ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

1213 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1059.006
Python
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used custom applications developed in python.

T1059.006
Python
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors' backdoors were written in Python and compiled with py2exe.

T1059.006
Python
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code with generating and executing numerous Python scripts including BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR to achieve their objectives.

T1059.007
JavaScript
CampaignOperation Dust Storm

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used JavaScript code.

T1059.007
JavaScript
CampaignWater Curupira Pikabot Distribution

Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution initial delivery included obfuscated JavaScript objects stored in password-protected ZIP archives.

T1059.007
JavaScript
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of encoded HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code.

T1059.007
JavaScript
CampaignPikabot Distribution February 2024

Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized obfuscated JavaScript files for initial Pikabot payload download.

T1059.007
JavaScript
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems.

T1059.008
Network Device CLI
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 accessed the Junos OS CLI on targeted devices.

T1059.008
Network Device CLI
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged the native CLI of the targeted FortiGate device.

T1059.009
Cloud API
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary utilized Cloud APIs for interacting with victim environments and exfiltrating data to include OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 API, and AWS API.

T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
CampaignShadowRay

During ShadowRay, threat actors downloaded a privilege escalation payload to gain root access.

T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan exploited software vulnerabilities in victim environments to escalate privileges during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.

T1069
Permission Groups Discovery
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the `Get-ManagementRoleAssignment` PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate Exchange management role assignments through an Exchange Management Shell.

T1069.001
Local Groups
CampaignOperation Digital Eye

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the local.exe tool to view group memberships.

T1069.001
Local Groups
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net localgroup "adminstrator" ` to identify accounts with local administrator rights.

T1069.001
Local Groups
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net group` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

T1069.001
Local Groups
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the command `net localgroup administrators` to list all administrators part of a local group.

T1069.002
Domain Groups
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors use the command `net group "domain admins" /dom` to enumerate domain groups.

T1069.002
Domain Groups
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used AdFind to enumerate domain groups.

T1069.003
Cloud Groups
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and their Active Directory attributes.

T1070
Indicator Removal
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors cleared logs to remove traces of their activity and restored compromised systems to a clean state to bypass manufacturer mitigations for CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887.

T1070
Indicator Removal
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 temporarily replaced legitimate utilities with their own, executed their payload, and then restored the original file.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group removed all previously delivered files from a compromised computer.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity removes on-disk copies of tools and other artifacts after it the primary botnet payload has been loaded into memory on the victim device.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capaple of removing scripts after execution.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that reduced their fingerprint on a compromised system by deleting malware-related files.

T1070.004
File Deletion
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, vba_macro.exe deletes itself after `FONTCACHE.DAT`, `rundll32.exe`, and the associated .lnk file is delivered.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors deleted `/tmp/test1.txt` on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs which was used to hold stolen configuration and cache files.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignOperation Digital Eye

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors deleted files delivered to compromised hosts, often named with the pattern do.* such as do.exe.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 routinely removed their tools, including custom backdoors, once remote access was achieved.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū

During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace deleted delivered tools and files from compromised hosts.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included multiple instances of file deletion or removal during execution and other adversary actions.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignAPT41 DUST

APT41 DUST deleted various artifacts from victim systems following use.

T1070.004
File Deletion
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, the threat actors consistently removed traces of their activity by first overwriting a file using `/c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & copy \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\system32\devmgr.dll \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\temp\LMAKSW.ps1 /y` and then deleting the overwritten file using `/c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & del \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\temp\LMAKSW.ps1`.

T1070.006
Timestomp
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors changed timestamps of multiple files on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to conceal malicious activity.

T1070.006
Timestomp
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute on tools.

T1070.006
Timestomp
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 modified timestamps of backdoors to match legitimate Windows files.

T1070.006
Timestomp
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary had Claude Code utilize `touch` to keep original timestamps of files in attempts to evade detection.

T1070.007
Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used an implant to delete logs associated with unauthorized access to targeted Junos OS devices.

T1070.008
Clear Mailbox Data
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 removed evidence of email export requests using `Remove-MailboxExportRequest`.

T1071
Application Layer Protocol
CampaignFrostyGoop Incident

During FrostyGoop Incident, the adversary initiated Layer Two Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP) connections to Moscow-based IP addresses.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group uses HTTP and HTTPS to contact actor-controlled C2 servers.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors issued HTTP `POST` requests to web shells with spoofed or empty Referrer headers, to circumvent authorization controls.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors used HTTP GET requests for C2.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

Mustang Panda used HTTP POST messages for command and control from PlugX installations during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse

During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used `wget` via HTTP to retrieve payloads.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests.

T1071.001
Web Protocols
CampaignIndian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions

During Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions, RedEcho network activity included SSL traffic over TCP 443 and HTTP traffic over non-standard ports.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.