Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has exfiltrated victim data to the MEGA file sharing site, SnowFlake, and AWS S3 buckets. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has exfiltrated stolen passwords to Dropbox. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupAkira | Akira will exfiltrate victim data using applications such as Rclone. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupPOLONIUM | POLONIUM has exfiltrated stolen data to POLONIUM-owned OneDrive and Dropbox accounts. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupConfucius | Confucius has exfiltrated victim data to cloud storage service accounts. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has used an uploader known as LUNCHMONEY that can exfiltrate files to Dropbox. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupTurla | Turla has used WebDAV to upload stolen USB files to a cloud drive. Turla has also exfiltrated stolen files to OneDrive and 4shared. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site. Storm-0501 has also utilized Rclone to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage such as MegaSync. Storm-0501 has exfiltrated data to their own infrastructure utilizing AzCopy Command-Line tool (CLI). |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupCinnamon Tempest | Cinnamon Tempest has uploaded captured keystroke logs to the Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service, Aliyun OSS. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupChimera | Chimera has exfiltrated stolen data to OneDrive accounts. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has utilized Rclone to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupEmber Bear | Ember Bear has used tools such as Rclone to exfiltrate information from victim environments to cloud storage such as `mega.nz`. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupToddyCat | ToddyCat has used a DropBox uploader to exfiltrate stolen files. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupLuminousMoth | LuminousMoth has exfiltrated data to Google Drive. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca has used the megacmd tool to upload stolen files from a victim network to MEGA. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupWizard Spider | Wizard Spider has exfiltrated stolen victim data to various cloud storage providers. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupHEXANE | HEXANE has used cloud services, including OneDrive, for data exfiltration. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupThreat Group-3390 | Threat Group-3390 has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has used Dynamic DNS (DDNS) services, such as FreeDNS or No-IP DDNS, to include servers located in South Korea. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupRedEcho | RedEcho used dynamic DNS domains associated with malicious infrastructure. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group has incorporated dynamic DNS domains in its infrastructure. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupTA2541 | TA2541 has used dynamic DNS services for C2 infrastructure. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupBITTER | BITTER has used DDNS for C2 communications. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has used Dynamic DNS providers for their malware C2 infrastructure. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has used DDNS services such as DuckDNS, noip[.]com, and con-ip[.]com to redirect victims to sites or repositories hosting malware implants. |
| T1568 Dynamic Resolution |
GroupTransparent Tribe | Transparent Tribe has used dynamic DNS services to set up C2. |
| T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS |
GroupmenuPass | menuPass has used dynamic DNS service providers to host malicious domains. |
| T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group has used fast flux DNS to mask their command and control channel behind rotating IP addresses. Additionally, Gamaredon Group has used a low-frequency variant of the single-flux method. |
| T1568.001 Fast Flux DNS |
GroupTA505 | TA505 has used fast flux to mask botnets by distributing payloads across multiple IPs. |
| T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms |
GroupAPT41 | APT41 has used DGAs to change their C2 servers monthly. |
| T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms |
GroupTA551 | TA551 has used a DGA to generate URLs from executed macros. |
| T1568.003 DNS Calculation |
GroupAPT12 | APT12 has used multiple variants of DNS Calculation including multiplying the first two octets of an IP address and adding the third octet to that value in order to get a resulting command and control port. |
| T1569 System Services |
GroupSalt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon has utilized SNMP daemon to execute commands to include SNMPwalk. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has created new services or modified existing ones to run executables, commands, or scripts. APT38 has also installed a persistent service on targeted hosts to load malicious DLLs at boot. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupBlackByte | BlackByte created malicious services for ransomware execution. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupAPT41 | APT41 used svchost.exe and Net to execute a system service installed to launch a Cobalt Strike BEACON loader. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupAPT32 | APT32's backdoor has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupFIN6 | FIN6 has created Windows services to execute encoded PowerShell commands. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupFIN7 | FIN7 has started the SSH service by executing `sc start sshd`. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupAPT39 | APT39 has used post-exploitation tools including RemCom and the Non-sucking Service Manager (NSSM) to execute processes. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupKe3chang | Ke3chang has used a tool known as RemoteExec (similar to PsExec) to remotely execute batch scripts and binaries. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupBlue Mockingbird | Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs by configuring them to execute via the "wercplsupport" service. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupChimera | Chimera has used PsExec to deploy beacons on compromised systems. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupMedusa Group | Medusa Group has utilized PsExec to execute scripts and commands within victim environments. Medusa Group has also used the Windows service RoboCopy to search and copy data for exfiltration. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupINC Ransom | INC Ransom has run a file encryption executable via `Service Control Manager/7045;winupd,%SystemRoot%\winupd.exe,user mode service,demand start,LocalSystem`. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupSilence | Silence has used Winexe to install a service on the remote system. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupWizard Spider | Wizard Spider has used `services.exe` to execute scripts and executables during lateral movement within a victim's network. Wizard Spider has also used batch scripts that leverage PsExec to execute a previously transferred ransomware payload on a victim's network. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupVelvet Ant | Velvet Ant executed and installed PlugX as a Windows service. |
| T1569.002 Service Execution |
GroupMoonstone Sleet | Moonstone Sleet used intermediate loader malware such as YouieLoader and SplitLoader that create malicious services. |
| T1569.003 Systemctl |
GroupTeamTNT | TeamTNT has created system services to execute cryptocurrency mining software. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.