Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has created and maintained personas on code repositories to distribute malicious payloads. ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025Socket Contagious Interview NPM April 2025Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025 |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupEmber Bear | Ember Bear has created accounts on dark web forums to obtain various tools and malware. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupFox Kitten | Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary created an account with the legitimate residential proxy provider proxy[.]geonode[.]io. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupThe Gentlemen | The Gentlemen and its affiliates have leveraged Tox to communicate with victims. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for their targeting efforts. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
CampaignOperation Ghost | For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered Twitter accounts to host C2 nodes. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupEXOTIC LILY | EXOTIC LILY has established social media profiles to mimic employees of targeted companies. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has created matching fake social media profiles to support new accounts created in victim environments. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has created fake social media accounts such as LinkedIn and Telegram accounts for their targeting efforts. ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview FamousChollima October 2024SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview October 2024Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024 |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has created new social media accounts for targeting efforts. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupCleaver | Cleaver has created fake LinkedIn profiles that included profile photos, details, and connections. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupStar Blizzard | Star Blizzard has established fraudulent profiles on professional networking sites to conduct reconnaissance. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupWater Galura | Water Galura operates a news channel on Telegram to make announcements for the Qilin RaaS. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupFox Kitten | Fox Kitten has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupMoonstone Sleet | Moonstone Sleet has created social media accounts to interact with victims. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has created Telegram Accounts. VOID MANTICORE has also leveraged online personas such as Handala Hack, Karma, and Homeland Justice on social media to include Telegram. VOID MANTICORE has established and maintained social media accounts on Twitter/X and Telegram to amplify operational claims and stolen data disclosures. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupHEXANE | HEXANE has established fraudulent LinkedIn accounts impersonating HR department employees to target potential victims with fake job offers. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has created fake LinkedIn and other social media accounts to contact targets and convince them--through messages and voice communications--to open malicious links. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has used its own Telegram channel and X accounts @pcpcats and @xploitrsturtle2 for external communications. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used professional platforms such as LinkedIn to contact potential victims. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupThe Gentlemen | The Gentlemen has established social media accounts on X. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has leveraged social media accounts to correspond with victims. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupSalt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon members have created and maintained professional accounts on social media to include LinkedIn. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors created Proton mail accounts for communication with organizations infected with ransomware. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignOperation Dust Storm | For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used free email providers such as Gmail for spearphishing. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignFunnyDream | For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors registered emails shinycorp@tuta[.]com and shinygroup@tuta[.]com to send victims extortion demands. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
CampaignOperation Wocao | For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupIndrik Spider | Indrik Spider has created email accounts to communicate with their ransomware victims, to include providing payment and decryption details. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupEXOTIC LILY | EXOTIC LILY has created e-mail accounts to spoof targeted organizations. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has created dedicated email accounts for use with tools such as IMAPLoader. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns. Mustang Panda has also created fake Google accounts to distribute malware via spear-phishing emails. Mustang Panda has also created accounts for spearphishing operations including the use of services such as Proton Mail. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has created fake email accounts to correspond with social media accounts, fake LinkedIn personas, code repository accounts, and job announcements on development job board services. Contagious Interview has also utilized fake email accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services. ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024 |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupAPT1 | APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupSilent Librarian | Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has created email accounts used in ransomware negotiations. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupStar Blizzard | Star Blizzard has registered impersonation email accounts to spoof experts in a particular field or individuals and organizations affiliated with the intended target. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.