Link Target

T1608.005

Sub-technique of T1608 Stage Capabilities.View on attack.mitre.org

About this technique

Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in Malicious Link. Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in Spearphishing Link) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in Spearphishing Link), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link.

Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as JavaScript to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during Spearphishing Link. Adversaries may also Upload Malware and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.

Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Malicious Link.

Links can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.

Adversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages. In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links). Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.

Detection rules0

Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1608.005.

Sigma0

No Sigma rules are mapped to this technique yet.

Splunk0

No Splunk rules are mapped to this technique yet.

Groups3

Software0

None recorded.

Campaigns2

Procedure examples5

Groups3

Used byProcedure example
GroupFIN7

FIN7 has created a fake link that redirected to an adversary-controlled Dropbox that downloaded the malicious executable.

GroupLuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has created a link to a Dropbox file that has been used in their spear-phishing operations.

GroupSilent Librarian

Silent Librarian has cloned victim organization login pages and staged them for later use in credential harvesting campaigns. Silent Librarian has also made use of a variety of URL shorteners for these staged websites.

Campaigns2

Used byProcedure example
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū

During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used links to direct victims to malicious files hosted on OneDrive.

CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors established an Okta phishing panel which victims were tricked into accessing from mobile phones or work computers during social engineering calls.

References13

  1. Cofense-redirect Open source
    Raymond, Nathaniel. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 17, 2024.
  2. Intezer App Service Phishing Open source
    Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  3. Kaspersky-masking Open source
    Dedenok, Roman. (2023, December 12). How cybercriminals disguise URLs. Retrieved January 17, 2024.
  4. Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020 Open source
    Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.
  5. Netskope Cloud Phishing Open source
    Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  6. Netskope GCP Redirection Open source
    Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.
  7. Proofpoint TA407 September 2019 Open source
    Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.
  8. Talos IPFS 2022 Open source
    Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.
  9. URI Open source
    Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  10. URI Unique Open source
    Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  11. URI Use Open source
    Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  12. iOS URL Scheme Open source
    Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  13. mandiant-masking Open source
    Simonian, Nick. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved January 17, 2024.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.