Cybereason Nocturnus. (2022, May 4). Operation CuckooBees: Deep-Dive into Stealthy Winnti Techniques. Retrieved September 22, 2022.
Not cited by any technique.
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1003.002 Security Account Manager |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors leveraged a custom tool to dump OS credentials and used following commands: `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.hiv`, `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.hiv`, and `reg save HKLM\\SECURITY security.hiv`, to dump SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives. |
| T1005 Data from Local System |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors collected data, files, and other information from compromised networks. |
| T1007 System Service Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net start` command as part of their initial reconnaissance. |
| T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `ipconfig`, `nbtstat`, `tracert`, `route print`, and `cat /etc/hosts` commands. |
| T1018 Remote System Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net view` and `ping` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1027.010 Command Obfuscation |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file. |
| T1027.011 Fileless Storage |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors stroed payloads in Windows CLFS (Common Log File System) transactional logs. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `query user` and `whoami` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to `rundll32.exe` to allow it to blend in with other Windows system files. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net session`, `net use`, and `netstat` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: `SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.` |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `tasklist` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1059.003 Windows Command Shell |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used batch scripts to perform reconnaissance. |
| T1059.005 Visual Basic |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file using `wscript` and wrote the decoded output to a text file. |
| T1069.001 Local Groups |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net group` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled HTTP and HTTPS listeners. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used compromised domain administrator credentials as part of their lateral movement. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `systeminfo` command to gather details about a compromised system. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `dir c:\\` to search for files. |
| T1087.001 Local Account |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net user` command to gather account information. |
| T1087.002 Domain Account |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `dsquery` and `dsget` commands to get domain environment information and to query users in administrative groups. |
| T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `fsutil fsinfo drives` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1124 System Time Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net time` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: `cscript //nologo "C:\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs" set winrm/config/service@{EnableCompatibilityHttpsListener="true"}`. |
| T1135 Network Share Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net share` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors exploited multiple vulnerabilities in externally facing servers. |
| T1201 Password Policy Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net accounts` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors generated a web shell within a vulnerable Enterprise Resource Planning Web Application Server as a persistence mechanism. |
| T1543.003 Windows Service |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors modified the `IKEEXT` and `PrintNotify` Windows services for persistence. |
| T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, attackers used a signed kernel rootkit to establish additional persistence. |
| T1560.001 Archive via Utility |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the Makecab utility to compress and a version of WinRAR to create password-protected archives of stolen data prior to exfiltration. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the legitimate Windows services `IKEEXT` and `PrintNotify` to side-load malicious DLLs. |
| T1588.002 Tool |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | For Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors obtained publicly-available JSP code that was used to deploy a webshell onto a compromised server. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.