Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
115 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1213.005 Messaging Applications |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has gathered Telegram Desktop messaging data from the applications data directories stored on the victim device to include cryptographic key material, and session mapping files that can recreate a compromised user’s Telegram session on another system. |
| T1213.006 Databases |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has copied Apple Notes database from its application container and staged for upload. |
| T1217 Browser Information Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources. APT38 has also used malware capable of enumerating 166 unique cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, and browser history. |
| T1218.001 Compiled HTML File |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used CHM files to move concealed payloads. |
| T1218.005 Mshta |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used a renamed version of `mshta.exe` to execute malicious HTML files. |
| T1218.007 Msiexec |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used `msiexec.exe` to execute malicious files. |
| T1218.011 Rundll32 |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used rundll32.exe to execute binaries, scripts, and Control Panel Item files and to execute code via proxy to avoid triggering security tools. |
| T1222.002 Linux and Mac Permissions |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has changed file and directory permissions using `chmod 777`. |
| T1480 Execution Guardrails |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has leveraged file discovery actions to determine if a predetermined file is present prior to execution to prevent redundant execution on a compromised device. |
| T1480.002 Mutual Exclusion |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has created a mutex to avoid duplicate execution. |
| T1485 Data Destruction |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used a custom secure delete function to make deleted files unrecoverable. |
| T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used Hermes ransomware to encrypt files with AES256. |
| T1505.003 Web Shell |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used web shells for persistence or to ensure redundant access. |
| T1518 Software Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has enumerated installed applications to build an inventory of the system’s software environment. |
| T1518.001 Security Software Discovery |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has identified security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors installed on a compromised system. APT38 has also executed malware implants to enumerate all installed applications on Windows hosts including installed security products. |
| T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK, which will initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR. |
| T1543.001 Launch Agent |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has executed a multiplatform implant that placed launch agents in ~/Library/NodePackages/ to establish persistence on macOS. |
| T1543.003 Windows Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has installed a new Windows service to establish persistence. APT38 has gained persistence on compromised systems independent of user logon by creating a background service using `sc create scdev binPath= "c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe -k scdev". |
| T1543.004 Launch Daemon |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has established persistence through storing the malicious plist files in `/Library/LaunchDaemons`. |
| T1546.016 Installer Packages |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has poisoned Axios and Mastra npm packages with malicious post-install hooks. |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has also added registry run keys within `HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MicrosoftUpdate` to enable persistence on Windows devices after reboot. APT38 has executed a multiplatform implant that dropped a Registry Run key to `:\ProgramData\NodePackages\` for persistence on Windows machines. APT38 has obtained boot- persistence on compromised systems independent of user logon by adding the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\scdev\Parameters`. |
| T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used the legitimate application `ieinstal.exe` to bypass UAC. |
| T1548.003 Sudo and Sudo Caching |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has executed persistence actions using `sudo` commands within zsh shells. |
| T1548.006 TCC Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to rename the folder `com.apple.TCC`, then used another process to move the `TCC.db` file to a new location, where SQLite3 was used to edit `TCC.db`. The edited `TCC.db` file allowed code signing authorization, permission access, etc. without requiring a user prompt. |
| T1552.003 Shell History |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has gathered data and credentials stored in Shell History. |
| T1552.004 Private Keys |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has gathered cryptographic key data related to cryptocurrency wallets, SSH keys, and messaging applications to include Telegram. |
| T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used ISO and VHD files to deploy malware and to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security measures. |
| T1555 Credentials from Password Stores |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has stolen credentials from the compromised device to include those used to access cryptocurrency wallets. |
| T1555.001 Keychain |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has stolen data stored in macOS keychain. |
| T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has gathered Web browser data to include saved credentials, cookies, bookmarks, autofill data, and extension-specific storage. APT38 has also sought cryptocurrency wallet extensions. |
| T1560.001 Archive via Utility |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has archived collected data within ZIP files prior to exfiltration. |
| T1561.002 Disk Structure Wipe |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK to render systems inoperable. |
| T1564.003 Hidden Window |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has configured malicious scripts to execute in hidden windows. |
| T1564.011 Ignore Process Interrupts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used remote access tools that run AppleScript using ` nohup osascript` to ignore hangup signals. |
| T1564.012 File/Path Exclusions |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has added Microsoft Defender exclusions to include `C:\Windows\System32` to suppress detection of dropped tooling. |
| T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used DYEPACK to create, delete, and alter records in databases used for SWIFT transactions. |
| T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used DYEPACK to manipulate SWIFT messages en route to a printer. |
| T1565.003 Runtime Data Manipulation |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used DYEPACK.FOX to manipulate PDF data as it is accessed to remove traces of fraudulent SWIFT transactions from the data displayed to the end user. |
| T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has conducted spearphishing campaigns using malicious email attachments. APT38 has sent fake Zoom support emails with malicious attachments. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has sent phishing emails with invite links to fictitious meetings. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used social media sites such as LinkedIn to send malicious links to potential vicitims. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has exfiltrated stolen credentials to actor-controlled infrastructure leveraging Telegram Bot API. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts. APT38 has also installed a persistent service on targeted hosts to load malicious DLLs at boot. |
| T1571 Non-Standard Port |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has leveraged unique non-standard ports for communications with actor-controlled C2 infrastructure to include Port 8000. |
| T1583.001 Domains |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has created fake domains to imitate legitimate venture capital or bank domains. APT38 has acquired domains to host fake skill assessments leading to malware download. APT38 has registered domains that masquerade as financial institutions and resemble legitimate services. APT38 has also obtained C2 domains to host second-stage malicious payloads. |
| T1583.003 Virtual Private Server |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used virtual private server (VPS) providers to host C2 infrastructure including Hostwinds. |
| T1583.006 Web Services |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used OneDrive and GoogleDrive to host malicious files. |
| T1585.001 Social Media Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used professional platforms such as LinkedIn to contact potential victims. |
| T1585.002 Email Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has set up anonymous emails to use in publishing poisoned software packages such as sergey2016@tutamail[.]com. |
| T1586.003 Cloud Accounts |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used virtual private server (VPS) providers to host C2 infrastructure including Hostwinds. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.