Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
24 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot features several methods to evade debugging by analysts, including checks for active debuggers, the use of breakpoints during execution, and checking various system information items such as system memory and the number of processors. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareBumblebee | Bumblebee can search for tools used in static analysis. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareTONESHELL | TONESHELL has leveraged custom exception handlers to hide code flow and stop execution of a debugger. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePUBLOAD | PUBLOAD has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. PUBLOAD has leveraged `OutputDebugStringW` and `OutputDebugStringA` functions. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareMafalda | Mafalda can search for debugging tools on a compromised host. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareRaspberry Robin | Raspberry Robin leverages anti-debugging mechanisms through the use of |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareRustyWater | RustyWater has registered a Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) to catch debugging efforts. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareDRATzarus | DRATzarus can use `IsDebuggerPresent` to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareDarkTortilla | DarkTortilla can detect debuggers by using functions such as `DebuggerIsAttached` and `DebuggerIsLogging`. DarkTortilla can also detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareROKRAT | ROKRAT can check for debugging tools. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePlugX | PlugX has made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareLumma Stealer | Lumma Stealer has checked for debugger strings by invoking `GetForegroundWindow` and looks for strings containing “x32dbg”, “x64dbg”, “windbg”, “ollydbg”, “dnspy”, “immunity debugger”, “hyperdbg”, “debug”, “debugger”, “cheat engine”, “cheatengine” and “ida”. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePureCrypter | PureCrypter has the ability to call `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareDarkGate | DarkGate checks the |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareLockBit 3.0 | LockBit 3.0 can check heap memory parameters for indications of a debugger and stop the flow of events to the attached debugger in order to hinder dynamic analysis. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareThiefQuest | ThiefQuest uses a function named |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareLatrodectus | Latrodectus has the ability to check for the presence of debuggers. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareSaint Bot | Saint Bot has used `is_debugger_present` as part of its environmental checks. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareBlack Basta | The Black Basta dropper can check system flags, CPU registers, CPU instructions, process timing, system libraries, and APIs to determine if a debugger is present. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareStrelaStealer | StrelaStealer variants include functionality to identify and evade debuggers. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareXLoader | XLoader uses anti-debugging mechanisms such as calling `NtQueryInformationProcess` with `InfoClass=7`, referencing `ProcessDebugPort`, to determine if it is being analyzed. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareANELLDR | ANELLDR can call `ZwSetInformationThread` with the second argument set to `ThreadHideFromDebugger (0x11)` to evade being debugged. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareStealBit | StealBit can detect it is being run in the context of a debugger. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
ToolAsyncRAT | AsyncRAT can use the `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` function to detect the presence of a debugger. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.