Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1584.001 Domains |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims. |
| T1584.001 Domains |
MalwareGootloader | Gootloader has used compromised legitimate domains to as a delivery network for malicious payloads. |
| T1584.002 DNS Server |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle modified Name Server (NS) items to refer to Sea Turtle-controlled DNS servers to provide responses for all DNS lookups. |
| T1584.002 DNS Server |
GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has reconfigured a victim's DNS records to actor-controlled domains and websites. |
| T1584.003 Virtual Private Server |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors abused Virtual Private Servers to store malicious files. |
| T1584.003 Virtual Private Server |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries used compromised VPS servers for C2. |
| T1584.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has compromised Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to proxy C2 traffic. |
| T1584.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupTurla | Turla has used the VPS infrastructure of compromised Iranian threat actors. |
| T1584.004 Server |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised servers to host their malicious tools. |
| T1584.004 Server |
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter | For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors compromised a server they used as part of the campaign's infrastructure. |
| T1584.004 Server |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary operated dedicated penetration testing servers accessible via MCP to support remote command execution, simultaneous tool coordination, and persistent operational state maintenance across campaign sessions. |
| T1584.004 Server |
CampaignJuicy Mix | During Juicy Mix, OilRig compromised an Israeli job portal to use for a C2 server. |
| T1584.004 Server |
CampaignOuter Space | During Outer Space, OilRig compromised an Israeli human resources site to use as a C2 server. |
| T1584.004 Server |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors compromised web servers to use for C2. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupIndrik Spider | Indrik Spider has served fake updates via legitimate websites that have been compromised. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used compromised Paessler Router Traffic Grapher (PRTG) servers from other organizations for C2. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has compromised legitimate websites to host C2 and malware modules. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team compromised legitimate Linux servers running the EXIM mail transfer agent for use in subsequent campaigns. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has used compromised legitimate websites as command and control nodes for operations. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupTurla | Turla has used compromised servers as infrastructure. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca has used compromised web servers as part of their operational infrastructure. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupAPT16 | APT16 has compromised otherwise legitimate sites as staging servers for second-stage payloads. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupDaggerfly | Daggerfly compromised web servers hosting updates for software as part of a supply chain intrusion. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
CampaignQuad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity has compromised various branded SOHO routers to form a botnet that has been leveraged in password spraying activity. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used compromised Cisco and NETGEAR end-of-life SOHO routers implanted with KV Botnet malware to support operations. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has used compromised devices in covert networks to obfuscate communications. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupAxiom | Axiom has used large groups of compromised machines for use as proxy nodes. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has used a botnet management interface to control large numbers of compromised hosts. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors abused compromised AWS buckets to store files. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has compromised legitimate websites to enable strategic website compromise attacks. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupWinter Vivern | Winter Vivern has used compromised WordPress sites to host malicious payloads for download. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupTurla | Turla has frequently used compromised WordPress sites for C2 infrastructure. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca has compromised Google Drive repositories. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
MalwareGootloader | Gootloader can insert malicious scripts to compromise vulnerable content management systems (CMS). |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity focuses on compromise of small office-home office (SOHO) network devices to build the subsequent botnet. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised and out-of-support Cyberoam VPN appliances for C2. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries used compromised Cisco routers for network communications. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used compromised small office/home office (SOHO) devices to interact with vulnerable Versa Director servers. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
CampaignQuad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity has compromised network devices, such as IP cameras, Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices, and SOHO routers, to leverage for follow-on activity. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
CampaignFLORAHOX Activity | FLORAHOX Activity has compromised network routers and IoT devices for the ORB network. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupZIRCONIUM | ZIRCONIUM has compromised network devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers and IoT devices for ORB (operational relay box) Proxy networks. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has used compromised networking devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) devices, as operational command and control infrastructure. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupSalt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon has leveraged compromised routers to facilitate operations. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors created Salesforce trial accounts to register their malicious applications. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupAPT17 | APT17 has created and cultivated profile pages in Microsoft TechNet. To make profile pages appear more legitimate, APT17 has created biographical sections and posted in forum threads. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has leveraged stolen PII to create accounts. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.