Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1583.006 Web Services |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has set up Clouflare Tunnels for malware C2. TeamPCP has also used the session messenger network for decentralized, encrypted exfiltration via *.getsession[.]org to recipient ID `05f9e609d79eed391015e11380dee4b5c9ead0b6e2e7f0134e6e51767a87323026`. |
| T1583.006 Web Services |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used OneDrive and GoogleDrive to host malicious files. |
| T1583.006 Web Services |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized the OnlyOffice platform to deliver malicious payloads to victims. NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized webservices in attempts to provide a sense of legitimacy to its infrastructure to include *[.]azurewebsites[.]net. NIMBUS MANTICORE has also utilized Cloudflare. |
| T1583.008 Malvertising |
GroupMustard Tempest | Mustard Tempest has posted false advertisements including for software packages and browser updates in order to distribute malware. |
| T1584.001 Domains |
GroupSideCopy | SideCopy has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware. |
| T1584.001 Domains |
GroupMustard Tempest | Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page. |
| T1584.001 Domains |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware. |
| T1584.001 Domains |
GroupAPT1 | APT1 hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points. |
| T1584.001 Domains |
GroupTransparent Tribe | Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns. |
| T1584.001 Domains |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims. |
| T1584.002 DNS Server |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle modified Name Server (NS) items to refer to Sea Turtle-controlled DNS servers to provide responses for all DNS lookups. |
| T1584.002 DNS Server |
GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has reconfigured a victim's DNS records to actor-controlled domains and websites. |
| T1584.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has compromised Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to proxy C2 traffic. |
| T1584.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupTurla | Turla has used the VPS infrastructure of compromised Iranian threat actors. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupIndrik Spider | Indrik Spider has served fake updates via legitimate websites that have been compromised. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used compromised Paessler Router Traffic Grapher (PRTG) servers from other organizations for C2. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has compromised legitimate websites to host C2 and malware modules. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team compromised legitimate Linux servers running the EXIM mail transfer agent for use in subsequent campaigns. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has used compromised legitimate websites as command and control nodes for operations. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupTurla | Turla has used compromised servers as infrastructure. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca has used compromised web servers as part of their operational infrastructure. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupAPT16 | APT16 has compromised otherwise legitimate sites as staging servers for second-stage payloads. |
| T1584.004 Server |
GroupDaggerfly | Daggerfly compromised web servers hosting updates for software as part of a supply chain intrusion. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used compromised Cisco and NETGEAR end-of-life SOHO routers implanted with KV Botnet malware to support operations. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has used compromised devices in covert networks to obfuscate communications. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupAxiom | Axiom has used large groups of compromised machines for use as proxy nodes. |
| T1584.005 Botnet |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has used a botnet management interface to control large numbers of compromised hosts. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has compromised legitimate websites to enable strategic website compromise attacks. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupWinter Vivern | Winter Vivern has used compromised WordPress sites to host malicious payloads for download. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupTurla | Turla has frequently used compromised WordPress sites for C2 infrastructure. |
| T1584.006 Web Services |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca has compromised Google Drive repositories. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupZIRCONIUM | ZIRCONIUM has compromised network devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers and IoT devices for ORB (operational relay box) Proxy networks. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has used compromised networking devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) devices, as operational command and control infrastructure. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages. |
| T1584.008 Network Devices |
GroupSalt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon has leveraged compromised routers to facilitate operations. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupAPT17 | APT17 has created and cultivated profile pages in Microsoft TechNet. To make profile pages appear more legitimate, APT17 has created biographical sections and posted in forum threads. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has leveraged stolen PII to create accounts. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has created and maintained personas on code repositories to distribute malicious payloads. ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025Socket Contagious Interview NPM April 2025Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025 |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupEmber Bear | Ember Bear has created accounts on dark web forums to obtain various tools and malware. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupFox Kitten | Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims. |
| T1585 Establish Accounts |
GroupThe Gentlemen | The Gentlemen and its affiliates have leveraged Tox to communicate with victims. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupEXOTIC LILY | EXOTIC LILY has established social media profiles to mimic employees of targeted companies. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has created matching fake social media profiles to support new accounts created in victim environments. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.