Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
CampaignOperation Spalax | During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has requested victims to disable Docker and other container environments in attempts to thwart container isolation and ensure device infection. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
GroupSaint Bear | Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
GroupDarkhotel | Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareBumblebee | Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareSquirrelwaffle | Squirrelwaffle has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareRaspberry Robin | Raspberry Robin contains real and fake second-stage payloads following initial execution, with the real payload only delivered if the malware determines it is not running in a virtualized environment. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareIcedID | IcedID has manipulated Keitaro Traffic Direction System to filter researcher and sandbox traffic. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwarePteranodon | Pteranodon has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareBisonal | Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareMetamorfo | Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareRedLine Stealer | RedLine Stealer has an anti-sandbox technique that requires the malware to consistently check with the C2 server, if the communication fails RedLine Stealer will not continue execution. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareBlack Basta | Black Basta can make a random number of calls to the `kernel32.beep` function to hinder log analysis. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareStoneDrill | StoneDrill has used several anti-emulation techniques to prevent automated analysis by emulators or sandboxes. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareRTM | RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareStrelaStealer | StrelaStealer payloads have used control flow obfuscation techniques such as excessively long code blocks of mathematical instructions to defeat sandboxing and related analysis methods. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareBazar | Bazar can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareXLoader | XLoader can utilize decoy command and control domains within the malware configuration to circumvent sandbox analysis. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareCarberp | Carberp has removed various hooks before installing the trojan or bootkit to evade sandbox analysis or other analysis software. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareEgregor | Egregor has used multiple anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques to prevent automated analysis by sandboxes. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareCHOPSTICK | CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareCozyCar | Some versions of CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareKevin | Kevin can sleep for a time interval between C2 communication attempts. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareAgent Tesla | Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareGelsemium | Gelsemium can use junk code to generate random activity to obscure malware behavior. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareMini Shai-Hulud | Mini Shai-Hulud has evaded sandbox detection by applying a 1-in-6 probability gate that generates a random number which will only trigger the wiper functionality when the set number outcome is met even in environments that match parameters of a geopolitical target. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used a script that ran WMI queries to check if a VM or sandbox was running, including VMWare and Virtualbox. The script would also call WMI to determine the number of cores allocated to the system; if less than two the script would stop execution. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has detected and killed virtual environments by using the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-CimInstance` that searches the classname of the computer system manufacturer through an if statement of `if($computerSystem.Manufacturer -match "VMware" -or $computerSystem.Manufacturer -match "Microsoft" -or $computerSystem.Manufacturer -match "VirtualBox")`. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has run system checks to determine if they were operating in a virtualized environment. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
GroupEvilnum | Evilnum has used a component called TerraLoader to check certain hardware and file information to detect sandboxed environments. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group has checked existing conditions, such as geographic location, device type, or system specification, before the victim is sent a malicious Word document. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
GroupOilRig | OilRig has used macros to verify if a mouse is connected to a compromised machine. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
GroupDarkhotel | Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
GroupWIRTE | WIRTE has configured C2 servers to check location and user-agent strings for victim endpoints to prevent sending a payload to sandboxed environments. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot performs a variety of system checks to determine if it is running in an analysis environment or sandbox, such as checking the number of processors (must be greater than two), and the amount of RAM (must be greater than 2GB). |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareSynAck | SynAck checks its directory location in an attempt to avoid launching in a sandbox. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareBumblebee | Bumblebee has the ability to search for designated file paths and Registry keys that indicate a virtualized environment from multiple products. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
Malwareyty | yty has some basic anti-sandbox detection that tries to detect Virtual PC, Sandboxie, and VMware. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareSmoke Loader | Smoke Loader scans processes to perform anti-VM checks. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareHeartCrypt | HeartCrypt will attempt to load non-existent DLLs in attempt to detect sandbox creation of a dummy DLL to prevent the program from crashing. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareGravityRAT | GravityRAT uses WMI to check the BIOS and manufacturer information for strings like "VMWare", "Virtual", and "XEN" and another WMI request to get the current temperature of the hardware to determine if it's a virtual machine environment. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwaremacOS.OSAMiner | macOS.OSAMiner can parse the output of the native `system_profiler` tool to determine if the machine is running with 4 cores. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareDUSTTRAP | DUSTTRAP decryption relies on the infected machine's `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGUID` value. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareSnip3 | Snip3 has the ability to detect Windows Sandbox, VMWare, or VirtualBox by querying `Win32_ComputerSystem` to extract the `Manufacturer` string. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareGuLoader | GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareWastedLocker | WastedLocker checked if UCOMIEnumConnections and IActiveScriptParseProcedure32 Registry keys were detected as part of its anti-analysis technique. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareInvisiMole | InvisiMole can check for artifacts of VirtualBox, Virtual PC and VMware environment, and terminate itself if they are detected. |
| T1497.001 System Checks |
MalwareWhisperGate | WhisperGate can stop its execution when it recognizes the presence of certain monitoring tools. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.