Sub-technique of T1070 Indicator Removal.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as Remote Services or External Remote Services. Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.
Network connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under :
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers
Windows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as C:\Users\\%username%\Documents\Default.rdp and `C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal
Server Client\Cache\`. Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in `/Library/Logs` and/or `/var/log/`).
Malicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as Disable or Modify System Firewall or tampering to enable Proxy. Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1070.007.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has cleared specific events that contained the threat actor’s IP address from multiple log sources. |
| GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has inspected server logs to remove their IPs. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareSUNBURST | SUNBURST also removed the firewall rules it created during execution. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used an implant to delete logs associated with unauthorized access to targeted Junos OS devices. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.