Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.
Not cited by any technique.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1027.009 Embedded Payloads |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot further decrypts information embedded via steganography using AES-CBC with the same 32 bit key as initial XOR operations combined with the first 16 bytes of the encrypted data as an initialization vector. Other Pikabot variants include encrypted, chunked sections of the stage 2 payload in the initial loader |
| T1027.011 Fileless Storage |
MalwarePikabot | Some versions of Pikabot build the final PE payload in memory to avoid writing contents to disk on the executing machine. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
MalwarePikabot | During the initial Pikabot command and control check-in, Pikabot will transmit collected system information encrypted using RC4. |
| T1055.003 Thread Execution Hijacking |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot can create a suspended instance of a legitimate process (e.g., ctfmon.exe), allocate memory within the suspended process corresponding to Pikabot's core module, then redirect execution flow via `SetContextThread` API so that when the thread resumes the Pikabot core module is executed. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
CampaignPikabot Distribution February 2024 | Pikabot Distribution February 2024 passed execution from obfuscated JavaScript files to PowerShell scripts to download and install Pikabot. |
| T1059.007 JavaScript |
CampaignPikabot Distribution February 2024 | Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized obfuscated JavaScript files for initial Pikabot payload download. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot performs a variety of system checks and gathers system information, including commands such as |
| T1087.001 Local Account |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot will retrieve the name of the user associated with the thread under which the malware is executing. |
| T1106 Native API |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot uses native Windows APIs to determine if the process is being debugged and analyzed, such as `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`, `NtQueryInformationProcess`, `ProcessDebugPort`, and `ProcessDebugFlags`. Other Pikabot variants populate a global list of Windows API addresses from the `NTDLL` and `KERNEL32` libraries, and references these items instead of calling the API items to obfuscate execution. |
| T1132.001 Standard Encoding |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot uses base64 encoding in conjunction with symmetric encryption mechanisms to obfuscate command and control communications. |
| T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot decrypts command and control URIs using ADVobfuscator, and decrypts IP addresses and port numbers with a custom algorithm. Other versions of Pikabot decode chunks of stored stage 2 payload content in the initial payload |
| T1480.001 Environmental Keying |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot stops execution if the infected system language matches one of several languages, with various versions referencing: Georgian, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Slovenian. |
| T1482 Domain Trust Discovery |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot will gather information concerning the Windows Domain the victim machine is a member of during execution. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot performs a variety of system checks to determine if it is running in an analysis environment or sandbox, such as checking the number of processors (must be greater than two), and the amount of RAM (must be greater than 2GB). |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
CampaignPikabot Distribution February 2024 | Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized emails with hyperlinks leading to malicious ZIP archive files containing scripts to download and install Pikabot. |
| T1571 Non-Standard Port |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot uses non-standard ports, such as 2967, 2223, and others, for HTTPS command and control communication. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
MalwarePikabot | Earlier Pikabot variants use a custom encryption procedure leveraging multiple mechanisms including AES with multiple rounds of Base64 encoding for its command and control communication. Later Pikabot variants eliminate the use of AES and instead use RC4 encryption for transmitted information. |
| T1574 Hijack Execution Flow |
CampaignPikabot Distribution February 2024 | Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized a tampered legitimate executable, `grepWinNP3.exe`, for its first stage Pikabot loader, modifying the open-source tool to execute malicious code when launched. |
| T1620 Reflective Code Loading |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot reflectively loads stored, previously encrypted components of the PE file into memory of the currently executing process to avoid writing content to disk on the executing machine. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot features several methods to evade debugging by analysts, including checks for active debuggers, the use of breakpoints during execution, and checking various system information items such as system memory and the number of processors. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.