ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

1213 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1027.013
Encrypted/Encoded File
CampaignAPT41 DUST

APT41 DUST used encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory.

T1027.013
Encrypted/Encoded File
CampaignNight Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors used a DLL that included an XOR-encoded section.

T1027.013
Encrypted/Encoded File
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to base64-encode the exploit payload to avoid character restrictions.

T1030
Data Transfer Size Limits
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors limited Rclone's bandwidth setting during exfiltration.

T1030
Data Transfer Size Limits
CampaignC0026

During C0026, the threat actors split encrypted archives containing stolen files and information into 3MB parts prior to exfiltration.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors executed `whoami` on victim machines to enumerate user context and validate privilege levels.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to enumerate hosts and gather username, machine name, and administrative permissions information.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignC0018

During C0018, the threat actors collected `whoami` information via PowerShell scripts.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignOperation Digital Eye

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used `GetUserInfo` to identify current user information.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `query user` and `whoami` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignNight Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors used password cracking and pass-the-hash tools to discover usernames and passwords.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors enumerated sessions and users on a remote host, and identified privileged users logged into a targeted system.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 used `whoami` to gather information from victim machines.

T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary utilized Claude Code to discover the user details through `whoami`.

T1036
Masquerading
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity involves changing process filename to pr_set_mm_exe_file and process name to pr_set_name during later infection stages.

T1036
Masquerading
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document.

T1036
Masquerading
CampaignOperation Dust Storm

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files.

T1036
Masquerading
CampaignC0018

During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.

T1036
Masquerading
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors named a binary file `compareForfor.jpg` to disguise it as a JPG file.

T1036
Masquerading
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.

T1036
Masquerading
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor involved the use of digital certificates on adversary-controlled network infrastructure that mimicked the formatting used by legitimate Cisco ASA appliances.

T1036.001
Invalid Code Signature
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary also forged digital signatures of tax documents using a combination of 96 byte padded SHA-256 hash and base64-encoding resemble a legitimately signed PDF file.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity installation steps include first identifying, then stopping, any process containing [kworker\/0:1], then renaming its initial installation stage to this process name.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors named a malicious scheduled task "WinUpdate" for persistence.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

Mustang Panda masqueraded Registry run keys as legitimate-looking service names such as `OneNote Update` during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 named tasks `\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCacheManager` in order to appear legitimate.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service
CampaignAPT41 DUST

APT41 DUST disguised DUSTPAN as a legitimate Windows binary such as `w3wp.exe` or `conn.exe`.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 used `SCHTASKS /Change` to modify legitimate scheduled tasks to run malicious code.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service
Campaign2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Systemd service units to masquerade GOGETTER malware as legitimate or seemingly legitimate services.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 created multiple strains of malware using names to mimic legitimate binaries such as appid, to, irad, lmpad, jdosd, and oemd.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter

During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors installed Rising Sun in the Startup folder and disguised it as `mssync.exe`.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignOperation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a legitimate Windows executable and secure directory for their payloads to bypass UAC.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack

In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignC0018

For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to `vmware_kb.exe`.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignJ-magic Campaign

During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors used the name “JunoscriptService” to masquerade malware as the Junos automation scripting service.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignOperation Digital Eye

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors attempted to make filenames appear legitimate by tailoring them to the victim organization.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors renamed ROADSWEEP to GoXML.exe and ZeroCleare to cl.exe.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignC0032

During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 renamed software and DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to `rundll32.exe` to allow it to blend in with other Windows system files.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries created rules that mimicked the name of an institution already present in the network device configuration to avoid detection.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, the threat actors renamed some tools and executables to appear as legitimate programs.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections.

T1036.008
Masquerade File Type
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group disguised malicious template files as JPEG files to avoid detection.

T1036.008
Masquerade File Type
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū

During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace disguised LNK and SFX (self-extracting) files as Word documents to lure victims into opening malicious files.

T1036.008
Masquerade File Type
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as `.txt` files.

T1036.010
Masquerade Account Name
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, “admin” and “система” (System).

T1037
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
CampaignArcaneDoor

ArcaneDoor used malicious boot scripts to install the Line Runner backdoor on victim devices.

T1039
Data from Network Shared Drive
CampaignC0015

During C0015, the threat actors collected files from network shared drives prior to network encryption.

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