Procedure examples

TeamPCP has stolen source code from victim environments including Mistral AI.

TeamPCP has hidden malicious payloads in the frame data of WAV audio files.

TeamPCP has cloned GitHub commit metadata including the author name, email, committer, and timestamps to use for impostor commits. TeamPCP has also used legitimate file names such as msbuild.exe and ringtone.wav to mask malicious payloads.

TeamPCP has leveraged malware capable of execution via the Linux CLI.

TeamPCP has poisoned PyPi packages with malicious code and has used a 13 file modular Python framework for data collection.

TeamPCP has used the JavaScript runtime for malware delivery and injected malicious JavaScript into OpenVSX extensions.

TeamPCP has queried the Kubernetes API for local service account tokens and has used `kubectl` for lateral movement.

TeamPCP has compromised credentials associated with open source security scanning tools and used them to push malicious code to all the resources the tools had access to.

TeamPCP has used compromised credentials for GitHub and software package repositories, including privileged service accounts, to inject malicious code into CI/CD pipelines.

TeamPCP has modified settings to publish private Aqua Security repositories to GitHub as public.

TeamPCP has modified legitimate software binaries to retrieve secondary payloads from C2.

TeamPCP has compromised VS Code and Open VSX IDE extensions.

TeamPCP has exploited misconfigurations in GitHub Actions and vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-33634 in the Aqua Security Trivy scanner and CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell) against vulnerable cloud endpoints.

TeamPCP has conducted coordinated supply chain attacks targeting open-source developer infrastructure including the NPM, VS Code, Docker, and PyPi ecosystems to compromise multiple software packages.

TeamPCP has deployed privileged DaemonSets to delete files on Kubernetes clusters and has executed recursive file deletions on non-containerized hosts.

TeamPCP has deployed ransomware and has announced partnerships with ransomware groups including Vect and CipherForce in online criminal forums.

TeamPCP has used malware to steal access tokens from targeted cloud and developer environments.

TeamPCP has used the systemd user service for malware persistence in targeted environments.

TeamPCP has modified software packages with preinstall scripts to download and execute malicious payloads.

TeamPCP has dropped malware into the Windows Startup folder to establish persistence.

TeamPCP has used stolen access tokens to inject malicious code into CI/CD workflows and to exfiltrate sensitive data from cloud, developer, and container environments.

TeamPCP has used malware to extract SSH and GPG keys from victim environments.

TeamPCP has compromised legitimate software release workflows resulting in malicious packages receiving legitimate project cryptographic signing.

TeamPCP has used malware to exfiltrate cloud secrets from targeted environments including AWS, GCP, and Azure.

TeamPCP has used a hidden .lock file to establish a 12 hour cooldown period between re-drops for installed malware.

In May 2026 TeamPCP announced co-ownership of the BreachForums cybercriminal forum claiming responsibility for platform operations, dispute resolution, personnel vetting, and hosting monetary contests.

TeamPCP has registered domains resembling legitimate victim sites such as scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org, checkmarx[.]zone, and git-tanstack[.]com to mask C2 and exfiltration endpoints. TeamPCP has also set up a dark web leak site to post stolen data.

TeamPCP has leased infrastructure specifically for offensive operations including Google assets in AS396982.

TeamPCP has set up Clouflare Tunnels for malware C2. TeamPCP has also used the session messenger network for decentralized, encrypted exfiltration via  *.getsession[.]org to recipient  ID `05f9e609d79eed391015e11380dee4b5c9ead0b6e2e7f0134e6e51767a87323026`.

TeamPCP has used its own Telegram channel and X accounts @pcpcats and @xploitrsturtle2 for external communications.

TeamPCP has developed and deployed custom malware including TeamPCP Cloud Stealer, CanisterWorm, and Mini Shai-Hulud.

TeamPCP has pushed GitHub commits that modified the actions/checkout to reference an imposter commit that downloaded malicious files from attacker-controlled C2 domains.

TeamPCP has engaged in cryptocurrency mining and theft. TeamPCP has also partnered with ransomware and data theft extortion groups, sold leaked code, and crowdsourced supply chain compromises by open-sourcing their Mini Shai-Hulud malware.

TeamPCP has compromised trusted CI/CD pipelines by injecting credential-stealing payloads into legitimate workflows and software packages including open-source security tools Trivy and KICS, and AI gateway LiteLLM.

TeamPCP has created Dune-themed GitHub repositories using stolen tokens.

TeamPCP impersonated legitimate maintainers to push imposter commits to the Aquasecurity Trivy scanner GitHub repository.