Campaign, Jun 2022 to Oct 2022.View on attack.mitre.org
The 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.
| Technique | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Systemd service units to masquerade GOGETTER malware as legitimate or seemingly legitimate services. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized a PowerShell utility called TANKTRAP to spread and launch a wiper using Windows Group Policy. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team proxied C2 communications within a TLS-based tunnel. |
| T1484.001 Group Policy Modification |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy and execute malware. |
| T1485 Data Destruction |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed CaddyWiper on the victim’s IT environment systems to wipe files related to the OT capabilities, along with mapped drives, and physical drive partitions. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the Neo-REGEORG webshell on an internet-facing server. |
| T1543.002 Systemd Service |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team configured Systemd to maintain persistence of GOGETTER, specifying the `WantedBy=multi-user.target` configuration to run GOGETTER when the system begins accepting user logins. |
| T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a Group Policy Object (GPO) to copy CaddyWiper's executable `msserver.exe` from a staging server to a local hard drive before deployment. |
| T1572 Protocol Tunneling |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the GOGETTER tunneler software to establish a “Yamux” TLS-based C2 channel with an external server(s). |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.