ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17636 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareOctopus

Octopus can collect system drive and disk size information.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareKillDisk

KillDisk retrieves the hard disk name by calling the CreateFileA to \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 API.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareQilin

Qilin has used `GetLogicalDrives()` and `EnumResourceW()` to locate mounted drives and shares.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareSoreFang

SoreFang can collect disk space information on victim machines by executing Systeminfo.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwarePasam

Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve information like free disk space.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareShadowPad

ShadowPad has discovered system information including volume serial numbers.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareINC Ransomware

INC Ransomware can discover and mount hidden drives to encrypt them.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareZox

Zox can enumerate attached drives.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareSLOTHFULMEDIA

SLOTHFULMEDIA has collected disk information from a victim machine.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareFALLCHILL

FALLCHILL can collect information about installed disks from the victim.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
ToolSILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can collect information related to a compromised host, including a list of drives.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
ToolAsyncRAT

AsyncRAT can check the disk size through the values obtained with `DeviceInfo.`

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
ToolCrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can enumerate the system drives and associated system name.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareZeroCleare

ZeroCleare can use the `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX`, `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY`, and `IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO` system calls to compute disk size.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareMiniFast

MiniFast has enumerated logical drives on impacted devices.

T1680
Local Storage Discovery
MalwareThe Gentlemen Ransomware

The Gentlemen Ransomware has discovered and enumerated valid drives through a PowerShell script. The Gentlemen Ransomware has also scanned for letter drives from A: to Z: using `os.Stat` to determine valid drives.

T1681
Search Threat Vendor Data
GroupUNC3886

UNC3886 has replaced indicators mentioned in open-source threat intelligence publications at times under a week after their release.

T1681
Search Threat Vendor Data
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has registered accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services to check for reporting associated with their infrastructure and to evaluate new potential infrastructure.

T1682
Query Public AI Services
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has used LLMs to identify think tanks, government organizations, and experts to inform targeting for spearphishing campaigns.

T1682
Query Public AI Services
GroupAPT42

APT42 has leveraged LLMs to search for official emails to build target lists, and conduct reconnaissance on potential business partners.

T1682
Query Public AI Services
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary used Anthropic’s Claude Code and OpenAI’s GPT-4.1 AI to conduct operations.

T1683
Generate Content
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign

During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary utilized Claude Code to automatically generate comprehensive documentation throughout the phases of the attack, including discovered services, harvested credentials, sensitive data, exploitation techniques, and complete attack progression.

T1683
Generate Content
MalwareBACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR

BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR has created a skills file titled `AI LATERAL_SUGGESTIONS.md` that included tables mapped with harvested credentials with potential victim internal servers.

T1683.001
Written Content
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has created fake social media accounts such as LinkedIn and Telegram accounts for their targeting efforts.

T1683.001
Written Content
GroupAPT-C-36

APT-C-36 has generated email content impersonating official notifications and documents that direct victims to execute malicious payloads.

T1683.001
Written Content
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has created Dune-themed GitHub repositories using stolen tokens.

T1683.001
Written Content
MalwareKali365

Kali365 has generated tailored branded phishing lures to target victims utilizing a myriad of reputable services and brands that entice users to interact with the content. Kali365 has also been enabled with AI such as Claude Sonnet that evaluates emails and generates tailored responses to facilitate BEC activities.

T1683.001
Written Content
GroupThe Gentlemen

The Gentlemen has utilized branded code and ransom notes.

T1683.001
Written Content
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to generate forged tax compliance certificates with the data collected by custom python scripts.

T1683.001
Written Content
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has created career-themed phishing lures to entice victims.

T1683.001
Written Content
GroupAPT38

APT38 has created decoy content that resembles legitimate guidance for support to victims that contain hidden malicious actions.

T1683.002
Audio-Visual Content
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has used AI to clone video-conferencing applications to distribute their BeaverTail malware. They have also used AI to create deepfake videos.

T1683.002
Audio-Visual Content
GroupAPT-C-36

APT-C-36 has used phishing pages appearing like legitimate banking login portals to compromise credentials.

T1683.002
Audio-Visual Content
GroupAPT38

APT38 has created fictitious profiles on social media utilizing fake photos and personas to entice users to engage in the schemes.

T1683.002
Audio-Visual Content
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has generated fictitious job-related themed websites that entice users to interact and launch malicious actions.

NIMBUS MANTICORE has also utilized decoy documents and files to provide a sense of legitimacy to the user.

NIMBUS MANTICORE has leveraged fake Microsoft Outlook login windows prompts to entice victims to enter their credentials.

T1683.002
Audio-Visual Content
GroupThe Gentlemen

The Gentlemen has leveraged a branded graphic that is placed on the systems desktop wallpaper that symbolizes the association of malicious activity to the group.

T1684
Social Engineering
GroupShinyHunters

ShinyHunters has used social engineering to demand payment from victims.

T1684.001
Impersonation
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group impersonated HR hiring personnel through LinkedIn messages and conducted interviews with victims in order to deceive them into downloading malware.

T1684.001
Impersonation
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors impersonated IT support personnel in voice calls with victims at times claiming to be addressing enterprise-wide connectivity issues.

T1684.001
Impersonation
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider impersonated legitimate IT personnel in phone calls and text messages either to direct victims to a credential harvesting site or getting victims to run commercial remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has also impersonated legitimate people, such as a foreign advisor, an embassy employee, and a think tank employee. Kimsuky has also purported to be a Japanese diplomat to communicate with the victims.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupAPT41

APT41 impersonated an employee at a video game developer company to send phishing emails.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupMuddyWater

MuddyWater has used support@microsoftonlines[.]com to send phishing emails that masqueraded as security updates from Microsoft. MuddyWater has also impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain info@tmcell.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupStorm-1811

Storm-1811 impersonates help desk and IT support personnel for phishing and social engineering purposes during initial access to victim environments.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupScattered Spider

Scattered Spider utilized social engineering to compel IT help desk personnel to reset passwords and MFA tokens. Scattered Spider has also used Microsoft Teams to pose as internal IT support or help desk personnel.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview had impersonated HR hiring personnel through social media, job board notifications, and conducted interviews with victims in order to entice them to download malware disguised as legitimate applications or malicious scripts from code repositories.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupSaint Bear

Saint Bear has impersonated government and related entities in both phishing activity and developing web sites with malicious links that mimic legitimate resources.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupMirrorFace

MirrorFace has sent targeted emails purporting to be from a Japanese political party’s PR department.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupStar Blizzard

Star Blizzard has registered impersonation email accounts to spoof experts in a particular field or individuals and organizations affiliated with the intended target.

T1684.001
Impersonation
GroupAPT28

LAMEHUG has sent spearphishing emails impersonating Ukrainian government officials.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.