ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

4815 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupLotus Blossom

Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `netstat` to identify system network connections.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupChimera

Chimera has used netstat -ano | findstr EST to discover network connections.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupBackdoorDiplomacy

BackdoorDiplomacy has used NetCat and PortQry to enumerate network connections and display the status of related TCP and UDP ports.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupToddyCat

ToddyCat has used `netstat -anop tcp` to discover TCP connections to compromised hosts.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupAPT5

APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to collect data on web requests from Pulse Secure Connect logs.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupLazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used net use to identify and establish a network connection with a remote host.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupINC Ransom

INC Ransom has used RDP to test network connections.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupEarth Lusca

Earth Lusca employed a PowerShell script called RDPConnectionParser to read and filter the Windows event log “Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational”
(Event ID 1024) to obtain network information from RDP connections. Earth Lusca has also used netstat from a compromised system to obtain network connection information.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupVelvet Ant

Velvet Ant has enumerated existing network connections on victim devices.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupHEXANE

HEXANE has used netstat to monitor connections to specific ports.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupMagic Hound

Magic Hound has used quser.exe to identify existing RDP connections.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupThreat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used `net use` and `netstat` to conduct internal discovery of systems. The group has also used `quser.exe` to identify existing RDP sessions on a victim.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupFIN13

FIN13 has used `netstat` and other net commands for network reconnaissance efforts.

T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has enumerated existing RDP sessions using remote management services to include Atelier Web Remote Commander (AWRC).

T1052.001
Exfiltration over USB
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has used a customized PlugX variant which could exfiltrate documents from air-gapped networks.

T1052.001
Exfiltration over USB
GroupTropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has exfiltrated data using USB storage devices.

T1053.002
At
GroupAPT18

APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network.

T1053.002
At
GroupBRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used at to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.

T1053.002
At
GroupThreat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network.

T1053.003
Cron
GroupAPT38

APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.

T1053.003
Cron
GroupRocke

Rocke installed a cron job that downloaded and executed files from the C2.

T1053.003
Cron
GroupAPT5

APT5 has made modifications to the crontab file including in `/var/cron/tabs/`.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupAPT38

APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. Additionally, APT38 has used living-off-the-land scripts to execute a malicious script via a scheduled task.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupBlackByte

BlackByte created scheduled tasks for payload execution.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupGALLIUM

GALLIUM established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupAPT3

An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru "System".

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks. Kimsuky has established persistence by creating a scheduled task named “ChromeUpdateTaskMachine” through the PowerShell cmdlet `Register-ScheduleTask` which was set to execute another PowerShell script once, then five minutes after its creation and periodically repeat every 30 minutes. Kimsuky has also set scheduled tasks that run periodically using the PT1M repetition pattern leveraging naming conventions of Anti-Virus software to include "AhnlabUpdate".

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupPatchwork

A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupAPT41

APT41 used a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupDragonfly

Dragonfly has used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupmenuPass

menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupAPT32

APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupMuddyWater

MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupNaikon

Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupFIN6

FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and FrameworkPOS.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupGamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupFIN7

FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence. Specifically, FIN7 has used OpenSSH to establish persistence.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupSandworm Team

Sandworm Team leveraged SHARPIVORY, a .NET dropper that writes embedded payload to disk and uses scheduled tasks to persist on victim machines.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupMachete

Machete has created scheduled tasks to maintain Machete's persistence.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence. Mustang Panda has also created a scheduled task that creates a reverse shell.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupAPT39

APT39 has created scheduled tasks for persistence.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupTA2541

TA2541 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for installed tools.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupAPT37

APT37 has created scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts on a compromised host.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupOilRig

OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupHigaisa

Higaisa dropped and added officeupdate.exe to scheduled tasks.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupConfucius

Confucius has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence on a compromised host.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupBlue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Scheduled Tasks to establish persistence on local and remote hosts.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupWinter Vivern

Winter Vivern executed PowerShell scripts that would subsequently attempt to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks objects to periodically retrieve and execute remotely-hosted payloads.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupStorm-0501

Storm-0501 had used a scheduled task named “SysUpdate” that was registered via GPO on devices in the network to distribute the Embargo ransomware.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
GroupBITTER

BITTER has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.