Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1564.002 Hidden Users |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has run |
| T1564.002 Hidden Users |
GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has modified the Registry to hide created user accounts. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT3 | APT3 has been known to use |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has used an information gathering module that will hide an AV software window from the victim. Kimsuky has also been known to use `-WindowStyle Hidden` to conceal PowerShell windows. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupGorgon Group | Gorgon Group has used |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group has used |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupFIN7 | FIN7 has used .txt files to conceal PowerShell commands. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupHigaisa | Higaisa used a payload that creates a hidden window. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupDarkHydrus | DarkHydrus has used |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has utilized the `ShowWindow` API function to hide the current window. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupDeep Panda | Deep Panda has used |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupToddyCat | ToddyCat has hidden malicious scripts using `powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden`. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has set the ShowWindow property of the Win32_ProcessStartup object to zero to hide PowerShell execution. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupCopyKittens | CopyKittens has used |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized PowerShell scripts that run without notifying the user of its execution to include `-nop -w hidden- ep bypass -enc`. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound malware has a function to determine whether the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden window. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT19 | APT19 used |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupNomadic Octopus | Nomadic Octopus executed PowerShell in a hidden window. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has configured malicious scripts to execute in hidden windows. |
| T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 used NTFS alternate data streams to hide their payloads. |
| T1564.005 Hidden File System |
GroupStrider | Strider has used a hidden file system that is stored as a file on disk. |
| T1564.005 Hidden File System |
GroupEquation | Equation has used an encrypted virtual file system stored in the Windows Registry. |
| T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider creates inbound rules on the compromised email accounts of security personnel to automatically delete emails from vendor security products. |
| T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules |
GroupFIN4 | FIN4 has created rules in victims' Microsoft Outlook accounts to automatically delete emails containing words such as “hacked," "phish," and “malware" in a likely attempt to prevent organizations from communicating about their activities. |
| T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has leveraged the PowerShell `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue` command to continue execution through system events. |
| T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 modified the startup file `/etc/init.d/localnet` to execute the line `nohup /bin/support &` so the script would run when the system was rebooted. |
| T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle executed SnappyTCP using the tool NoHup, which keeps the malware running on a system after exiting the shell or terminal. |
| T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used remote access tools that run AppleScript using ` nohup osascript` to ignore hangup signals. |
| T1564.012 File/Path Exclusions |
GroupTurla | Turla has placed LunarWeb install files into directories that are excluded from scanning. |
| T1564.012 File/Path Exclusions |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has added Microsoft Defender exclusions to include `C:\Windows\System32` to suppress detection of dropped tooling. |
| T1565 Data Manipulation |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has injected fraudulent transactions into compromised networks that mimic legitimate behavior to siphon off incremental amounts of money. |
| T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used DYEPACK to create, delete, and alter records in databases used for SWIFT transactions. |
| T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used DYEPACK to manipulate SWIFT messages en route to a printer. |
| T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used DYEPACK.FOX to manipulate PDF data as it is accessed to remove traces of fraudulent SWIFT transactions from the data displayed to the end user. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has used spearphishing to gain initial access and intelligence. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupAppleJeus | AppleJeus has used spearphishing emails to distribute malicious payloads. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupMuddyWater | MuddyWater has sent phishing emails to targets from the email address support@microsoftonlines[.]com. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle used spear phishing to gain initial access to victims. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupAxiom | Axiom has used spear phishing to initially compromise victims. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupGOLD SOUTHFIELD | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted malicious spam (malspam) campaigns to gain access to victim's machines. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupINC Ransom | INC Ransom has used phishing to gain initial access. |
| T1566 Phishing |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has emailed victims threatening messages. VOID MANTICORE has used phishing as an initial access vector. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has conducted spearphishing campaigns using malicious email attachments. APT38 has sent fake Zoom support emails with malicious attachments. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
GroupElderwood | Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing malicious attachments. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
GroupSideCopy | SideCopy has sent spearphishing emails with malicious hta file attachments. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns. Kimsuky has also distributed emails with attached compressed zip files that contained malicious .LNK files masquerading as legitimate files. Kimsuky has delivered tailored PDF documents that contain malicious links. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
GroupEXOTIC LILY | EXOTIC LILY conducted an e-mail thread-hijacking campaign with malicious ISO attachments. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
Groupadmin@338 | admin@338 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.