Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupAPT42 | APT42 has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query anti-virus products. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has used WMI to execute PowerShell. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupINC Ransom | INC Ransom has used WMIC to deploy ransomware. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca used a VBA script to execute WMI. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupWizard Spider | Wizard Spider has used WMI and LDAP queries for network discovery and to move laterally. Wizard Spider has also used batch scripts to leverage WMIC to deploy ransomware. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupVelvet Ant | Velvet Ant used the `wmiexec.py` tool within Impacket for remote process execution via WMI. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized WMIC to log into the victim host and create a process `process call create “cmd.exe /c copy \\?\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\windows\system32\config\system c:\users\public”`. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used a tool to run `cmd /c wmic computersystem get domain` for discovery. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupThreat Group-3390 | A Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupFIN8 | FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn `cmd.exe` execution. FIN8 has also used WMIC and the Impacket suite for lateral movement, as well as during and post compromise cleanup activities. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has utilized `WMI` to execute commands and move laterally on compromised Windows machines. |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has leveraged `wmic.exe` to enumerate logged in users on compromised devices. |
| T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
GroupTeamTNT | TeamTNT has sent locally staged files with collected credentials to C2 servers using cURL. |
| T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
GroupPlay | Play has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data to actor-controlled accounts. |
| T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupStorm-1811 | Storm-1811 has exfiltrated captured user credentials via Secure Copy Protocol (SCP). |
| T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has used SMTPS to exfiltrate collected data from victims. |
| T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupMirrorFace | MirrorFace has used Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) for file exfiltration. |
| T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 has exfiltrated archives of collected data previously staged on a target's OWA server via HTTPS. |
| T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used malware to exfiltrate stolen data with a custom ICAP-style protocol over HTTPS. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupSalt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon has exfiltrated configuration files from exploited network devices over FTP and TFTP. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupAPT32 | APT32's backdoor can exfiltrate data by encoding it in the subdomain field of DNS packets. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupFIN6 | FIN6 has sent stolen payment card data to remote servers via HTTP POSTs. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used FTP to exfiltrate archive files. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has exfiltrated victim information using FTP. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupOilRig | OilRig has exfiltrated data via Microsoft Exchange and over FTP separately from its primary C2 channel over DNS. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupThrip | Thrip has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data from a targeted organization over FTP. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupWizard Spider | Wizard Spider has exfiltrated victim information using FTP. |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupAPT33 | APT33 has used FTP to exfiltrate files (separately from the C2 channel). |
| T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
GroupFIN8 | FIN8 has used FTP to exfiltrate collected data. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 installed a port monitoring tool, MAPMAKER, to print the active TCP connections on the local system. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupGALLIUM | GALLIUM used |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupAPT3 | APT3 has a tool that can enumerate current network connections. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
Groupadmin@338 | admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to display network connections: |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has used `netstat -ano` on compromised hosts to enumerate network connections. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupAPT41 | APT41 has enumerated IP addresses of network resources and used the |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupmenuPass | menuPass has used |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupAPT32 | APT32 used the |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupMuddyWater | MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connections on the target machine. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupTeamTNT | TeamTNT has run |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team had gathered user, IP address, and server data related to RDP sessions on a compromised host. It has also accessed network diagram files useful for understanding how a host's network was configured. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupAndariel | Andariel has used the |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupOilRig | OilRig has used |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupTropic Trooper | Tropic Trooper has tested if the localhost network is available and other connection capability on an infected system using command scripts. |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupKe3chang | Ke3chang performs local network connection discovery using |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupAPT1 | APT1 used the |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupTurla | Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover active local network connections using the |
| T1049 System Network Connections Discovery |
GroupPoseidon Group | Poseidon Group obtains and saves information about victim network interfaces and addresses. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.