Procedure examples

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has the ability to upload files from a compromised host.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can collect the network interface MAC address on the infected host.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has a variant that is packed with UPX.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D encrypts its strings in RSA256 and encodes them in a custom base64 scheme and XOR.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses file naming conventions with associated executable locations to blend in with the macOS TimeMachine and OpenSSL services. Such as, naming a LaunchAgent plist file `com.apple.openssl.plist` which executes OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D from the user's `~/Library/OpenSSL/` folder upon user login.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has disguised it's true file structure as an application bundle by adding special characters to the filename and using the icon for legitimate Word documents.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses PowerShell scripts.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses a shell script as the main executable inside an app bundle and drops an embedded base64-encoded payload to the /tmp folder.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses Word macros for execution.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has a command to delete a file from the system. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D deletes the app bundle and dropper after execution.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can use the touch -t command to change timestamps.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can also use use HTTP POST and GET requests to send and receive C2 information.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D collects processor information, memory information, computer name, hardware UUID, serial number, and operating system version. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used the ioreg command to gather some of this information.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used a custom binary protocol over port 443 for C2 traffic.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has a command to download and execute a file on the victim’s machine.

For network communications, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D loads a dynamic library (`.dylib` file) using `dlopen()` and obtains a function pointer to execute within that shared library using `dlsym()`.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used `zlib` to compress all data after 0x52 for the custom TCP C2 protocol.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses a decode routine combining bit shifting and XOR operations with a variable key that depends on the length of the string that was encoded. If the computation for the variable XOR key turns out to be 0, the default XOR key of 0x1B is used. This routine is also referenced as the `rotate` function in reporting.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has changed permissions of a second-stage payload to an executable via chmod.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D checks a number of system parameters to see if it is being run on real hardware or in a virtual machine environment, such as `sysctl hw.model` and the kernel boot time.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchAgents.

If running with root permissions, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchDaemons.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses the command xattr -d com.apple.quarantine to remove the quarantine file attribute used by Gatekeeper.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D scrambles and encrypts data using AES256 before sending it to the C2 server.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used AES in CBC mode to encrypt collected data when saving that data to disk.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D sets the main loader file’s attributes to hidden.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used a custom binary protocol over TCP port 443 for C2.

OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D encrypts data sent back to the C2 using AES in CBC mode with a null initialization vector (IV) and a key sent from the server that is padded to 32 bytes.