ATT&CKProcedure examples

Procedure examples

Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.

17136 examples

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareDisco

Disco has been executed through inducing user interaction with malicious .zip and .msi files.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareOctopus

Octopus has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareQilin

Qilin has been delivered to victims through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareAppleJeus

AppleJeus has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareSTARWHALE

STARWHALE has relied on victims opening a malicious Excel file for execution.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareAgent Tesla

Agent Tesla has been executed through malicious e-mail attachments

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareAstaroth

Astaroth has used malicious files including VBS, LNK, and HTML for execution.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareQakBot

QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious attachments.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareSYSCON

SYSCON has been executed by luring victims to open malicious e-mail attachments.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareHancitor

Hancitor has used malicious Microsoft Word documents, sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareDridex

Dridex has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareOSX/Shlayer

OSX/Shlayer has relied on users mounting and executing a malicious DMG file.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareJSS Loader

JSS Loader has been executed through malicious attachments contained in spearphishing emails.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareWarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT has relied on a victim to open a malicious attachment within an email for execution.

T1204.002
Malicious File
ToolCSPY Downloader

CSPY Downloader has been delivered via malicious documents with embedded macros.

T1204.002
Malicious File
ToolCARROTBALL

CARROTBALL has been executed through users being lured into opening malicious e-mail attachments.

T1204.002
Malicious File
ToolAsyncRAT

AsyncRAT has been executed through victims opening malicious file attachments.

T1204.002
Malicious File
ToolBrute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 has gained execution through users opening malicious documents.

T1204.002
Malicious File
ToolRemcos

Remcos has been executed by luring victims into opening malicious email attachments including Excel files.

T1204.002
Malicious File
MalwareBADFLICK

BADFLICK has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.

T1204.003
Malicious Image
GroupTeamTNT

TeamTNT has relied on users to download and execute malicious Docker images.

T1204.004
Malicious Copy and Paste
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious code.

T1204.004
Malicious Copy and Paste
GroupMuddyWater

MuddyWater has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious PowerShell code.

T1204.004
Malicious Copy and Paste
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious code.

T1204.004
Malicious Copy and Paste
MalwareHavoc

The Havoc infection chain has been initiated via ClickFix lures in phishing emails.

T1204.004
Malicious Copy and Paste
MalwareKali365

Kali365 has dynamically generated legitimate device codes that displays on the victims screen alongside instructions to copy and paste the device code to initiate and complete a successful authentication process.

T1204.005
Malicious Library
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has relied on users to install a malicious library from a code repository to infect the victim's device and has led to additional payload distribution and theft of sensitive data.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
CampaignRedPenguin

During RedPenguin, UNC3886 leveraged malware capable of inpecting packets for a magic-string to activate backdoor functionalities.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
CampaignCutting Edge

During Cutting Edge, threat actors sent a magic 48-byte sequence to enable the PITSOCK backdoor to communicate via the `/tmp/clientsDownload.sock` socket.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
GroupKimsuky

Kimsuky has used TRANSLATEXT to redirect clients to legitimate Gmail, Naver or Kakao pages if the clients connect with no parameters.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
GroupMustang Panda

Mustang Panda has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values of “17 03 03” or “46 77 4d”.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
GroupUNC3886

UNC3886 has used the TABLEFLIP traffic redirection utility to listen for specialized command packets on compromised FortiManager devices.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareTONESHELL

TONESHELL has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareBUSHWALK

BUSHWALK can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareJ-magic

J-magic can monitor TCP traffic for packets containing one of five different predefined parameters and will spawn a reverse shell if one of the parameters and the proper response string to a subsequent challenge is received.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwarePUBLOAD

PUBLOAD has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values of 17 03 03. PUBLOAD has also used magic bytes consisting of 46 77 4d.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareUmbreon

Umbreon provides additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareTRANSLATEXT

TRANSLATEXT has redirected clients to legitimate Gmail, Naver or Kakao pages if the clients connect with no parameters.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareREPTILE

The REPTILE reverse shell component can listen for a specialized packet in TCP, UDP, or ICMP for activation.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareChaos

Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareUroburos

Uroburos can intercept the first client to server packet in the 3-way TCP handshake to determine if the packet contains the correct unique value for a specific Uroburos implant. If the value does not match, the packet and the rest of the TCP session are passed to the legitimate listening application.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareSYNful Knock

SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareWinnti for Linux

Winnti for Linux has used a passive listener, capable of identifying a specific magic value before executing tasking, as a secondary command and control (C2) mechanism.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareKobalos

Kobalos is triggered by an incoming TCP connection to a legitimate service from a specific source port.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareRyuk

Ryuk has used Wake-on-Lan to power on turned off systems for lateral movement.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwarePandora

Pandora can identify if incoming HTTP traffic contains a token and if so it will intercept the traffic and process the received command.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwarePenquin

Penquin will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareZIPLINE

ZIPLINE can identify a specific string in intercepted network traffic, `SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_0.3xx.`, to trigger its command functionality.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareBRUSHFIRE

BRUSHFIRE has monitored inbound VPN traffic to compromised appliances until specific inbound packets contain a specific magic string/pattern instead of external beaconing.

T1205
Traffic Signaling
MalwareMini Shai-Hulud

Mini Shai-Hulud has examined commit messages for a keyword followed by base64 encoded segments to validate communications and to execute subsequent actions to include exfiltration.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.