Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1497.003 Time Based Checks |
MalwareStrifeWater | StrifeWater can modify its sleep time responses from the default of 20-22 seconds. |
| T1497.003 Time Based Checks |
Toolevilginx2 | evilginx2 has the ability to hide phishing lures for a set time to avoid scanning by sandboxes. |
| T1497.003 Time Based Checks |
ToolBrute Ratel C4 | Brute Ratel C4 can call `NtDelayExecution` to pause execution. |
| T1497.003 Time Based Checks |
MalwareCanisterWorm | CanisterWorm has leveraged a Sleep setting of five minutes before executing tasks to evade sandbox environments. |
| T1497.003 Time Based Checks |
MalwareBADFLICK | BADFLICK has delayed communication to the actor-controlled IP address by 5 minutes. |
| T1497.003 Time Based Checks |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used the `Sleep` API before C2 communication. |
| T1498 Network Denial of Service |
GroupAPT28 | In 2016, APT28 conducted a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against the World Anti-Doping Agency. |
| T1498 Network Denial of Service |
MalwareLucifer | Lucifer can execute TCP, UDP, and HTTP denial of service (DoS) attacks. |
| T1498 Network Denial of Service |
MalwareNKAbuse | NKAbuse enables multiple types of network denial of service capabilities across several protocols post-installation. |
| T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team temporarily disrupted service to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector websites after compromising a Georgian web hosting provider in 2019. |
| T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service |
MalwareOnionDuke | OnionDuke has the capability to use a Denial of Service module. |
| T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service |
MalwareZxShell | ZxShell has a feature to perform SYN flood attack on a host. |
| T1499.004 Application or System Exploitation |
MalwareIndustroyer | Industroyer uses a custom DoS tool that leverages CVE-2015-5374 and targets hardcoded IP addresses of Siemens SIPROTEC devices. |
| T1505 Server Software Component |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary had Claude Code discover and utilize pre-established stored procedures to query the victim database. |
| T1505.001 SQL Stored Procedures |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used various MS-SQL stored procedures. |
| T1505.001 SQL Stored Procedures |
MalwareStuxnet | Stuxnet used xp_cmdshell to store and execute SQL code. |
| T1505.002 Transport Agent |
MalwareLightNeuron | LightNeuron has used a malicious Microsoft Exchange transport agent for persistence. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignFrostyGoop Incident | FrostyGoop Incident deployed a ReGeorg variant web shell to impacted systems following initial access for persistence. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors followed exploitation of SharePoint servers with installation of a malicious .aspx web shell (spinstall0.aspx) that was written to the `_layouts/15/` directory, granting persistent HTTP-based access. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used multiple web shells to maintain presence on compromised Connect Secure appliances such as WIREFIRE, GLASSTOKEN, BUSHWALK, LIGHTWIRE, and FRAMESTING. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignOperation Digital Eye | During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors deployed a PHP-based webshell to maintain persistent access. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | For HomeLand Justice, threat actors used .aspx webshells named pickers.aspx, error4.aspx, and ClientBin.aspx, to maintain persistence. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles planted Web shells on Outlook Exchange servers. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors generated a web shell within a vulnerable Enterprise Resource Planning Web Application Server as a persistence mechanism. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignAPT41 DUST | APT41 DUST involved use of web shells such as ANTSWORD and BLUEBEAM for persistence. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation resulted in the deployment of the VersaMem web shell for follow-on activity. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used their own web shells, as well as those previously placed on target systems by other threat actors, for reconnaissance and lateral movement. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan relied extensively on web shell use following initial access for persistence and command execution purposes in victim environments during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells through the creation of malicious ViewState objects. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
Campaign2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the Neo-REGEORG webshell on an internet-facing server. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used web shells for persistence or to ensure redundant access. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupBlackByte | BlackByte has used ASPX web shells following exploitation of vulnerabilities in services such as Microsoft Exchange. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupGALLIUM | GALLIUM used Web shells to persist in victim environments and assist in execution and exfiltration. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has used modified versions of open source PHP web shells to maintain access, often adding "Dinosaur" references within the code. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used webshells, including ones named AuditReport.jspx and iisstart.aspx, in compromised environments. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has commonly created Web shells on victims' publicly accessible email and web servers, which they used to maintain access to a victim network and download additional malicious files. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 has used Web shells to maintain access to victim websites. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has deployed multiple web shells on compromised servers including SIMPLESEESHARP, SPORTSBALL, China Chopper, and ASPXSpy. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has used webshells including P.A.S. Webshell to maintain access to victim networks. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has been linked to web shells following likely server compromise as an initial access vector into victim networks. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used China Chopper web shells to maintain access to victims’ environments. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupAPT39 | APT39 has installed ANTAK and ASPXSPY web shells. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupMoses Staff | Moses Staff has dropped a web shell onto a compromised system. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupOilRig | OilRig has used web shells, often to maintain access to a victim network. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has started a web service in the target host and wait for the adversary to connect, acting as a web shell. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupSea Turtle | Sea Turtle deployed the SnappyTCP web shell during intrusion operations. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan relies on web shells for an initial foothold as well as persistence into the victim's systems. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has installed web shells on exploited Microsoft Exchange servers. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has utilized webshells to an exploited Microsoft Exchange Server. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupBackdoorDiplomacy | BackdoorDiplomacy has used web shells to establish an initial foothold and for lateral movement within a victim's system. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.