Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
Published
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1012 Query Registry |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has run commands such as `reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[service name]\Parameters` to verify if installed implants are running as a service. |
| T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `ipconfig` and `netstat` to gather network information on compromised hosts. |
| T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex will gather system information such as MAC and IP addresses. |
| T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has performed checks to determine if a victim machine is able to access the Internet. |
| T1027.002 Software Packing |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex has used VMProtect to pack and obscure itself. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex encrypts collected system data then exfiltrates via existing command and control channels. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used WMI to enable lateral movement. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `netstat` to identify system network connections. |
| T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex is designed to be dynamic link library (DLL) injected into an infected endpoint and executed directly in memory. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has locally staged compressed and archived data for follow-on exfiltration. |
| T1074.001 Local Data Staging |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex gathers host information and stages it locally as a RAR file prior to exfiltration. Sagerunex stores logged data in an encrypted file located at `%TEMP%/TS_FB56.tmp` during execution. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex gathers information from the infected system such as hostname. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `dir` to examine the local filesystem of victim machines. |
| T1087.001 Local Account |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `net` to profile local system users. |
| T1087.002 Domain Account |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used `net` commands and tools such as AdFind to profile domain accounts associated with victim machines and make Active Directory queries. |
| T1090 Proxy |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex uses several proxy configuration settings to ensure connectivity. |
| T1090.001 Internal Proxy |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used publicly available tools such as the Venom proxy tool to proxy traffic out of victim environments. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used tools such as the publicly available HTran tool for proxying traffic in victim environments. |
| T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex has used virtual private servers (VPS) for command and control traffic as well as third-party cloud services in more recent variants. |
| T1102.003 One-Way Communication |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex has used web services such as Twitter for command and control purposes. |
| T1106 Native API |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex calls the `WaitForSingleObject` API function as part of time-check logic. |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has installed tools such as Sagerunex by writing them to the Windows registry. |
| T1134 Access Token Manipulation |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has retrieved process tokens for processes to adjust the privileges of the launch process or other items. |
| T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex uses a custom decryption routine to unpack itself during installation. |
| T1480 Execution Guardrails |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex uses a "servicemain" function to verify its environment to ensure it can only be executed as a service, as well as the existence of a configuration file in a specified directory. |
| T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools to steal cookies from browsers such as Chrome. |
| T1543.003 Windows Service |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has configured tools such as Sagerunex to run as Windows services. |
| T1560.001 Archive via Utility |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used WinRAR for compressing data in RAR format. |
| T1560.001 Archive via Utility |
MalwareSagerunex | Sagerunex has archived collected materials in RAR format. |
| T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used custom tools to compress and archive data on victim systems. |
| T1588.002 Tool |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools such as a Python-based cookie stealer for Chrome browsers, Impacket, and the Venom proxy tool. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.