Procedure examples

An APT3 downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections for its initial C2.

menuPass has used a global service provider's IP as a proxy for C2 traffic from a victim.

MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location. MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to command and control (C2). MuddyWater has also used go-socks5 variants to bypass firewalls and Network Address Translation (NAT), to communicate with a hardcoded C2 server, and to exfiltrate data.

APT39 has used various tools to proxy C2 communications.

FIN5 maintains access to victim environments by using FLIPSIDE to create a proxy for a backup RDP tunnel.

APT29 uses compromised residential endpoints as proxies for defense evasion and network access.

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow C2 even if the victim is behind a router. APT28 has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between CHOPSTICK and their server.

Tonto Team has routed their traffic through an external server in order to obfuscate their location.

Lazarus Group has used multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.

Silence has used ProxyBot, which allows the attacker to redirect traffic from the current node to the backconnect server via Sock4\Socks5.

TrickBot has been known to reach a command and control server via one of nine proxy IP addresses.

InvisiMole InvisiMole can identify proxy servers used by the victim and use them for C2 communication.

QUIETEXIT can proxy traffic via SOCKS.

Okrum can identify proxy servers configured and used by the victim, and use it to make HTTP requests to C2 its server.

Regin leveraged several compromised universities as proxies to obscure its origin.

ShimRat can use pre-configured HTTP proxies.

The Winnti for Windows HTTP/S C2 mode can make use of an external proxy.

POWERSTATS has connected to C2 servers through proxies.

QakBot has a module that can proxy C2 communications.

evilginx2 can route traffic via SOCKS5 and HTTP(S) proxies between an intended phishing victim's machine and legitimate websites.

Mythic can leverage a modified SOCKS5 proxy to tunnel egress C2 traffic.

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used infrastructure associated with operational relay box (ORB) networks.

SPACEHOP Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices to proxy C2 communications.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Tor IPs for voice calls and for the collection of stolen data.

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized Tor nodes for C2.

During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed commands through the installed web shell via Tor exit nodes.

Quad7 Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices for password spray attacks.

FLORAHOX Activity has routed traffic through a customized Tor relay network layer.

During CostaRicto, the threat actors used a layer of proxies to manage C2 communications.

Volt Typhoon has used multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure.

Gamaredon Group has used Tor for C2 traffic.

ZIRCONIUM has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network – consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) – to proxy traffic.

Leviathan has used multi-hop proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic.

Lotus Blossom has used tools such as the publicly available HTran tool for proxying traffic in victim environments.

A backdoor used by APT29 created a Tor hidden service to forward traffic from the Tor client to local ports 3389 (RDP), 139 (Netbios), and 445 (SMB) enabling full remote access from outside the network and has also used TOR.

Medusa Group has used TOR nodes for communications.

Ember Bear has configured multi-hop proxies via ProxyChains within victim environments.

APT28 has routed traffic over Tor and VPN servers to obfuscate their activities.

FIN4 has used Tor to log in to victims' email accounts.

Inception used chains of compromised routers to proxy C2 communications between them and cloud service providers.

Ninja has the ability to use a proxy chain with up to 255 hops when using TCP.

Ursnif has used Tor for C2.

StrongPity can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.

GreyEnergy has used Tor relays for Command and Control servers.

BOLDMOVE is capable of relaying traffic from command and control servers to follow-on systems.

SystemBC has used multiple proxy layers, such as SOCKS5 and Tor, for C2 communication. SystemBC has also leveraged Tor for encrypting and concealing C2 traffic. The server component of SystemBC has used SOCKS5 for C2 communication.

Keydnap uses a copy of tor2web proxy for HTTPS communications.

Siloscape uses Tor to communicate with C2.

NGLite has abused NKN infrastructure for its C2 communication.

WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic.