Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1087.002 Domain Account |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used PowerShell to discover domain accounts by exectuing `Get-ADUser` and `Get-ADGroupMember`. |
| T1087.002 Domain Account |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `dsquery` and `dsget` commands to get domain environment information and to query users in administrative groups. |
| T1087.002 Domain Account |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the `net` command to retrieve information about domain accounts. |
| T1087.003 Email Account |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used compromised Exchange accounts to search mailboxes for administrator accounts. |
| T1087.003 Email Account |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to identify email addresses. |
| T1087.004 Cloud Account |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and to identify privileged users, along with the email addresses and AD attributes. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used Fast Reverse Proxy to communicate with C2. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | Mustang Panda proxied communication through the Cloudflare CDN service during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capable of establishing a SOCKS proxy connection to a specified IP and port. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignOperation Sharpshooter | For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used the ExpressVPN service to hide their location. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used the GO Simple Tunnel reverse proxy tool. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Mullvad VPN IPs to proxy voice phishing calls. |
| T1090 Proxy |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized the rsocx tool identified as `r.exe` and `rsocx.exe` to tunnel within the internal infrastructure using a Reverse SOCKS Proxy. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom proxy tool called "Agent" which has support for multiple hops. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic. |
| T1090 Proxy |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider installed the open-source rsocx reverse proxy tool on a targeted ESXi appliance. |
| T1090.001 Internal Proxy |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used SSH port forwarding capabilities on public-facing systems, and configured at least one instance of Cobalt Strike to use a network pipe over SMB. |
| T1090.001 Internal Proxy |
CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign | During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used the built-in |
| T1090.001 Internal Proxy |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors proxied traffic through multiple infected systems. |
| T1090.001 Internal Proxy |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary utilized Claude Code to maintain access to the victim’s internal network through proxy tunnels. |
| T1090.002 External Proxy |
CampaignQuad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity has initialized SOCKS5 proxies on compromised devices. |
| T1090.002 External Proxy |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to utilize a residential proxy including `us[.]proxy[.]geonode[.]io` using port 9000. During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to connect through a SOCKS proxy, that traversed an internet-facing server, to authenticate to victim hosts over SSH. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used infrastructure associated with operational relay box (ORB) networks. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
CampaignSPACEHOP Activity | SPACEHOP Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices to proxy C2 communications. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Tor IPs for voice calls and for the collection of stolen data. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized Tor nodes for C2. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed commands through the installed web shell via Tor exit nodes. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
CampaignQuad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices for password spray attacks. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
CampaignFLORAHOX Activity | FLORAHOX Activity has routed traffic through a customized Tor relay network layer. |
| T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy |
CampaignCostaRicto | During CostaRicto, the threat actors used a layer of proxies to manage C2 communications. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity command and control traffic uses a non-standard, likely custom protocol for communication. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | Mustang Panda communicated over TCP 5000 from adversary administrative servers to adversary command and control nodes during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 leveraged malware that used UDP and TCP sockets for C2. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the Unix socket and a reverse TCP shell for C2 communications. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignC0021 | During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used a non-standard TCP session to initialize communication prior to establishing HTTPS command and control. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom protocol for command and control. |
| T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Campaign2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team proxied C2 communications within a TLS-based tunnel. |
| T1098 Account Manipulation |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the `sp_addlinkedsrvlogin` command in MS-SQL to create a link between a created account and other servers in the network. |
| T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added credentials to OAuth Applications and Service Principals. |
| T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used aws_consoler to create temporary federated credentials for fake users in order to obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without MFA. |
| T1098.002 Additional Email Delegate Permissions |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors added the `ApplicationImpersonation` management role to accounts under their control to impersonate users and take ownership of targeted mailboxes. |
| T1098.002 Additional Email Delegate Permissions |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync using `Set-CASMailbox`, allowing it to obtain copies of victim mailboxes. It also added additional permissions (such as Mail.Read and Mail.ReadWrite) to compromised Application or Service Principals. |
| T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 granted `company administrator` privileges to a newly created service principle. |
| T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used IAM manipulation to gain persistence and to assume or elevate privileges. |
| T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys |
CampaignOperation Digital Eye | During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used SSH access enabled by authorized_keys files for remote execution. |
| T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to establish persistence on the system by injecting an SSH key located at `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` file via a crontab script. |
| T1098.005 Device Registration |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 registered devices in order to enable mailbox syncing via the `Set-CASMailbox` command. |
| T1098.005 Device Registration |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider registered devices for MFA to maintain persistence through victims' VPN. |
| T1102 Web Service |
CampaignOperation Spalax | During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.