ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

4815 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1608.001
Upload Malware
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has pushed GitHub commits that modified the actions/checkout to reference an imposter commit that downloaded malicious files from attacker-controlled C2 domains.

T1608.001
Upload Malware
GroupAPT38

APT38 has uploaded malware to cloud storage services for download by targeted victims.

T1608.001
Upload Malware
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has staged malicious payloads on actor-controlled infrastructure for download to the victim environment.

T1608.002
Upload Tool
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has utilized a file hosting service called filemail[.]com to host a zip file that contained a RMM service such as ConnectWise.

T1608.002
Upload Tool
GroupThreat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has staged tools, including gsecdump and WCE, on previously compromised websites.

T1608.003
Install Digital Certificate
GroupSea Turtle

Sea Turtle captured legitimate SSL certificates from victim organizations and installed these on Sea Turtle-controlled infrastructure to enable subsequent adversary-in-the-middle operations.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupMustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest has injected malicious JavaScript into compromised websites to infect victims via drive-by download.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupDragonfly

Dragonfly has compromised websites to redirect traffic and to host exploit kits.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupAPT32

APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate, but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupFIN7

FIN7 has compromised a digital product website and modified multiple download links to point to trojanized versions of offered digital products.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupCURIUM

CURIUM used strategic website compromise to fingerprint then target victims.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupLuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has redirected compromised machines to an actor-controlled webpage through HTML injection.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupTransparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has set up websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.

T1608.004
Drive-by Target
GroupThreat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest.

T1608.005
Link Target
GroupFIN7

FIN7 has created a fake link that redirected to an adversary-controlled Dropbox that downloaded the malicious executable.

T1608.005
Link Target
GroupSilent Librarian

Silent Librarian has cloned victim organization login pages and staged them for later use in credential harvesting campaigns. Silent Librarian has also made use of a variety of URL shorteners for these staged websites.

T1608.005
Link Target
GroupLuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has created a link to a Dropbox file that has been used in their spear-phishing operations.

T1608.005
Link Target
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE had registered domains that would point to a typo-squatted domain used to deliver malicious payloads.

NIMBUS MANTICORE has also pre-shared credentials with a link to spoofed phishing login pages that enable the download of malicious payloads when authorized credentials are used.

T1608.006
SEO Poisoning
GroupMustard Tempest

Mustard Tempest has poisoned search engine results to return fake software updates in order to distribute malware.

T1608.006
SEO Poisoning
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized Search Engine Optimization (SEO) poisoning to deliver malware to unsuspecting victims.

NIMBUS MANTICORE has also registered dozens of domains that link to a typosquatted domain to generate link-based reputation signals and incorporated keyword stuffing to improve search ranking.

T1609
Container Administration Command
GroupTeamTNT

TeamTNT executed Hildegard through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.

T1610
Deploy Container
GroupTeamTNT

TeamTNT has deployed different types of containers into victim environments to facilitate execution. TeamTNT has also transferred cryptocurrency mining software to Kubernetes clusters discovered within local IP address ranges.

T1610
Deploy Container
GroupSalt Typhoon

Salt Typhoon has enabled Linux containers in victim network device environments using `guestshell enable`.

T1610
Deploy Container
GroupTeamPCP

TeamPCP has deployed privileged DaemonSets to delete files on targeted Kubernetes clusters.

T1611
Escape to Host
GroupTeamTNT

TeamTNT has deployed privileged containers that mount the filesystem of victim machine.

T1613
Container and Resource Discovery
GroupTeamTNT

TeamTNT has checked for running containers with docker ps and for specific container names with docker inspect. TeamTNT has also searched for Kubernetes pods running in a local network.

T1614
System Location Discovery
GroupSideCopy

SideCopy has identified the country location of a compromised host.

T1614
System Location Discovery
GroupVolt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim's system current location.

T1614.001
System Language Discovery
GroupBlackByte

BlackByte identified system language settings to determine follow-on execution.

T1614.001
System Language Discovery
GroupKe3chang

Ke3chang has used implants to collect the system language ID of a compromised machine.

T1614.001
System Language Discovery
GroupStorm-0501

Storm-0501 has identified system language codes on a compromised host to determine if the victim falls under a non-supported language code that is prohibited for targeting, including victims associated with Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that may draw attention of law enforcement in countries where the ransomware operator or affiliates may reside/operate from.

T1614.001
System Language Discovery
GroupMirrorFace

MirrorFace has deployed shellcode to check for Japanese Microsoft Office settings.

T1614.001
System Language Discovery
GroupMalteiro

Malteiro will terminate Mispadu's infection process if the language of the victim machine is not Spanish or Portuguese.

T1615
Group Policy Discovery
GroupTurla

Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover Group Policy details using the gpresult command.

T1619
Cloud Storage Object Discovery
GroupShinyHunters

ShinyHunters has used Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) Browser and WinSCP to access S3 objects.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has used the Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script to reflectively load a Mimikatz credential stealing DLL into memory. Kimsuky has also used reflective loading through .NET assembly using `[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load`.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
GroupGamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has used an obfuscated PowerShell script that used `System.Reflection.Assembly` to gather and send victim information to the C2.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
GroupFIN7

FIN7 has loaded a .NET assembly into the currect execution context via `Reflection.Assembly::Load`.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
GroupLazarus Group

Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via KernelCallbackTable hijacking. Lazarus Group has also used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs into memory at runtime.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
GroupAPT38

APT38 has configured malicious payloads to reflectively load using the macOS `NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory` API.
APT38 has also reflectively loaded .NET DLLs to bypass disk-based detection.

T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
GroupScattered Spider

Scattered Spider has used multifactor authentication (MFA) fatigue by sending repeated MFA authentication requests to targets.

T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
GroupAPT29

APT29 has used repeated MFA requests to gain access to victim accounts.

T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
GroupLAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has spammed target users with MFA prompts in the hope that the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. Mustang Panda has also made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger.

T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
GroupAPT29

APT29 has abused misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate admin users and create additional authentication certificates.

T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE has stolen and leveraged vulnerable Active Directory Certificate Services templates to impersonate higher-privileged user accounts.

T1650
Acquire Access
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has purchased user credentials and other sensitive data from Initial Access Brokers (IABs).

T1651
Cloud Administration Command
GroupAPT29

APT29 has used Azure Run Command and Azure Admin-on-Behalf-of (AOBO) to execute code on virtual machines.

T1651
Cloud Administration Command
GroupVOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE has abused built-in remote wipe or factory reset commands to wipe devices managed within an organization’s Cloud management solution impacting laptops, servers, and mobile devices.

T1652
Device Driver Discovery
GroupMedusa Group

Medusa Group has queried drivers on the victim device through the command `driverquery`.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.