.

T1583.008
Malvertising
GroupMustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest has posted false advertisements including for software packages and browser updates in order to distribute malware.

T1583.008
Malvertising
MalwareRaspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin variants have been delivered via malicious advertising items that, when interacted with, download a malicious archive file containing the initial payload, hosted on services such as Discord.

T1584
Compromise Infrastructure
CampaignIndian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions

Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions included the use of compromised infrastructure, such as DVR and IP camera devices, for command and control purposes in ShadowPad activity.

T1584
Compromise Infrastructure
CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign

During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 compromised third-party infrastructure in physical proximity to targets of interest for follow-on activities.

T1584.001
Domains
CampaignOperation Dream Job

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.

T1584.001
Domains
CampaignC0021

For C0021, the threat actors used legitimate but compromised domains to host malicious payloads.

T1584.001
Domains
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 compromised domains to use for C2.

T1584.001
Domains
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries compromised infrastructure to use for C2.

T1584.001
Domains
CampaignC0010

During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.

T1584.001
Domains
GroupSideCopy

SideCopy has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware.

T1584.001
Domains
GroupMustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page.

T1584.001
Domains
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware.

T1584.001
Domains
GroupAPT1

APT1 hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points.

T1584.001
Domains
GroupTransparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.