ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17136 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1572
Protocol Tunneling
ToolFRP

FRP can tunnel SSH and Unix Domain Socket communications over TCP between external nodes and exposed resources behind firewalls or NAT.

T1572
Protocol Tunneling
ToolBrute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 can use DNS over HTTPS for C2.

T1572
Protocol Tunneling
ToolMythic

Mythic can use SOCKS proxies to tunnel traffic through another protocol.

T1572
Protocol Tunneling
MalwareDuqu

Duqu uses a custom command and control protocol that communicates over commonly used ports, and is frequently encapsulated by application layer protocols.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
CampaignKV Botnet Activity

KV Botnet Activity command and control activity includes transmission of an RSA public key in communication from the server, but this is followed by subsequent negotiation stages that represent a form of handshake similar to TLS negotiation.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
CampaignTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack

In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles used cryptcat binaries to encrypt their traffic.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupTropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has encrypted traffic with the C2 to prevent network detection.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupBITTER

BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupAPT29

APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
GroupMagic Hound

Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareRCSession

RCSession can use an encrypted beacon to check in with C2.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareNETWIRE

NETWIRE can encrypt C2 communications.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareGomir

Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm for content sent to command and control infrastructure.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareEmotet

Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwarePowerLess

PowerLess can use an encrypted channel for C2 communications.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareChaes

Chaes has used encryption for its C2 channel.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
Malwaregh0st RAT

gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareCryptoistic

Cryptoistic can engage in encrypted communications with C2.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareMacMa

MacMa has used TLS encryption to initialize a custom protocol for C2 communications.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwarePowGoop

PowGoop can receive encrypted commands from C2.

T1573
Encrypted Channel
MalwareLizar

Lizar can support encrypted communications between the client and server.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
CampaignOperation Dream Job

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used an AES key to communicate with their C2 server.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
CampaignFrankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors communicated with C2 via an encrypted RC4 byte stream and AES-CBC.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 malware used the RC4 cipher to encrypt outgoing C2 messages.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack

During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus's VEILEDSIGNAL communication module supports three commands to conduct the following actions: send implant data, execute shellcode, and terminate itself.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupVolt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has used a version of the Awen web shell that employed AES encryption and decryption for C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupMuddyWater

MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4. Mustang Panda has also leveraged encryption and compression algorithms to obfuscate the traffic between the system and C2 server, methods observed included RC4, AES, XOR with 0x5a, and LZO.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used AES encrypted communications in C2.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has encrypted C2 traffic using RC4.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupHigaisa

Higaisa used AES-128 to encrypt C2 traffic.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupRedCurl

RedCurl has used AES-128 CBC to encrypt C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupStealth Falcon

Stealth Falcon malware encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a hard-coded key.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupBRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used RC4 encryption (for Datper malware) and AES (for xxmm malware) to obfuscate HTTP traffic. BRONZE BUTLER has also used a tool called RarStar that encodes data with a custom XOR algorithm when posting it to a C2 server.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupDarkhotel

Darkhotel has used AES-256 and 3DES for C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupAPT28

APT28 installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupLazarus Group

Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupInception

Inception has encrypted network communications with AES.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupAPT33

APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareTrickBot

TrickBot uses a custom crypter leveraging Microsoft’s CryptoAPI to encrypt C2 traffic.Newer versions of TrickBot have been known to use `bcrypt` to encrypt and digitally sign responses to their C2 server.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareBLINDINGCAN

BLINDINGCAN has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareNinja

Ninja can XOR and AES encrypt C2 messages.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwarePikabot

Earlier Pikabot variants use a custom encryption procedure leveraging multiple mechanisms including AES with multiple rounds of Base64 encoding for its command and control communication. Later Pikabot variants eliminate the use of AES and instead use RC4 encryption for transmitted information.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareBumblebee

Bumblebee can encrypt C2 requests and responses with RC4

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareTorisma

Torisma has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareStuxnet

Stuxnet encodes the payload of system information sent to the command and control servers using a one byte 0xFF XOR key. Stuxnet also uses a 31-byte long static byte string to XOR data sent to command and control servers. The servers use a different static key to encrypt replies to the implant.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareDowndelph

Downdelph uses RC4 to encrypt C2 responses.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareRotaJakiro

RotaJakiro encrypts C2 communication using a combination of AES, XOR, ROTATE encryption, and ZLIB compression.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareSardonic

Sardonic has the ability to use an RC4 key to encrypt communications to and from actor-controlled C2 servers.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
MalwareEmissary

The C2 server response to a beacon sent by a variant of Emissary contains a 36-character GUID value that is used as an encryption key for subsequent network communications. Some variants of Emissary use various XOR operations to encrypt C2 data.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.