Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1572 Protocol Tunneling |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has used tunneling tools to facilitate destructive attacks on compromised devices. |
| T1572 Protocol Tunneling |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH. |
| T1572 Protocol Tunneling |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has utilized web shells and Java tools for tunneling capabilities to and from compromised assets. |
| T1573 Encrypted Channel |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has encrypted traffic with the C2 to prevent network detection. |
| T1573 Encrypted Channel |
GroupBITTER | BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications. |
| T1573 Encrypted Channel |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication. |
| T1573 Encrypted Channel |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used a version of the Awen web shell that employed AES encryption and decryption for C2 communications. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupMuddyWater | MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4. Mustang Panda has also leveraged encryption and compression algorithms to obfuscate the traffic between the system and C2 server, methods observed included RC4, AES, XOR with 0x5a, and LZO. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupZIRCONIUM | ZIRCONIUM has used AES encrypted communications in C2. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has encrypted C2 traffic using RC4. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupHigaisa | Higaisa used AES-128 to encrypt C2 traffic. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupRedCurl | RedCurl has used AES-128 CBC to encrypt C2 communications. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupStealth Falcon | Stealth Falcon malware encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a hard-coded key. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupBRONZE BUTLER | BRONZE BUTLER has used RC4 encryption (for Datper malware) and AES (for xxmm malware) to obfuscate HTTP traffic. BRONZE BUTLER has also used a tool called RarStar that encodes data with a custom XOR algorithm when posting it to a C2 server. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupDarkhotel | Darkhotel has used AES-256 and 3DES for C2 communications. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupLazarus Group | Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupInception | Inception has encrypted network communications with AES. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupAPT33 | APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupFIN6 | FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupRedEcho | RedEcho uses SSL for network communication. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupTA2541 | TA2541 has used TLS encrypted C2 communications including for campaigns using AsyncRAT. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupOilRig | OilRig used the PowerExchange utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has used SSL to connect to C2 servers. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupRedCurl | RedCurl has used HTTPS for C2 communication. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has used HTTPS for command and control. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupAPT42 | APT42 has used tools such as NICECURL with command and control communication taking place over HTTPS. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupCobalt Group | Cobalt Group has used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupVelvet Ant | Velvet Ant has used a reverse SSH shell to securely communicate with victim devices. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupFIN8 | FIN8 has used the Plink utility to tunnel RDP back to C2 infrastructure. |
| T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has established a connection between the staging host and the C2 using SSH. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupSideCopy | SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the `credwiz.exe` process and side-load the malicious payload `Duser.dll`. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupGALLIUM | GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupAPT3 | APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupPatchwork | A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupAPT41 | APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti for Windows. APT41 has also used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupEvilnum | Evilnum has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory, instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupmenuPass | menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT. menuPass has also used DLL search order hijacking. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder). |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupMuddyWater | MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupNaikon | Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupStorm-1811 | Storm-1811 has deployed a malicious DLL (7z.DLL) that is sideloaded by a modified, legitimate installer (7zG.exe) when that installer is executed with an additional command line parameter of `b` at runtime to load a Cobalt Strike beacon payload. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupSidewinder | Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file. Mustang Panda has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs. 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDAAnomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019BroadcomCSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugXEset PlugX Korplug Mustang Panda March 2022Google Threat Intelligence Group MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX August 2025IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023Proofpoint TA416 November 2020Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020Sophos PlugX September 2022Trend Micro Mustang Panda Earth Preta Toneshell February 2025Unit42 Bookworm Nov2015ZscalerZscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025 |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupHigaisa | Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools. |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupAquatic Panda | Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load `exe`, `dll`, and `dat` files into memory. Aquatic Panda loaded a malicious DLL into the legitimate Windows Security Health Service executable ( |
| T1574.001 DLL |
GroupBlackTech | BlackTech has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.