ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17636 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
MalwareCobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly command can run a .NET executable within the memory of a sacrificial process by loading the CLR.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
MalwareLokibot

Lokibot has reflectively loaded the decoded DLL into memory.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
MalwareIceApple

IceApple can use reflective code loading to load .NET assemblies into `MSExchangeOWAAppPool` on targeted Exchange servers.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
MalwaremetaMain

metaMain has reflectively loaded a DLL to read, decrypt, and load an orchestrator file.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
MalwareBRUSHFIRE

BRUSHFIRE has executed its commands within memory and is not saved on disk.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
MalwareGelsemium

Gelsemium can use custom shellcode to map embedded DLLs into memory.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
MalwareLizar

Lizar has used the Reflective DLL injection module from Github to inject itself into a process’s memory.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
ToolSILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can run a .NET executable within the memory of a sacrificial process by loading the CLR.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
ToolPowerSploit

PowerSploit reflectively loads a Windows PE file into a process.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
ToolBrute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 has used reflective loading to execute malicious DLLs.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
ToolDonut

Donut can generate code modules that enable in-memory execution of VBScript, JScript, EXE, DLL, and dotNET payloads.

T1620
Reflective Code Loading
GroupAPT38

APT38 has configured malicious payloads to reflectively load using the macOS `NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory` API.
APT38 has also reflectively loaded .NET DLLs to bypass disk-based detection.

T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
CampaignC0027

During C0027, Scattered Spider attempted to gain access by continuously sending MFA messages to the victim until they accept the MFA push challenge.

T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
GroupScattered Spider

Scattered Spider has used multifactor authentication (MFA) fatigue by sending repeated MFA authentication requests to targets.

T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
GroupAPT29

APT29 has used repeated MFA requests to gain access to victim accounts.

T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
GroupLAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has spammed target users with MFA prompts in the hope that the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that used the `IsDebuggerPresent` call to detect debuggers.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. Mustang Panda has also made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwarePikabot

Pikabot features several methods to evade debugging by analysts, including checks for active debuggers, the use of breakpoints during execution, and checking various system information items such as system memory and the number of processors.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareBumblebee

Bumblebee can search for tools used in static analysis.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareTONESHELL

TONESHELL has leveraged custom exception handlers to hide code flow and stop execution of a debugger.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwarePUBLOAD

PUBLOAD has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. PUBLOAD has leveraged `OutputDebugStringW` and `OutputDebugStringA` functions.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareMafalda

Mafalda can search for debugging tools on a compromised host.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareRaspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin leverages anti-debugging mechanisms through the use of ThreadHideFromDebugger.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareRustyWater

RustyWater has registered a Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) to catch debugging efforts.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareDRATzarus

DRATzarus can use `IsDebuggerPresent` to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareDarkTortilla

DarkTortilla can detect debuggers by using functions such as `DebuggerIsAttached` and `DebuggerIsLogging`. DarkTortilla can also detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareROKRAT

ROKRAT can check for debugging tools.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwarePlugX

PlugX has made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareLumma Stealer

Lumma Stealer has checked for debugger strings by invoking `GetForegroundWindow` and looks for strings containing “x32dbg”, “x64dbg”, “windbg”, “ollydbg”, “dnspy”, “immunity debugger”, “hyperdbg”, “debug”, “debugger”, “cheat engine”, “cheatengine” and “ida”.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwarePureCrypter

PureCrypter has the ability to call `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareDarkGate

DarkGate checks the BeingDebugged flag in the PEB structure during execution to identify if the malware is being debugged.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareLockBit 3.0

LockBit 3.0 can check heap memory parameters for indications of a debugger and stop the flow of events to the attached debugger in order to hinder dynamic analysis.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareThiefQuest

ThiefQuest uses a function named is_debugging to perform anti-debugging logic. The function invokes sysctl checking the returned value of P_TRACED. ThiefQuest also calls ptrace with the PTRACE_DENY_ATTACH flag to prevent debugging.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareLatrodectus

Latrodectus has the ability to check for the presence of debuggers.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareSaint Bot

Saint Bot has used `is_debugger_present` as part of its environmental checks.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareBlack Basta

The Black Basta dropper can check system flags, CPU registers, CPU instructions, process timing, system libraries, and APIs to determine if a debugger is present.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareStrelaStealer

StrelaStealer variants include functionality to identify and evade debuggers.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareXLoader

XLoader uses anti-debugging mechanisms such as calling `NtQueryInformationProcess` with `InfoClass=7`, referencing `ProcessDebugPort`, to determine if it is being analyzed.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareANELLDR

ANELLDR can call `ZwSetInformationThread` with the second argument set to `ThreadHideFromDebugger (0x11)` to evade being debugged.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareStealBit

StealBit can detect it is being run in the context of a debugger.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
ToolAsyncRAT

AsyncRAT can use the `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` function to detect the presence of a debugger.

T1622
Debugger Evasion
MalwareVidar

Vidar has used the `IsDebuggerPresent` function to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim machine.

T1647
Plist File Modification
MalwareCuckoo Stealer

Cuckoo Stealer can create and populate property list (plist) files to enable execution.

T1647
Plist File Modification
MalwareXCSSET

In older versions, XCSSET uses the plutil command to modify the LSUIElement, DFBundleDisplayName, and CFBundleIdentifier keys in the /Contents/Info.plist file to change how XCSSET is visible on the system. In later versions, XCSSET leverages a third-party notarized `dockutil` tool to modify the `.plist` file responsible for presenting applications to the user in the Dock and LaunchPad to point to a malicious application.

T1648
Serverless Execution
ToolPacu

Pacu can create malicious Lambda functions.

T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
GroupAPT29

APT29 has abused misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate admin users and create additional authentication certificates.

T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
ToolAADInternals

AADInternals can create and export various authentication certificates, including those associated with Azure AD joined/registered devices.

T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
ToolMimikatz

Mimikatz's `CRYPTO` module can create and export various types of authentication certificates.

T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
MalwareMini Shai-Hulud

Mini Shai-Hulud has collected victim client certificates to assist in signed authentication assertion with Azure environments.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.