ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

4815 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1572
Protocol Tunneling
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has used tunneling tools to facilitate destructive attacks on compromised devices.

T1572
Protocol Tunneling
GroupMagic Hound

Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH.

T1572
Protocol Tunneling
GroupFIN13

FIN13 has utilized web shells and Java tools for tunneling capabilities to and from compromised assets.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupTropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has encrypted traffic with the C2 to prevent network detection.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupBITTER

BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupAPT29

APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupMagic Hound

Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupVolt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has used a version of the Awen web shell that employed AES encryption and decryption for C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupMuddyWater

MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4. Mustang Panda has also leveraged encryption and compression algorithms to obfuscate the traffic between the system and C2 server, methods observed included RC4, AES, XOR with 0x5a, and LZO.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used AES encrypted communications in C2.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has encrypted C2 traffic using RC4.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupHigaisa

Higaisa used AES-128 to encrypt C2 traffic.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupRedCurl

RedCurl has used AES-128 CBC to encrypt C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupStealth Falcon

Stealth Falcon malware encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a hard-coded key.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupBRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used RC4 encryption (for Datper malware) and AES (for xxmm malware) to obfuscate HTTP traffic. BRONZE BUTLER has also used a tool called RarStar that encodes data with a custom XOR algorithm when posting it to a C2 server.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupDarkhotel

Darkhotel has used AES-256 and 3DES for C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupAPT28

APT28 installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupLazarus Group

Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupInception

Inception has encrypted network communications with AES.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupAPT33

APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupFIN6

FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupRedEcho

RedEcho uses SSL for network communication.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupTA2541

TA2541 has used TLS encrypted C2 communications including for campaigns using AsyncRAT.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupOilRig

OilRig used the PowerExchange utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupTropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has used SSL to connect to C2 servers.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupRedCurl

RedCurl has used HTTPS for C2 communication.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has used HTTPS for command and control.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupAPT42

APT42 has used tools such as NICECURL with command and control communication taking place over HTTPS.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupCobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupVelvet Ant

Velvet Ant has used a reverse SSH shell to securely communicate with victim devices.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupFIN8

FIN8 has used the Plink utility to tunnel RDP back to C2 infrastructure.

T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
GroupShinyHunters

ShinyHunters has established a connection between the staging host and the C2 using SSH.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupSideCopy

SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the `credwiz.exe` process and side-load the malicious payload `Duser.dll`.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupGALLIUM

GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupAPT3

APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupPatchwork

A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupAPT41

APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti for Windows. APT41 has also used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupEvilnum

Evilnum has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory, instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupmenuPass

menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT. menuPass has also used DLL search order hijacking.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupAPT32

APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder).

T1574.001
DLL
GroupMuddyWater

MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupNaikon

Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupStorm-1811

Storm-1811 has deployed a malicious DLL (7z.DLL) that is sideloaded by a modified, legitimate installer (7zG.exe) when that installer is executed with an additional command line parameter of `b` at runtime to load a Cobalt Strike beacon payload.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupSidewinder

Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file. Mustang Panda has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupHigaisa

Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the OINFO12.OCX dynamic link library.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupTropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupAquatic Panda

Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load `exe`, `dll`, and `dat` files into memory. Aquatic Panda loaded a malicious DLL into the legitimate Windows Security Health Service executable (SecurityHealthService.exe) to execute malicious code on victim systems.

T1574.001
DLL
GroupBlackTech

BlackTech has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.