Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17636 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1587.001 Malware |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries observed that their malware was initially detected by the victims EDR solutions, so they modified the payload and attempted to execute the new version within the same day. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
CampaignC0010 | For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation | Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation involved the development of a new web shell variant, VersaMem. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors developed their own custom webshells to upload to compromised servers. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
CampaignCostaRicto | For CostaRicto, the threat actors used custom malware, including PS1, CostaBricks, and SombRAT. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupIndrik Spider | Indrik Spider has developed malware for their operations, including ransomware such as BitPaymer and WastedLocker. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupSalt Typhoon | Salt Typhoon has used custom tooling including JumbledPath. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupTeamTNT | |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupFIN7 | FIN7 has developed malware for use in operations, including the creation of infected removable media. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupSandworm Team | Sandworm Team has developed malware for its operations, including malicious mobile applications and destructive malware such as NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has developed custom malware for use in their operations. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has deployed custom malware families on Fortinet and VMware systems. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has developed malware that utilizes Qt cross-platform framework to include BeaverTail. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupMoses Staff | Moses Staff has built malware, such as DCSrv and PyDCrypt, for targeting victims' machines. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupOilRig | OilRig actively developed and used a series of downloaders during 2022. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupAoqin Dragon | Aoqin Dragon has used custom malware, including Mongall and Heyoka Backdoor, in their operations. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupKe3chang | Ke3chang has developed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupTurla | Turla has developed its own unique malware for use in operations. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupRedCurl | RedCurl has created its own tools to use during operations. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has used unique malware in many of their operations. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupMirrorFace | MirrorFace has created and continued to develop custom strains of malware including LODEINFO. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupCleaver | Cleaver has created customized tools and payloads for functions including ARP poisoning, encryption, credential dumping, ASP.NET shells, web backdoors, process enumeration, WMI querying, HTTP and SMB communications, network interface sniffing, and keystroke logging. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupLuminousMoth | LuminousMoth has used unique malware for information theft and exfiltration. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has customized existing malware with new capabilities including njRAT, AsyncRAT, LimeRAT, and BitRAT. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupMoonstone Sleet | Moonstone Sleet has developed custom malware, including a malware delivery mechanism masquerading as a legitimate game. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has utilized custom-malware and wipers to include BiBi Wiper. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupPlay | |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has utilized custom malware to maintain persistence in a compromised environment. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has developed and deployed custom malware including TeamPCP Cloud Stealer, CanisterWorm, and Mini Shai-Hulud. |
| T1587.001 Malware |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has generated custom malware. NIMBUS MANTICORE has incorporated AI-generated code in its malware development. |
| T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their malware and the dbxcli utility. |
| T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates |
GroupPatchwork | Patchwork has created self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies that were later used to sign malware. |
| T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates |
GroupPROMETHIUM | PROMETHIUM has created self-signed certificates to sign malicious installers. |
| T1587.002 Code Signing Certificates |
GroupDaggerfly | Daggerfly created code signing certificates to sign malicious macOS files. |
| T1587.003 Digital Certificates |
CampaignJ-magic Campaign | During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors used self-signed certificates on VPS C2 infrastructure. |
| T1587.003 Digital Certificates |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included acquiring digital certificates mimicking patterns associated with Cisco ASA appliances for command and control infrastructure. |
| T1587.003 Digital Certificates |
CampaignC0011 | For C0011, Transparent Tribe established SSL certificates on the typo-squatted domains the group registered. |
| T1587.003 Digital Certificates |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group has used the same TLS certificate across its infrastructure. |
| T1587.003 Digital Certificates |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has utilized their own self-signed TLS certificate “Microsoft IT TLS CA 5” with their infrastructure. |
| T1587.003 Digital Certificates |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has created self-signed digital certificates to enable mutual TLS authentication for malware. |
| T1587.003 Digital Certificates |
GroupPROMETHIUM | PROMETHIUM has created self-signed digital certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic. |
| T1587.004 Exploits |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to research exploitation techniques for an identified SSRF vulnerability, to generate a tailored custom attack payload, and to develop a full exploit chain prior to deployment. |
| T1587.004 Exploits |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has exploited zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access. |
| T1587.004 Exploits |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has used zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2022-41328 against FortiOS and CVE-2023-20867 and CVE-2023-34048 against VMware vCenter. |
| T1587.004 Exploits |
GroupLeviathan | Leviathan has rapidly transformed and adapted public exploit proof-of-concept code for new vulnerabilities and utilized them against target networks. |
| T1587.004 Exploits |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has exploited zero-day vulnerability CVE-2026-35273 against Oracle PeopleSoft application infrastructure. |
| T1587.004 Exploits |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary used Claude Code to create exploit scripts. |
| T1588.001 Malware |
CampaignOperation Spalax | For Operation Spalax, the threat actors obtained malware, including Remcos, njRAT, and AsyncRAT. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.