Sub-technique of T1078 Valid Accounts.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Default accounts are not limited to client machines; rather, they also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications, whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.
Default accounts may be created on a system after initial setup by connecting or integrating it with another application. For example, when an ESXi server is connected to a vCenter server, a default privileged account called `vpxuser` is created on the ESXi server. If a threat actor is able to compromise this account’s credentials (for example, via Exploitation for Credential Access on the vCenter host), they will then have access to the ESXi server.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1078.001.
| Rule | Level | Log source |
|---|---|---|
| Root Account Enable Via Dsenableroot | medium | macos / process_creation |
| Admin User Remote Logon | low | windows / NULL |
| Guest Account Enabled Via Sysadminctl | low | macos / process_creation |
| Rule | Type | Risk | Data source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP | TTP | NULL | |
| Okta Account Lockout Events | Anomaly | NULL | |
| Okta Failed SSO Attempts | Anomaly | NULL | |
| Okta New API Token Created | TTP | NULL | Okta |
| Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check | TTP | NULL | Okta |
| Okta Suspicious Activity Reported | TTP | NULL | Okta |
| Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users | TTP | NULL | |
| Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack | TTP | NULL | |
| Windows Guest Account Enabled Via Net.EXE | Anomaly | NULL | Sysmon EventID 1, Windows Event Log Security 4688, CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupEmber Bear | Ember Bear has abused default user names and passwords in externally-accessible IP cameras for initial access. |
| GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has leveraged default credentials for authenticating myWebMethods (WMS) and QLogic web management interface to gain initial access. |
| GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via `"powershell.exe" /c net user DefaultAccount /active:yes` to connect to a targeted Exchange server over RDP. |
| GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has harvested and used vCenter Server service accounts. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareHyperStack | HyperStack can use default credentials to connect to IPC$ shares on remote machines. |
| MalwareStuxnet | Stuxnet infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used the built-in administrator account to move laterally using RDP and Impacket. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
