ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

1213 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `scheduler` and `schtasks` to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration. APT29 also created a scheduled task to maintain SUNSPOT persistence when the host booted.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: `SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.`

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute malicious PowerShell code on remote systems.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: `\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor`, `\Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility`, `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults`, and `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared`.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
Campaign2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignCostaRicto

During CostaRicto, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to download backdoor tools.

T1055
Process Injection
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 exploited CVE-2025-21590 to enable malicious code injection into the memory of legitimate processes.

T1055
Process Injection
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter

During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors leveraged embedded shellcode to inject a downloader into the memory of Word.

T1055
Process Injection
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team loaded BlackEnergy into svchost.exe, which then launched iexplore.exe for their C2.

T1055
Process Injection
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack

During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus's VEILEDSIGNAL uses process injection to inject the C2 communication module code in the first found process instance of Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. It also monitors the established named pipe and re-injects the C2 communication module if necessary.

T1055
Process Injection
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used malicious SparkGateway plugins to inject shared objects into web process memory on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to enable deployment of backdoors.

T1055
Process Injection
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included injecting code into the AAA and Crash Dump processes on infected Cisco ASA devices.

T1055
Process Injection
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors injected code into a selected process, which in turn launches a command as a child process of the original.

T1055.001
Dynamic-link Library Injection
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors used a DLL named `D8B3.dll` that was injected into the Winlogon process.

T1055.002
Portable Executable Injection
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack

During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus uses the SigFlip tool to inject arbitrary code without affecting or breaking the file's signature.

T1055.009
Proc Memory
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity final payload installation includes mounting and binding to the \/proc\/ filepath on the victim system to enable subsequent operation in memory while also removing on-disk artifacts.

T1056
Input Capture
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation

Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation intercepted and harvested credentials from user logins to compromised devices.

T1056
Input Capture
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan captured submitted multfactor authentication codes and other technical artifacts related to remote access sessions during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.

T1056.001
Keylogging
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team gathered account credentials via a BlackEnergy keylogger plugin.

T1056.001
Keylogging
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified a JavaScript file on the Web SSL VPN component of Ivanti Connect Secure devices to keylog credentials.

T1056.001
Keylogging
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors obtained the password for the victim's password manager via a custom keylogger.

T1056.003
Web Portal Capture
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack

In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles captured credentials as they were being changed by redirecting text-based login codes to websites they controlled.

T1056.003
Web Portal Capture
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified the JavaScript loaded by the Ivanti Connect Secure login page to capture credentials entered.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

Scripts associated with KV Botnet Activity initial deployment can identify processes related to security tools and other botnet families for follow-on disabling during installation.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain a list of all running processes.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capable of reading the PID for the Junos OS snmpd daemon.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors obtained a list of running processes on a victim machine using `cmd /c tasklist > %temp%\temp.ini`.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors used the `tasklist /s` command as well as `taskmanager` to obtain a list of running processes.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used multiple command-line utilities to enumerate running processes.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignFunnyDream

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Tasklist on targeted systems.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `tasklist` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

T1057
Process Discovery
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries enumerated current running processes using `tasklist`.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, the threat actors used `tasklist` to collect a list of running processes on an infected system.

T1057
Process Discovery
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to use BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR to enumerate the processes running on victim systems and fed it into OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 API for analysis along with other system information.

T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
CampaignOperation Spalax

For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) scripts to install malware.

T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Perl scripts to enable the deployment of the THINSPOOL shell script dropper and for enumerating host data.

T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands.

T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
CampaignFLORAHOX Activity

FLORAHOX Activity has executed PHP and Shell scripts to identify and infect subsequent routers for the ORB network.

T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to create a reverse shell callback on an Amazon Web Services hosted system.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used PowerShell commands to explore the environment of compromised victims.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used PowerShell to execute attacker-controlled encoded commands.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors used PowerShell to run a series of Base64-encoded commands that acted as a stager and enumerated hosts.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

Mustang Panda used LNK files to execute PowerShell commands leading to eventual PlugX installation during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack

In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles used a publicly available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignC0018

During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignC0021

During C0021, the threat actors used obfuscated PowerShell to extract an encoded payload from within an .LNK file.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignJuicy Mix

During Juicy Mix, OilRig used a PowerShell script to steal credentials.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used PowerShell cmdlets New-MailboxSearch and Get-Recipient for discovery.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used PowerShell to perform timestomping.

T1059.001
PowerShell
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used PowerShell to create new tasks on remote machines, identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and execute other commands.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.