Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupLotus Blossom | Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `netstat` to identify system network connections. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupChimera | Chimera has used |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupBackdoorDiplomacy | BackdoorDiplomacy has used NetCat and PortQry to enumerate network connections and display the status of related TCP and UDP ports. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupToddyCat | ToddyCat has used `netstat -anop tcp` to discover TCP connections to compromised hosts. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupAPT5 | APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to collect data on web requests from Pulse Secure Connect logs. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has used |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupINC Ransom | INC Ransom has used RDP to test network connections. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca employed a PowerShell script called RDPConnectionParser to read and filter the Windows event log “Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational” |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupVelvet Ant | Velvet Ant has enumerated existing network connections on victim devices. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupHEXANE | HEXANE has used netstat to monitor connections to specific ports. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used quser.exe to identify existing RDP connections. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupThreat Group-3390 | Threat Group-3390 has used `net use` and `netstat` to conduct internal discovery of systems. The group has also used `quser.exe` to identify existing RDP sessions on a victim. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has used `netstat` and other net commands for network reconnaissance efforts. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has enumerated existing RDP sessions using remote management services to include Atelier Web Remote Commander (AWRC). |
| T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used a customized PlugX variant which could exfiltrate documents from air-gapped networks. |
| T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has exfiltrated data using USB storage devices. |
| T1053.002 At |
GroupAPT18 | APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network. |
| T1053.002 At |
GroupBRONZE BUTLER | BRONZE BUTLER has used at to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement. |
| T1053.002 At |
GroupThreat Group-3390 | Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network. |
| T1053.003 Cron |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system. |
| T1053.003 Cron |
GroupRocke | Rocke installed a cron job that downloaded and executed files from the C2. |
| T1053.003 Cron |
GroupAPT5 | APT5 has made modifications to the crontab file including in `/var/cron/tabs/`. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. Additionally, APT38 has used living-off-the-land scripts to execute a malicious script via a scheduled task. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupBlackByte | BlackByte created scheduled tasks for payload execution. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupGALLIUM | GALLIUM established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupAPT3 | An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks. Kimsuky has established persistence by creating a scheduled task named “ChromeUpdateTaskMachine” through the PowerShell cmdlet `Register-ScheduleTask` which was set to execute another PowerShell script once, then five minutes after its creation and periodically repeat every 30 minutes. Kimsuky has also set scheduled tasks that run periodically using the PT1M repetition pattern leveraging naming conventions of Anti-Virus software to include "AhnlabUpdate". |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupPatchwork | A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupAPT41 | APT41 used a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupmenuPass | menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupMuddyWater | MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupNaikon | Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupFIN6 | FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and FrameworkPOS. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupFIN7 | FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence. Specifically, FIN7 has used OpenSSH to establish persistence. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team leveraged SHARPIVORY, a .NET dropper that writes embedded payload to disk and uses scheduled tasks to persist on victim machines. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupMachete | Machete has created scheduled tasks to maintain Machete's persistence. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence. Mustang Panda has also created a scheduled task that creates a reverse shell. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupAPT39 | APT39 has created scheduled tasks for persistence. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupTA2541 | TA2541 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for installed tools. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupAPT37 | APT37 has created scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts on a compromised host. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupOilRig | OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupHigaisa | Higaisa dropped and added |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupConfucius | Confucius has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence on a compromised host. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupBlue Mockingbird | Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Scheduled Tasks to establish persistence on local and remote hosts. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupWinter Vivern | Winter Vivern executed PowerShell scripts that would subsequently attempt to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks objects to periodically retrieve and execute remotely-hosted payloads. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 had used a scheduled task named “SysUpdate” that was registered via GPO on devices in the network to distribute the Embargo ransomware. |
| T1053.005 Scheduled Task |
GroupBITTER | BITTER has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.