Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1040 Network Sniffing |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used a passive backdoor to act as a libpcap-based packet sniffer. |
| T1040 Network Sniffing |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy’s network sniffer module to discover user credentials being sent over the network between the local LAN and the power grid’s industrial control systems. |
| T1040 Network Sniffing |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included network packet capture and sniffing for data collection in victim environments. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors exfiltrated stolen credentials and internal data over HTTPS to C2 infrastructure. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which sent the data back to the adversary's C2. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 uploaded specified files from compromised devices to a remote server. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uploaded stolen files to their C2 servers. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used HTTP to transfer data from compromised Exchange servers. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included use of existing command and control channels for data exfiltration. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the XServer backdoor to exfiltrate data. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan exfiltrated collected data over existing command and control channels during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
CampaignC0018 | During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to enumerate internal network services and endpoints across targeted environments using browser automation via MCP, including databases, container registries, admin interfaces, and workflow orchestration platforms. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors executed the Advanced Port Scanner tool on compromised systems. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized Ping, the Advanced Port Scanner and Advanced IP Scanner to enumerate network devices. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors scanned for open ports and used nbtscan to find NETBIOS nameservers. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, used RustScan to scan for open ports on targeted ESXi appliances. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
CampaignCostaRicto | During CostaRicto, the threat actors employed nmap and pscan to scan target environments. |
| T1046 Network Service Discovery |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary instructed Claude Code to use BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR to enumerate ports on victim devices and fed it into OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 API for analysis along with other system information. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used WMIC to executed a remote XSL script. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used WMI for execution. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running as well as to determine the operating system version. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignC0018 | During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host (`wmiprvse.exe`) to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the `DownloadString` method. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors used `wmic` and `rundll32` to load Cobalt Strike onto a target host. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used WMI to modify Windows Defender settings. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used WMI for the remote execution of files for lateral movement. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used WMI to proxy execution of UPPERCUT. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignFunnyDream | During FunnyDream, the threat actors used `wmiexec.vbs` to run remote commands. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, WMI in scripts were used for remote execution and system surveys. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors has used WMI to execute commands. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket. |
| T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 exfiltrated collected data over a simple HTTPS request to a password-protected archive staged on a victim's OWA servers. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries exfiltrated data to an actor-controlled infrastructure using HTTP POSTs. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 exfiltrated victim data via DNS lookups by encoding and prepending it as subdomains to the attacker-controlled domain. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to map internal network architecture and access relationships. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
CampaignFunnyDream | During FunnyDream, the threat actors used netstat to discover network connections on remote systems. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net session`, `net use`, and `netstat` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries identified network connections utilizing `netstat -nao` and `netstat -r`. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors collected a list of open connections on the infected system using `netstat` and checks whether it has an internet connection. |
| T1053 Scheduled Task/Job |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries set FortiGate scheduled tasks to run the adversary generated CLI scripts weekly. |
| T1053.003 Cron |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors configured cron jobs to retrieve payloads from actor-controlled infrastructure. |
| T1053.003 Cron |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to escalate privileges by modifying a crontab script to inject an SSH key into root’s `authorized_keys` file and then restore the file modification time, so the crontab script appeared unchanged. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used scheduled tasks to help establish persistence. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: `/Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR`, named "WinUpdate" |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles installed scheduled tasks defined in XML files. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignJuicy Mix | During Juicy Mix, OilRig used VBS droppers to schedule tasks for persistence. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used scheduled task XML triggers. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.