Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17136 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareMiniDuke | MiniDuke uses Google Search to identify C2 servers if its primary C2 method via Twitter is not working. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareAnchor | Anchor can use secondary C2 servers for communication after establishing connectivity and relaying victim information to primary C2 servers. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareS-Type | S-Type primarily uses port 80 for C2, but falls back to ports 443 or 8080 if initial communication fails. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareDustySky | DustySky has two hard-coded domains for C2 servers; if the first does not respond, it will try the second. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareXTunnel | The C2 server used by XTunnel provides a port number to the victim to use as a fallback in case the connection closes on the currently used port. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareCharmPower | CharmPower can change its C2 channel once every 360 loops by retrieving a new domain from the actors’ S3 bucket. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareQUADAGENT | QUADAGENT uses multiple protocols (HTTPS, HTTP, DNS) for its C2 server as fallback channels if communication with one is unsuccessful. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareTAINTEDSCRIBE | TAINTEDSCRIBE can randomly pick one of five hard-coded IP addresses for C2 communication; if one of the IP fails, it will wait 60 seconds and then try another IP address. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareGlassWorm | GlassWorm has utilized Google Calendar as backup C2. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareUroburos | Uroburos can use up to 10 channels to communicate between implants. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwarePipeMon | PipeMon can switch to an alternate C2 domain when a particular date has been reached. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareJHUHUGIT | JHUHUGIT tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy, and finally injecting code into a running browser if the proxy method fails. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareCrutch | Crutch has used a hardcoded GitHub repository as a fallback channel. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareDerusbi | Derusbi uses a backup communication method with an HTTP beacon. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareShark | Shark can update its configuration to use a different C2 server. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareBazar | Bazar has the ability to use an alternative C2 server if the primary server fails. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareHiddenFace | HiddenFace can use active and passive C2 modes that use different encryption algorithms and backdoor commands. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareValak | Valak can communicate over multiple C2 hosts. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareOilBooster | OilBooster can use a backup channel to request a new refresh token from its C2 server after 10 consecutive unsuccessful connections to the primary OneDrive C2 server. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareCardinal RAT | Cardinal RAT can communicate over multiple C2 host and port combinations. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareBISCUIT | BISCUIT malware contains a secondary fallback command and control server that is contacted after the primary command and control server. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareKwampirs | Kwampirs uses a large list of C2 servers that it cycles through until a successful connection is established. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareCHOPSTICK | CHOPSTICK can switch to a new C2 channel if the current one is broken. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareEbury | Ebury has implemented a fallback mechanism to begin using a DGA when the attacker hasn't connected to the infected system for three days. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareSideTwist | SideTwist has primarily used port 443 for C2 but can use port 80 as a fallback. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareMis-Type | Mis-Type first attempts to use a Base64-encoded network protocol over a raw TCP socket for C2, and if that method fails, falls back to a secondary HTTP-based protocol to communicate to an alternate C2 server. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareKevin | Kevin can assign hard-coded fallback domains for C2. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareLinfo | Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can change C2 servers. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareGelsemium | Gelsemium can use multiple domains and protocols in C2. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
ToolMythic | Mythic can use a list of C2 URLs as fallback mechanisms in case one IP or domain gets blocked. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareTeamPCP Cloud Stealer | TeamPCP Cloud Stealer can compress and encrypt data and exfiltrate it via POST to an attacker-controlled domain. If that method fails it can use the victim's own GitHub account to create a public repository and uploads the encrypted data as a release asset. |
| T1008 Fallback Channels |
MalwareMini Shai-Hulud | Mini Shai-Hulud has established Fallback Channels to exfiltrate data to Github when other configured infrastructure is found to be unreachable. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has collected window title information from compromised systems. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
GroupHEXANE | HEXANE has used a PowerShell-based keylogging tool to capture the window title. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwarePowerDuke | PowerDuke has a command to get text of the current foreground window. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwarePAKLOG | PAKLOG has used `GetForegroundWindow` to access the foreground window. PAKLOG has also captured text from the foreground windows. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareTONESHELL | TONESHELL has used `GetForegroundWindow` to detect virtualization or sandboxes by calling the API twice and comparing each window handle. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareNETWIRE | NETWIRE can discover and close windows on controlled systems. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareAria-body | Aria-body has the ability to identify the titles of running windows on a compromised host. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareDUSTTRAP | DUSTTRAP can enumerate running application windows. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareMachete | Machete saves the window names. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareInvisiMole | InvisiMole can enumerate windows and child windows on a compromised host. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareWINERACK | WINERACK can enumerate active windows. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareKazuar | Kazuar gathers information about opened windows. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareFlagpro | Flagpro can check the name of the window displayed on the system. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareROKRAT | ROKRAT can use the `GetForegroundWindow` and `GetWindowText` APIs to discover where the user is typing. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareDarkWatchman | DarkWatchman reports window names along with keylogger information to provide application context. |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareDarkGate | DarkGate will search for cryptocurrency wallets by examining application window names for specific strings. DarkGate extracts information collected via NirSoft tools from the hosting process's memory by first identifying the window through the |
| T1010 Application Window Discovery |
MalwareMetamorfo | Metamorfo can enumerate all windows on the victim’s machine. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.