ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

1213 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1087.002
Domain Account
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used PowerShell to discover domain accounts by exectuing `Get-ADUser` and `Get-ADGroupMember`.

T1087.002
Domain Account
CampaignOperation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `dsquery` and `dsget` commands to get domain environment information and to query users in administrative groups.

T1087.002
Domain Account
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the `net` command to retrieve information about domain accounts.

T1087.003
Email Account
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used compromised Exchange accounts to search mailboxes for administrator accounts.

T1087.003
Email Account
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to identify email addresses.

T1087.004
Cloud Account
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and to identify privileged users, along with the email addresses and AD attributes.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation

During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used Fast Reverse Proxy to communicate with C2.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

Mustang Panda proxied communication through the Cloudflare CDN service during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capable of establishing a SOCKS proxy connection to a specified IP and port.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter

For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used the ExpressVPN service to hide their location.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse

During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used the GO Simple Tunnel reverse proxy tool.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Mullvad VPN IPs to proxy voice phishing calls.

T1090
Proxy
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized the rsocx tool identified as `r.exe` and `rsocx.exe` to tunnel within the internal infrastructure using a Reverse SOCKS Proxy.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom proxy tool called "Agent" which has support for multiple hops.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignC0017

During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.

T1090
Proxy
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider installed the open-source rsocx reverse proxy tool on a targeted ESXi appliance.

T1090.001
Internal Proxy
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used SSH port forwarding capabilities on public-facing systems, and configured at least one instance of Cobalt Strike to use a network pipe over SMB.

T1090.001
Internal Proxy
CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign

During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used the built-in netsh portproxy command to create internal proxies on compromised systems.

T1090.001
Internal Proxy
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors proxied traffic through multiple infected systems.

T1090.001
Internal Proxy
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary utilized Claude Code to maintain access to the victim’s internal network through proxy tunnels.

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to connect to the internal victim devices through SSH tunnels.

T1090.002
External Proxy
CampaignQuad7 Activity

Quad7 Activity has initialized SOCKS5 proxies on compromised devices.

T1090.002
External Proxy
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to utilize a residential proxy including `us[.]proxy[.]geonode[.]io` using port 9000.

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to connect through a SOCKS proxy, that traversed an internet-facing server, to authenticate to victim hosts over SSH.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used infrastructure associated with operational relay box (ORB) networks.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
CampaignSPACEHOP Activity

SPACEHOP Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices to proxy C2 communications.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Tor IPs for voice calls and for the collection of stolen data.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized Tor nodes for C2.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed commands through the installed web shell via Tor exit nodes.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
CampaignQuad7 Activity

Quad7 Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices for password spray attacks.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
CampaignFLORAHOX Activity

FLORAHOX Activity has routed traffic through a customized Tor relay network layer.

T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
CampaignCostaRicto

During CostaRicto, the threat actors used a layer of proxies to manage C2 communications.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity command and control traffic uses a non-standard, likely custom protocol for communication.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

Mustang Panda communicated over TCP 5000 from adversary administrative servers to adversary command and control nodes during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 leveraged malware that used UDP and TCP sockets for C2.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the Unix socket and a reverse TCP shell for C2 communications.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
CampaignC0021

During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation

Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used a non-standard TCP session to initialize communication prior to establishing HTTPS command and control.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
CampaignOperation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom protocol for command and control.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol
Campaign2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team proxied C2 communications within a TLS-based tunnel.

T1098
Account Manipulation
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the `sp_addlinkedsrvlogin` command in MS-SQL to create a link between a created account and other servers in the network.

T1098.001
Additional Cloud Credentials
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added credentials to OAuth Applications and Service Principals.

T1098.001
Additional Cloud Credentials
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider used aws_consoler to create temporary federated credentials for fake users in order to obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without MFA.

T1098.002
Additional Email Delegate Permissions
CampaignHomeLand Justice

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors added the `ApplicationImpersonation` management role to accounts under their control to impersonate users and take ownership of targeted mailboxes.

T1098.002
Additional Email Delegate Permissions
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync using `Set-CASMailbox`, allowing it to obtain copies of victim mailboxes. It also added additional permissions (such as Mail.Read and Mail.ReadWrite) to compromised Application or Service Principals.

T1098.003
Additional Cloud Roles
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 granted `company administrator` privileges to a newly created service principle.

T1098.003
Additional Cloud Roles
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider used IAM manipulation to gain persistence and to assume or elevate privileges.

T1098.004
SSH Authorized Keys
CampaignOperation Digital Eye

During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used SSH access enabled by authorized_keys files for remote execution.

T1098.004
SSH Authorized Keys
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure

During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to establish persistence on the system by injecting an SSH key located at `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` file via a crontab script.

T1098.005
Device Registration
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 registered devices in order to enable mailbox syncing via the `Set-CASMailbox` command.

T1098.005
Device Registration
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider registered devices for MFA to maintain persistence through victims' VPN.

T1102
Web Service
CampaignOperation Spalax

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads.

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