Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `scheduler` and `schtasks` to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration. APT29 also created a scheduled task to maintain SUNSPOT persistence when the host booted. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: `SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.` |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute malicious PowerShell code on remote systems. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: `\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor`, `\Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility`, `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults`, and `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared`. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
Campaign2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignCostaRicto | During CostaRicto, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to download backdoor tools. |
| T1055 Process Injection |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 exploited CVE-2025-21590 to enable malicious code injection into the memory of legitimate processes. |
| T1055 Process Injection |
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter | During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors leveraged embedded shellcode to inject a downloader into the memory of Word. |
| T1055 Process Injection |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team loaded BlackEnergy into svchost.exe, which then launched iexplore.exe for their C2. |
| T1055 Process Injection |
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack | During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus's VEILEDSIGNAL uses process injection to inject the C2 communication module code in the first found process instance of Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. It also monitors the established named pipe and re-injects the C2 communication module if necessary. |
| T1055 Process Injection |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used malicious SparkGateway plugins to inject shared objects into web process memory on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to enable deployment of backdoors. |
| T1055 Process Injection |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included injecting code into the AAA and Crash Dump processes on infected Cisco ASA devices. |
| T1055 Process Injection |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors injected code into a selected process, which in turn launches a command as a child process of the original. |
| T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors used a DLL named `D8B3.dll` that was injected into the Winlogon process. |
| T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection |
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack | During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus uses the SigFlip tool to inject arbitrary code without affecting or breaking the file's signature. |
| T1055.009 Proc Memory |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity final payload installation includes mounting and binding to the |
| T1056 Input Capture |
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation intercepted and harvested credentials from user logins to compromised devices. |
| T1056 Input Capture |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan captured submitted multfactor authentication codes and other technical artifacts related to remote access sessions during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1056.001 Keylogging |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team gathered account credentials via a BlackEnergy keylogger plugin. |
| T1056.001 Keylogging |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified a JavaScript file on the Web SSL VPN component of Ivanti Connect Secure devices to keylog credentials. |
| T1056.001 Keylogging |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors obtained the password for the victim's password manager via a custom keylogger. |
| T1056.003 Web Portal Capture |
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles captured credentials as they were being changed by redirecting text-based login codes to websites they controlled. |
| T1056.003 Web Portal Capture |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified the JavaScript loaded by the Ivanti Connect Secure login page to capture credentials entered. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | Scripts associated with KV Botnet Activity initial deployment can identify processes related to security tools and other botnet families for follow-on disabling during installation. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain a list of all running processes. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capable of reading the PID for the Junos OS snmpd daemon. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors obtained a list of running processes on a victim machine using `cmd /c tasklist > %temp%\temp.ini`. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors used the `tasklist /s` command as well as `taskmanager` to obtain a list of running processes. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used multiple command-line utilities to enumerate running processes. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignFunnyDream | During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Tasklist on targeted systems. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `tasklist` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries enumerated current running processes using `tasklist`. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, the threat actors used `tasklist` to collect a list of running processes on an infected system. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to use BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR to enumerate the processes running on victim systems and fed it into OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 API for analysis along with other system information. |
| T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
CampaignOperation Spalax | For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) scripts to install malware. |
| T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Perl scripts to enable the deployment of the THINSPOOL shell script dropper and for enumerating host data. |
| T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands. |
| T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
CampaignFLORAHOX Activity | FLORAHOX Activity has executed PHP and Shell scripts to identify and infect subsequent routers for the ORB network. |
| T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to create a reverse shell callback on an Amazon Web Services hosted system. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used PowerShell commands to explore the environment of compromised victims. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used PowerShell to execute attacker-controlled encoded commands. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used PowerShell to run a series of Base64-encoded commands that acted as a stager and enumerated hosts. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | Mustang Panda used LNK files to execute PowerShell commands leading to eventual PlugX installation during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles used a publicly available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignC0018 | During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignC0021 | During C0021, the threat actors used obfuscated PowerShell to extract an encoded payload from within an .LNK file. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignJuicy Mix | During Juicy Mix, OilRig used a PowerShell script to steal credentials. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used PowerShell cmdlets New-MailboxSearch and Get-Recipient for discovery. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used PowerShell to perform timestomping. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used PowerShell to create new tasks on remote machines, identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and execute other commands. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.