Procedure examples

Maze has decrypted strings and other important information during the encryption process. Maze also calls certain functions dynamically to hinder analysis.

Maze has inserted large blocks of junk code, including some components to decrypt strings and other important information for later in the encryption process.

Maze operators have created scheduled tasks masquerading as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update" designed to launch the ransomware.

Maze has used WMI to attempt to delete the shadow volumes on a machine, and to connect a virtual machine to the network domain of the victim organization's network.

Maze has used the "WNetOpenEnumW", "WNetEnumResourceW”, “WNetCloseEnum” and “WNetAddConnection2W” functions to enumerate the network resources on the infected machine.

Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update", to launch Maze at a specific time.

Maze has injected the malware DLL into a target process.

Maze has gathered all of the running system processes.

The Maze encryption process has used batch scripts with various commands.

Maze has used the “Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection” function following attempts to delete the shadow volumes, in order to leave the system in the same state as it was prior to redirection.

Maze has communicated to hard-coded IP addresses via HTTP.

Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the "GetUSerDefaultUILanguage" function.

Maze has used several Windows API functions throughout the encryption process including IsDebuggerPresent, TerminateProcess, Process32FirstW, among others.

Maze has delivered components for its ransomware attacks using MSI files, some of which have been executed from the command-line using msiexec.

Maze has disrupted systems by encrypting files on targeted machines, claiming to decrypt files if a ransom payment is made. Maze has used the ChaCha algorithm, based on Salsa20, and an RSA algorithm to encrypt files.

Maze has stopped SQL services to ensure it can encrypt any database.

Maze has attempted to delete the shadow volumes of infected machines, once before and once after the encryption process.

Maze has issued a shutdown command on a victim machine that, upon reboot, will run the ransomware within a VM.

Maze has created a file named "startup_vrun.bat" in the Startup folder of a virtual machine to establish persistence.

Maze operators have used VirtualBox and a Windows 7 virtual machine to run the ransomware; the virtual machine's configuration file mapped the shared network drives of the target company, presumably so Maze can encrypt files on the shared drives as well as the local machine.

Maze has forged POST strings with a random choice from a list of possibilities including "forum", "php", "view", etc. while making connection with the C2, hindering detection efforts.

Maze has checked the language of the machine with function GetUserDefaultUILanguage and terminated execution if the language matches with an entry in the predefined list.

Maze has disabled dynamic analysis and other security tools including IDA debugger, x32dbg, and OllyDbg. It has also disabled Windows Defender's Real-Time Monitoring feature and attempted to disable endpoint protection services.