Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
MalwareEbury | When Ebury is running as an OpenSSH server, it uses LD_PRELOAD to inject its malicious shared module in to programs launched by SSH sessions. Ebury hooks the following functions from `libc` to inject into subprocesses; `system`, `popen`, `execve`, `execvpe`, `execv`, `execvp`, and `execl`. |
| T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
MalwareXCSSET | XCSSET adds malicious file paths to the |
| T1574.006 Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
MalwareHiddenWasp | HiddenWasp adds itself as a shared object to the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. |
| T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable |
MalwareBRICKSTORM | BRICKSTORM has checked hard-coded paths of `/etc/sysconfig/` or `/etc/sysconfig/network` prior to execution and loading file contents from that path. |
| T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable |
MalwareDarkGate | DarkGate overrides the |
| T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable |
ToolPowerSploit | PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable. |
| T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable |
ToolEmpire | Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable. |
| T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking |
ToolPowerSploit | PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities. |
| T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking |
ToolEmpire | Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities. |
| T1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path |
ToolPowerSploit | PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit unquoted path vulnerabilities. |
| T1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path |
ToolEmpire | Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit unquoted path vulnerabilities. |
| T1574.010 Services File Permissions Weakness |
MalwareBlackEnergy | One variant of BlackEnergy locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish persistence. |
| T1574.011 Services Registry Permissions Weakness |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a batch file that modified the COMSysApp service to load a malicious ipnet.dll payload and to load a DLL into the `svchost.exe` process. |
| T1574.012 COR_PROFILER |
GroupBlue Mockingbird | Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe and Windows Registry modifications to set the COR_PROFILER environment variable to execute a malicious DLL whenever a process loads the .NET CLR. |
| T1574.012 COR_PROFILER |
MalwareDarkTortilla | DarkTortilla can detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active. |
| T1574.013 KernelCallbackTable |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has abused the |
| T1574.013 KernelCallbackTable |
MalwareFinFisher | FinFisher has used the |
| T1574.014 AppDomainManager |
MalwareIMAPLoader | IMAPLoader is executed via the AppDomainManager injection technique. |
| T1574.014 AppDomainManager |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has leveraged AppDomain Hijacking facilitated through a trojanized `.config` file. |
| T1578.001 Create Snapshot |
ToolPacu | Pacu can create snapshots of EBS volumes and RDS instances. |
| T1578.002 Create Cloud Instance |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used access to the victim's Azure tenant to create Azure VMs. |
| T1578.002 Create Cloud Instance |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has created Amazon EC2 instances within the victim's environment. |
| T1578.002 Create Cloud Instance |
GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has created new virtual machines within the target's cloud environment after leveraging credential access to cloud assets. |
| T1578.003 Delete Cloud Instance |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has conducted mass deletion of cloud data stores and resources from Azure subscriptions. |
| T1578.003 Delete Cloud Instance |
GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources in the cloud to trigger the organization's incident and crisis response process. |
| T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider enumerates cloud environments including Amazon Web Services (AWS) S3 buckets to identify server and backup management infrastructure, resource access, databases and storage containers . |
| T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has enumerated compromised cloud environments to identify critical assets, data stores, and back resources. |
| T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery |
ToolPacu | Pacu can enumerate AWS infrastructure, such as EC2 instances. |
| T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery |
ToolTruffleHog | TruffleHog can enumerate AWS Infrastructure to include EC2 instances. |
| T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery |
MalwareTeamPCP Cloud Stealer | TeamPCP Cloud Stealer has the ability to search for generic GitHub runners. |
| T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has used Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) Browser and WinSCP to collect information on S3 bucket configurations. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupIndrik Spider | Indrik Spider has purchased access to victim VPNs to facilitate access to victim environments. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has used funds from stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to acquire operational infrastructure. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team used various third-party email campaign management services to deliver phishing emails. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has used services such as Astrill VPN. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle accessed victim networks from VPN service provider networks. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupStar Blizzard | Star Blizzard has used HubSpot and MailerLite marketing platform services to hide the true sender of phishing emails. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupEmber Bear | Ember Bear uses services such as IVPN, SurfShark, and Tor to add anonymization to operations. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupAgrius | Agrius typically uses commercial VPN services for anonymizing last-hop traffic to victim networks, such as ProtonVPN. |
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
GroupTeamPCP | In May 2026 TeamPCP announced co-ownership of the BreachForums cybercriminal forum claiming responsibility for platform operations, dispute resolution, personnel vetting, and hosting monetary contests. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group registered a domain name identical to that of a compromised company as part of their BEC effort. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors registered C2 domains to spoof legitimate Microsoft domains. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | Mustang Panda registered adversary-controlled domains during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations that were re-registrations of expired domains. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, threat actors registered domains for C2. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignOperation Dust Storm | For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established domains as part of their operational infrastructure. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignIndian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions | During Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions, RedEcho registered domains spoofing Indian critical infrastructure entities. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignOperation Spalax | For Operation Spalax, the threat actors registered hundreds of domains using Duck DNS and DNS Exit. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignC0021 | For C0021, the threat actors registered domains for use in C2. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignOperation Ghost | For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered domains for use in C2 including some crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 acquired C2 domains, sometimes through resellers. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.