ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17636 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1585
Establish Accounts
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has created and maintained personas on code repositories to distribute malicious payloads.

T1585
Establish Accounts
GroupEmber Bear

Ember Bear has created accounts on dark web forums to obtain various tools and malware.

T1585
Establish Accounts
GroupFox Kitten

Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims.

T1585
Establish Accounts
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary created an account with the legitimate residential proxy provider proxy[.]geonode[.]io.

T1585
Establish Accounts
GroupThe Gentlemen

The Gentlemen and its affiliates have leveraged Tox to communicate with victims.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
CampaignOperation Dream Job

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for their targeting efforts.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
CampaignOperation Ghost

For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered Twitter accounts to host C2 nodes.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupEXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY has established social media profiles to mimic employees of targeted companies.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupAPT32

APT32 has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupSandworm Team

Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupCURIUM

CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupScattered Spider

Scattered Spider has created matching fake social media profiles to support new accounts created in victim environments.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has created fake social media accounts such as LinkedIn and Telegram accounts for their targeting efforts.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupLeviathan

Leviathan has created new social media accounts for targeting efforts.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupCleaver

Cleaver has created fake LinkedIn profiles that included profile photos, details, and connections.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupStar Blizzard

Star Blizzard has established fraudulent profiles on professional networking sites to conduct reconnaissance.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupWater Galura

Water Galura operates a news channel on Telegram to make announcements for the Qilin RaaS.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupFox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupLazarus Group

Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupMoonstone Sleet

Moonstone Sleet has created social media accounts to interact with victims.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has created Telegram Accounts. VOID MANTICORE has also leveraged online personas such as Handala Hack, Karma, and Homeland Justice on social media to include Telegram. VOID MANTICORE has established and maintained social media accounts on Twitter/X and Telegram to amplify operational claims and stolen data disclosures.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupHEXANE

HEXANE has established fraudulent LinkedIn accounts impersonating HR department employees to target potential victims with fake job offers.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupMagic Hound

Magic Hound has created fake LinkedIn and other social media accounts to contact targets and convince them--through messages and voice communications--to open malicious links.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has used its own Telegram channel and X accounts @pcpcats and @xploitrsturtle2 for external communications.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupAPT38

APT38 has used professional platforms such as LinkedIn to contact potential victims.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupThe Gentlemen

The Gentlemen has established social media accounts on X.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has leveraged social media accounts to correspond with victims.

T1585.001
Social Media Accounts
GroupSalt Typhoon

Salt Typhoon members have created and maintained professional accounts on social media to include LinkedIn.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors created Proton mail accounts for communication with organizations infected with ransomware.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignOperation Dust Storm

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū

During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used free email providers such as Gmail for spearphishing.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignFunnyDream

For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors registered emails shinycorp@tuta[.]com and shinygroup@tuta[.]com to send victims extortion demands.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
CampaignOperation Wocao

For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupIndrik Spider

Indrik Spider has created email accounts to communicate with their ransomware victims, to include providing payment and decryption details.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupEXOTIC LILY

EXOTIC LILY has created e-mail accounts to spoof targeted organizations.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupSandworm Team

Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupCURIUM

CURIUM has created dedicated email accounts for use with tools such as IMAPLoader.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns. Mustang Panda has also created fake Google accounts to distribute malware via spear-phishing emails. Mustang Panda has also created accounts for spearphishing operations including the use of services such as Proton Mail.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has created fake email accounts to correspond with social media accounts, fake LinkedIn personas, code repository accounts, and job announcements on development job board services. Contagious Interview has also utilized fake email accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupAPT1

APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupLeviathan

Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupSilent Librarian

Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has created email accounts used in ransomware negotiations.

T1585.002
Email Accounts
GroupStar Blizzard

Star Blizzard has registered impersonation email accounts to spoof experts in a particular field or individuals and organizations affiliated with the intended target.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.