Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1059.006 Python |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used custom applications developed in python. |
| T1059.006 Python |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors' backdoors were written in Python and compiled with py2exe. |
| T1059.006 Python |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code with generating and executing numerous Python scripts including BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR to achieve their objectives. |
| T1059.007 JavaScript |
CampaignOperation Dust Storm | During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used JavaScript code. |
| T1059.007 JavaScript |
CampaignWater Curupira Pikabot Distribution | Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution initial delivery included obfuscated JavaScript objects stored in password-protected ZIP archives. |
| T1059.007 JavaScript |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of encoded HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code. |
| T1059.007 JavaScript |
CampaignPikabot Distribution February 2024 | Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized obfuscated JavaScript files for initial Pikabot payload download. |
| T1059.007 JavaScript |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems. |
| T1059.008 Network Device CLI |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 accessed the Junos OS CLI on targeted devices. |
| T1059.008 Network Device CLI |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged the native CLI of the targeted FortiGate device. |
| T1059.009 Cloud API |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary utilized Cloud APIs for interacting with victim environments and exfiltrating data to include OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 API, and AWS API. |
| T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
CampaignShadowRay | During ShadowRay, threat actors downloaded a privilege escalation payload to gain root access. |
| T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan exploited software vulnerabilities in victim environments to escalate privileges during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1069 Permission Groups Discovery |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the `Get-ManagementRoleAssignment` PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate Exchange management role assignments through an Exchange Management Shell. |
| T1069.001 Local Groups |
CampaignOperation Digital Eye | During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the local.exe tool to view group memberships. |
| T1069.001 Local Groups |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net localgroup "adminstrator" ` to identify accounts with local administrator rights. |
| T1069.001 Local Groups |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net group` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1069.001 Local Groups |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the command `net localgroup administrators` to list all administrators part of a local group. |
| T1069.002 Domain Groups |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors use the command `net group "domain admins" /dom` to enumerate domain groups. |
| T1069.002 Domain Groups |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used AdFind to enumerate domain groups. |
| T1069.003 Cloud Groups |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and their Active Directory attributes. |
| T1070 Indicator Removal |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors cleared logs to remove traces of their activity and restored compromised systems to a clean state to bypass manufacturer mitigations for CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887. |
| T1070 Indicator Removal |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 temporarily replaced legitimate utilities with their own, executed their payload, and then restored the original file. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group removed all previously delivered files from a compromised computer. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity removes on-disk copies of tools and other artifacts after it the primary botnet payload has been loaded into memory on the victim device. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capaple of removing scripts after execution. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that reduced their fingerprint on a compromised system by deleting malware-related files. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, vba_macro.exe deletes itself after `FONTCACHE.DAT`, `rundll32.exe`, and the associated .lnk file is delivered. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors deleted `/tmp/test1.txt` on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs which was used to hold stolen configuration and cache files. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignOperation Digital Eye | During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors deleted files delivered to compromised hosts, often named with the pattern do.* such as do.exe. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 routinely removed their tools, including custom backdoors, once remote access was achieved. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace deleted delivered tools and files from compromised hosts. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included multiple instances of file deletion or removal during execution and other adversary actions. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignAPT41 DUST | APT41 DUST deleted various artifacts from victim systems following use. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, the threat actors consistently removed traces of their activity by first overwriting a file using `/c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & copy \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\system32\devmgr.dll \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\temp\LMAKSW.ps1 /y` and then deleting the overwritten file using `/c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & del \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\temp\LMAKSW.ps1`. |
| T1070.006 Timestomp |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors changed timestamps of multiple files on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to conceal malicious activity. |
| T1070.006 Timestomp |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used timestomping to modify the |
| T1070.006 Timestomp |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 modified timestamps of backdoors to match legitimate Windows files. |
| T1070.006 Timestomp |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary had Claude Code utilize `touch` to keep original timestamps of files in attempts to evade detection. |
| T1070.007 Clear Network Connection History and Configurations |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used an implant to delete logs associated with unauthorized access to targeted Junos OS devices. |
| T1070.008 Clear Mailbox Data |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 removed evidence of email export requests using `Remove-MailboxExportRequest`. |
| T1071 Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignFrostyGoop Incident | During FrostyGoop Incident, the adversary initiated Layer Two Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP) connections to Moscow-based IP addresses. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group uses HTTP and HTTPS to contact actor-controlled C2 servers. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors issued HTTP `POST` requests to web shells with spoofed or empty Referrer headers, to circumvent authorization controls. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used HTTP GET requests for C2. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | Mustang Panda used HTTP POST messages for command and control from PlugX installations during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used `wget` via HTTP to retrieve payloads. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
CampaignIndian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions | During Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions, RedEcho network activity included SSL traffic over TCP 443 and HTTP traffic over non-standard ports. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.