Anubhav, A., Jallepalli, D. (2016, September 23). Hancitor (AKA Chanitor) observed using multiple attack approaches. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
Not cited by any technique.
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1027.015 Compression |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has delivered compressed payloads in ZIP files to victims. |
| T1059.001 PowerShell |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has used PowerShell to execute commands. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has deleted files using the VBA |
| T1106 Native API |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has used |
| T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has decoded Base64 encoded URLs to insert a recipient’s name into the filename of the Word document. Hancitor has also extracted executables from ZIP files. |
| T1204.002 Malicious File |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has used malicious Microsoft Word documents, sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros. |
| T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
MalwareHancitor | Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails with malicious attachments. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
