Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File |
CampaignAPT41 DUST | APT41 DUST used encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory. |
| T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used a DLL that included an XOR-encoded section. |
| T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to base64-encode the exploit payload to avoid character restrictions. |
| T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors limited Rclone's bandwidth setting during exfiltration. |
| T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits |
CampaignC0026 | During C0026, the threat actors split encrypted archives containing stolen files and information into 3MB parts prior to exfiltration. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors executed `whoami` on victim machines to enumerate user context and validate privilege levels. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to enumerate hosts and gather username, machine name, and administrative permissions information. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignC0018 | During C0018, the threat actors collected `whoami` information via PowerShell scripts. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignOperation Digital Eye | During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used `GetUserInfo` to identify current user information. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `query user` and `whoami` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used password cracking and pass-the-hash tools to discover usernames and passwords. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors enumerated sessions and users on a remote host, and identified privileged users logged into a targeted system. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 used `whoami` to gather information from victim machines. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary utilized Claude Code to discover the user details through `whoami`. |
| T1036 Masquerading |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity involves changing process filename to |
| T1036 Masquerading |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document. |
| T1036 Masquerading |
CampaignOperation Dust Storm | For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files. |
| T1036 Masquerading |
CampaignC0018 | During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename. |
| T1036 Masquerading |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors named a binary file `compareForfor.jpg` to disguise it as a JPG file. |
| T1036 Masquerading |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app. |
| T1036 Masquerading |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor involved the use of digital certificates on adversary-controlled network infrastructure that mimicked the formatting used by legitimate Cisco ASA appliances. |
| T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary also forged digital signatures of tax documents using a combination of 96 byte padded SHA-256 hash and base64-encoding resemble a legitimately signed PDF file. |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity installation steps include first identifying, then stopping, any process containing |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors named a malicious scheduled task "WinUpdate" for persistence. |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | Mustang Panda masqueraded Registry run keys as legitimate-looking service names such as `OneNote Update` during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations. |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 named tasks `\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCacheManager` in order to appear legitimate. |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
CampaignAPT41 DUST | APT41 DUST disguised DUSTPAN as a legitimate Windows binary such as `w3wp.exe` or `conn.exe`. |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 used `SCHTASKS /Change` to modify legitimate scheduled tasks to run malicious code. |
| T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service |
Campaign2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Systemd service units to masquerade GOGETTER malware as legitimate or seemingly legitimate services. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 created multiple strains of malware using names to mimic legitimate binaries such as appid, to, irad, lmpad, jdosd, and oemd. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter | During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors installed Rising Sun in the Startup folder and disguised it as `mssync.exe`. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a legitimate Windows executable and secure directory for their payloads to bypass UAC. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignC0018 | For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to `vmware_kb.exe`. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignJ-magic Campaign | During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors used the name “JunoscriptService” to masquerade malware as the Junos automation scripting service. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignOperation Digital Eye | During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors attempted to make filenames appear legitimate by tailoring them to the victim organization. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors renamed ROADSWEEP to GoXML.exe and ZeroCleare to cl.exe. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 renamed software and DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to `rundll32.exe` to allow it to blend in with other Windows system files. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries created rules that mimicked the name of an institution already present in the network device configuration to avoid detection. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, the threat actors renamed some tools and executables to appear as legitimate programs. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group disguised malicious template files as JPEG files to avoid detection. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace disguised LNK and SFX (self-extracting) files as Word documents to lure victims into opening malicious files. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as `.txt` files. |
| T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, “admin” and “система” (System). |
| T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor used malicious boot scripts to install the Line Runner backdoor on victim devices. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors collected files from network shared drives prior to network encryption. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.