ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

1213 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1040
Network Sniffing
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used a passive backdoor to act as a libpcap-based packet sniffer.

T1040
Network Sniffing
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy’s network sniffer module to discover user credentials being sent over the network between the local LAN and the power grid’s industrial control systems.

T1040
Network Sniffing
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included network packet capture and sniffing for data collection in victim environments.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors exfiltrated stolen credentials and internal data over HTTPS to C2 infrastructure.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which sent the data back to the adversary's C2.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 uploaded specified files from compromised devices to a remote server.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uploaded stolen files to their C2 servers.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used HTTP to transfer data from compromised Exchange servers.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor included use of existing command and control channels for data exfiltration.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the XServer backdoor to exfiltrate data.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan exfiltrated collected data over existing command and control channels during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.

T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
CampaignC0018

During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign

During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to enumerate internal network services and endpoints across targeted environments using browser automation via MCP, including databases, container registries, admin interfaces, and workflow orchestration platforms.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors executed the Advanced Port Scanner tool on compromised systems.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized Ping, the Advanced Port Scanner and Advanced IP Scanner to enumerate network devices.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors scanned for open ports and used nbtscan to find NETBIOS nameservers.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
CampaignC0027

During C0027, used RustScan to scan for open ports on targeted ESXi appliances.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
CampaignCostaRicto

During CostaRicto, the threat actors employed nmap and pscan to scan target environments.

T1046
Network Service Discovery
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary instructed Claude Code to use BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR to enumerate ports on victim devices and fed it into OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 API for analysis along with other system information.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used WMIC to executed a remote XSL script.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used WMI for execution.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running as well as to determine the operating system version.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignC0018

During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host (`wmiprvse.exe`) to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the `DownloadString` method.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors used `wmic` and `rundll32` to load Cobalt Strike onto a target host.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used WMI to modify Windows Defender settings.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used WMI for the remote execution of files for lateral movement.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū

During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used WMI to proxy execution of UPPERCUT.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignFunnyDream

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used `wmiexec.vbs` to run remote commands.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, WMI in scripts were used for remote execution and system surveys.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors has used WMI to execute commands.

T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.

T1048.002
Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 exfiltrated collected data over a simple HTTPS request to a password-protected archive staged on a victim's OWA servers.

T1048.003
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries exfiltrated data to an actor-controlled infrastructure using HTTP POSTs.

T1048.003
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 exfiltrated victim data via DNS lookups by encoding and prepending it as subdomains to the attacker-controlled domain.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign

During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to map internal network architecture and access relationships.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
CampaignFunnyDream

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used netstat to discover network connections on remote systems.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net session`, `net use`, and `netstat` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries identified network connections utilizing `netstat -nao` and `netstat -r`.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors collected a list of open connections on the infected system using `netstat` and checks whether it has an internet connection.

T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries set FortiGate scheduled tasks to run the adversary generated CLI scripts weekly.

T1053.003
Cron
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse

During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors configured cron jobs to retrieve payloads from actor-controlled infrastructure.

T1053.003
Cron
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to escalate privileges by modifying a crontab script to inject an SSH key into root’s `authorized_keys` file and then restore the file modification time, so the crontab script appeared unchanged.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used scheduled tasks to help establish persistence.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: `/Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR`, named "WinUpdate"

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack

In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles installed scheduled tasks defined in XML files.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignJuicy Mix

During Juicy Mix, OilRig used VBS droppers to schedule tasks for persistence.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used scheduled task XML triggers.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.