Sub-technique of T1098 Account Manipulation.View on attack.mitre.org
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).
This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.
For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.
In some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to Create Account or modify a victim-owned account.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1098.003.
| Rule | Level | Log source |
|---|---|---|
| App Granted Privileged Delegated Or App Permissions | high | azure / NULL |
| App Assigned To Azure RBAC/Microsoft Entra Role | medium | azure / NULL |
| Github Outside Collaborator Detected | medium | github / NULL |
| Google Workspace Application Access Level Modified | medium | gcp / NULL |
| Granting Of Permissions To An Account | medium | azure / NULL |
| Okta Admin Role Assigned to an User or Group | medium | okta / NULL |
| User Added to an Administrator's Azure AD Role | medium | azure / NULL |
| Rule | Type | Risk | Data source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Add app role assignment to service principal |
| Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Add member to role |
| Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Update application |
| Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Add member to role |
| Azure AD PIM Role Assigned | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory |
| Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory |
| Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Add member to role |
| Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Add member to role |
| Azure AD Service Principal Privilege Escalation | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Add app role assignment to service principal |
| Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted | TTP | NULL | Azure Active Directory Consent to application |
| O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal | TTP | NULL | O365 Add app role assignment to service principal. |
| O365 Application Available To Other Tenants | TTP | NULL | Office 365 Universal Audit Log |
| O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned | TTP | NULL | O365 Update application. |
| O365 High Privilege Role Granted | TTP | NULL | O365 Add member to role. |
| O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application | TTP | NULL | O365 Update application. |
| O365 Privileged Role Assigned | TTP | NULL | Office 365 Universal Audit Log |
| O365 Privileged Role Assigned To Service Principal | TTP | NULL | Office 365 Universal Audit Log |
| O365 Service Principal Privilege Escalation | TTP | NULL | O365 Add app role assignment grant to user. |
| O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted | TTP | NULL | O365 Consent to application. |
None recorded.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has added the global admin role to accounts they have created in the targeted organization's cloud instances. |
| GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has assigned user access admin roles in order to gain Tenant Root Group management permissions in Azure. |
| GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has elevated their access to Azure resources using `Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action` and `Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write` operations to gain User Access Administrator and Owner Azure roles over the victims’ Azure subscriptions. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used IAM manipulation to gain persistence and to assume or elevate privileges. |
| CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 granted `company administrator` privileges to a newly created service principle. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.